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SUMMARY
This dissertation consists of three studies on choice-based revenue management. All
these studies are motivated by applications that arise in real-world business settings and
have not been well addressed in the literature. The unifying theme of these studies is
finding appropriate models to account for customer choice behavior while solving the cor-
responding revenue optimization problems effectively. Chapter 2 considers a network rev-
enue management problem for airlines, where airline customers tend to purchase on price.
Chapter 3 explores a dynamic load pricing problem in truckload marketplaces from market
makers’ perspective, where carriers exhibit choice behavior on loads. Chapter 4 studies as-
sortment optimization problems in which some customers are rigid about the products they
want while others are willing to substitute if their most preferred products are not available.
We propose novel problem formulations, give efficient solution methods, derive insights in




Over the past decades, discrete choice models have received significant attention in the
research and practice of revenue management to capture customer choice behavior, giv-
ing rise to choice-based revenue management. As opposed to a traditional approach that
assumes that each customer only purchases a predetermined product, choice-based rev-
enue management accounts for the fact that customers substitute among available products
or simply leave without purchasing if their preferred products are unavailable. It is not
surprising that choice-based revenue management has been reported to provide significant
improvements in revenue generation.
While various discrete choice models have been proposed and studied in the revenue
management context, there is a gap between the fruitful findings in academia and indus-
try practices. Companies who implement choice-based revenue management usually only
adopt simple models, e.g., the multinomial logit choice model, or turn to black-box ma-
chine learning methods that are ready to apply but provide few managerial insights. A
more sophisticated choice model may capture customer choice behavior more faithfully,
but a more straightforward choice model typically results in tractable revenue optimization
problems. This dilemma prohibits the advancement of choice-based revenue management
in practice and many benefits it can provide.
This dissertation strives to narrow the gap by balancing between the sophistication of
choice modeling and the tractability of revenue optimization. In particular, we formulate
revenue management problems under discrete choice models motivated by evidence ob-
served from real-world applications. We characterize structures of the optimal solutions,
provide efficient solution methods or tractable approximations, derive key managerial in-
sights, and develop near-optimal operational strategies.
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Chapter 2 considers a revenue management problem under a spiked multinomial logit
model. This study is motivated by our collaboration with an airline partner. We observe a
prominent phenomenon in our airline partner’s booking data that a disproportionate num-
ber of customers would purchase a product when it becomes the cheapest available one
in the offered set of alternatives. The classic multinomial logit model cannot capture this
phenomenon. Thus, we adopt a variant of the multinomial logit model, the spiked multi-
nomial logit model, that accommodates the phenomenon, and formulate a network revenue
management problem for airlines. Due to the “curse of dimensionality,” we study a de-
terministic approximation of the problem. We show that the approximation can be solved
efficiently by solving a small linear program. We use the solution of the small linear pro-
gram to construct a booking limit policy and prove that the policy is asymptotically optimal:
Roughly speaking, the policy achieves near-optimal performance when the market is large.
To our knowledge, this is the first such result for a booking limit policy under a discrete
choice model.
Chapter 3 considers a dynamic load pricing problem for truckload transportation mar-
ketplaces. The study is motivated by the emergence of online truckload marketplaces,
where a market maker buys transportation services from carriers and sells transportation
services to shippers. In these marketplaces, shippers often enter into long-term contracts
with the market maker, and the market maker secures shipping capacity from carriers in a
real-time market. Therefore, it is crucial for the market maker to adjust its offered price
to carriers for each load based on the dynamics of supply (shipping capacity of carriers)
and demand (load requests from shippers). While there are previous studies on truckload
pricing problems, we notice few that consider carriers’ random choice behavior, which is
an essential part of the market dynamics. We use a multinomial logit model to incorporate
carriers’ random choice behavior and formulate the market maker’s dynamic load pricing
problem as a Markov decision process. We study a discrete-time fluid approximation of
the problem and propose a simple pricing policy based on its solution. We show that the
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proposed policy is asymptotically optimal with a loss ratio of order O(1/θ), where θ rep-
resents the scale of shipper demand and carrier supply. This loss ratio is surprisingly lower
than the usual O(1/
√
θ) loss ratio reported in the revenue management literature. We also
present a continuous-time fluid model and discuss the managerial insights provided by its
solution.
Chapter 4 considers assortment optimization problems when customers choose under
a mixture of multinomial logit and independent demand models. Using a mixture of these
two models is arguably the most natural approach to combine the representational power
of both models. It is also motivated by plausible purchase behavior: Some customers are
rigid about the products they want, while others are willing to substitute if their preferred
ones are not available. Assortment optimization problems under mixtures of choice models
are notoriously difficult. So, it is surprising as we show that the single-shot assortment
optimization problem under our mixture choice model is efficiently solvable. We provide
a polynomial-sized linear program formulation and a combinatorial algorithm for solving
the single-shot assortment optimization problem. To our knowledge, we are the first to
give efficient methods for assortment optimization under a mixture of choice models. We
also formulate an assortment-based network revenue management problem. We reduce a
standard linear programming approximation of the problem with an exponential number of
variables to an equivalent one of substantially smaller size.
3
CHAPTER 2
NETWORK REVENUE MANAGEMENT UNDER A SPIKED MULTINOMIAL
LOGIT CHOICE MODEL
2.1 Overview
Revenue management is widely used by airlines to maximize revenues through optimizing
inventory control and pricing. Most airlines have a number of fare classes for each itinerary,
where an itinerary refers to a timed sequence of flights. Each fare class has certain booking
rules (e.g., change fees and frequent flyer credits) and a price that for revenue management
purposes is regarded as predetermined. Airlines then control prices by opening or closing
fare classes. We refer to a combination of an itinerary and a fare class as a product. Thus,
a basic decision in airline revenue management is to select which subset of products to
offer to customers at each point in time. The subset of products made available to cus-
tomers is called an assortment, and the problem of selecting a subset to maximize revenue
is known as assortment optimization. Airlines dynamically adjust assortments based on the
remaining seats on flights and the time until departure. The assortment decisions need to be
considered jointly for the flights in an airline network, because some itineraries use capacity
on multiple flights and because customers may substitute among different itineraries. The
scale of airline networks makes solving assortment optimization problems challenging.
One of the most popular choice models is the multinomial logit (MNL) model. The
MNL model has an easily interpretable structure, and the parameter estimation problem
as well as the assortment optimization problem and the price optimization problem under
the MNL model are tractable [1, 2, 3]. However, the MNL model falls victim to the inde-
pendence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property, which states that the relative choice
probabilities of two alternatives do not depend on the presence of other alternatives in the
4
choice set. This can be severely restrictive for modeling the choice behavior of airline cus-
tomers, among others for the following reason. It has been noticed that significantly more
customers tend to choose the cheapest fare class among a considered set of available prod-
ucts than predicted by the MNL model, for example, most customers who book a ticket
choose the cheapest available fare class for their chosen flight [4, 5]. This phenomenon
violates the IIA property. For example, Figure 2.1 shows an airline’s booking data for a
specific flight. The fare classes are ordered such that Class 1 has the highest price and
Class 8 has the lowest price. In the left figure, we show the fraction of bookings in each
fare class for the flight when all eight fare classes are open. In the right figure, we show the
fraction of bookings in each fare class for the flight when only Classes 1 to 7 are open. Note
that in both cases, the cheapest available fare class (Class 8 on the left and Class 7 on the
right) receives more than 60% of bookings. Moreover, the fraction of bookings in Class 7 is
significantly more than that in Class 6 when Class 7 is the cheapest available fare class (on
the right), but the fraction of bookings in Class 7 is less than that in Class 6 when Class 7
is not the cheapest available fare class (on the left). Since the ratio between the fractions of
bookings in Class 7 and Class 6 is affected by the inclusion of other alternatives (such as
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Figure 2.1: Historical booking data
We refer to the above phenomenon as “the spike effect,” i.e., a disproportionate number
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of customers (than predicted by the MNL model) buy the cheapest available fare class
on each flight. To capture the spike effect, we consider an extension of the MNL model
that has separate preference weights for the cheapest products among the offered sets of
available products. We call this the spiked multinomial logit (spiked-MNL) choice model,
which was first introduced by [5].
Main Contributions: We characterize the structure of assortments that are Pareto-
optimal, provide a tractable approximation, and show asymptotic optimality of a booking
limit policy built on the solution of the approximation.
Assortment Optimization. Motivated by empirical data from airlines, we adopt a spiked-
MNL model introduced previously and further study its properties. We formulate a dy-
namic assortment optimization problem under the spiked-MNL model as a Markov deci-
sion process. We establish that the efficient sets, which offer a Pareto-optimal trade-off
between revenue and resource usage, are nested-by-revenue assortments under the spiked-
MNL model (Theorem 2.4).
Linear Program Approximation. We consider a deterministic (fluid) approximation of
the network revenue management problem under the spiked-MNL model, known as the
choice-based deterministic linear program (CDLP). Even though this linear program has
exponentially many variables, we prove that it can be solved in polynomial time by solving
an equivalent sales-based linear program (SBLP) and by exploiting the nested-by-revenue
structure of efficient sets (Theorem 2.7).
Asymptotic Optimal Policy. We show how the CDLP solution can be used to construct
a nested booking limit policy of the form widely used in practice, and we prove the asymp-
totic optimality of such a booking limit policy (Theorem 2.8). To our knowledge, this is the
first such result for booking limit policy in the assortment optimization setting. To deal with
the randomness of assortments resulting from applying the booking limit policy, our proof




There is an extensive body of literature on assortment optimization [6, 7]. Our litera-
ture review below focuses on papers that study assortment optimization for airlines under
customer choice behavior, which are the most relevant for our work. The idea of airline
assortment optimization can be traced back to traditional revenue management methodol-
ogy such as Littlewood’s proposal for controlling the availability of two fare classes [8].
Traditional demand models assume that each customer comes with a request for a prede-
termined product (flight and fare class combination). The seller then decides whether to
accept or reject the customer’s request. Revenue management under this traditional in-
dependent demand assumption is surveyed in [9]. As ignoring customer choice behavior
may lead to cascading deterioration of revenue performance [10], some partial modeling
remedies such as buy-downs and buy-ups, or spill-and-recapture, have been proposed to
incorporate demand substitution [11, 12, 13].
More recently, choice-based demand models have been studied more widely [14]. The
authors in [15] consider the problem of assortment optimization under a general choice
model for a single flight, which is formulated as a dynamic program. Due to the curse of
dimensionality, the computational burden of solving the dynamic program increases expo-
nentially from a single flight to parallel flights, and to general airline networks. Therefore,
a choice-based deterministic linear program (CDLP) is proposed in [16] as an approxima-
tion of the dynamic program. The solution of the CDLP can be used to build good control
policies. For example, [17] extends the concept of efficient sets from [15] and proves that
the policy based on the the CDLP solution is asymptotically optimal for the dynamic pro-
gram. Even though the number of efficient sets usually is much less than the number of
subsets, there could still be exponentially many efficient sets and thus exponentially many
decision variables for the CDLP. Therefore, [17] also suggests solving the CDLP using
column generation. Recently, [18] proposes a SBLP formulation for general attraction de-
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mand models, including the MNL model. The SBLP has a polynomial number of variables
under the MNL model and is equivalent to the CDLP. For alternative approaches of ap-
proximating the dynamic program, we refer readers to [19] for approximation of the value
functions, and [20] for a segment-based deterministic concave program.
In addition to assortment optimization under general choice models, many researchers
have considered assortment optimization for more specific choice models. Among all these
models, the MNL model is one of the most studied ones [1, 2, 17, 21, 22, 18]. The MNL
model has many favorable properties, such as the maximum likelihood estimation problem,
the assortment optimization problem, and the optimal pricing problem, being easy to solve.
Also, some structure results on the optimal assortment or the pricing decision are presented
under the MNL model. For example, the optimal policy of the assortment optimization
problem under the MNL model is nested-by-fare-order for single flight revenue manage-
ment [15]. Other choice models that have been considered in the assortment optimization
literature include robust MNL [23, 24], nested logit [25, 26, 27], mixed [28, 29], Markov
chain [30], and rank-based choice models [31, 32].
Typical airline reservation control systems use either booking limits [33, 34] or bid-
prices [35] to control the availability of fare classes. Originally, these controls were moti-
vated by the structure of optimal booking controls for single flights under the independent
demand model. Although optimal booking controls can not be implemented in general with
booking limits or bid prices, it nevertheless is of practical importance to find good booking
controls that can be implemented with an airline’s reservation control system.
The spike effect has been noticed in the airline industry before [4]. However, we are not
aware of any research besides [5] and [36] that considers the spike effect in choice models.
As shown in the example in Figure 2.1, the spike effect cannot be represented by the MNL
choice model. Therefore, both [5] and [36] use an extension of the MNL model, i.e., the
spiked-MNL model, to incorporate the spike effect.
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2.3 Problem Formulation
We consider a revenue management problem with a network of flights, marketed by a
single decision maker, which depart during a considered time period, such as one day. Let
F denote the set of flights, and let m := |F| denote the number of flights. For each flight
f ∈ F , let cf denote the seat capacity of flight f , and let c := (cf , f ∈ F) ∈ Zm+ . An
itinerary consists of a subset of flights, including a single flight or a sequence of connecting
flights. Let G denote the set of itineraries. For each itinerary, the airline has a number of fare
classes, each of which specifies a price and is associated with certain booking rules, e.g.,
refundability. A product is a combination of an itinerary and a fare class for that itinerary.
Let J denote the set of products, and let n := |J | denote the number of products. For each
flight f ∈ F and product j ∈ J , let ajf ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether product j uses a seat on
flight f , and let aj := (ajf , f ∈ F) ∈ {0, 1}m. Let rj denote the net revenue of product j,
and let r := (rj, j ∈ J ) ∈ Rn. For each itinerary g ∈ G, let J g denote the set of products
for itinerary g, and let n(g) := |J g|, i.e., the number of fare classes for the itinerary.
The selling horizon is partitioned into discrete periods indexed by t = 1, . . . , T . We
assume that the time periods are sufficiently short so that there is at most one customer
arrival in each period. In each period t, the airline selects an assortment A(t) ⊂ J to offer
to customers. Each customer considers only a subset of the products in J for purchase. For
example, a customer who wants to travel from origin A to destination B, considers only
the products for itineraries that start at A and end at B. If a customer arrives in period t, let
C(t) ⊂ J denote the consideration set of the customer. Let j = 0 denote the alternative
always available to each customer that one can buy nothing from the airline, also called the
no-purchase alternative or the null alternative. Let S(t) := A(t)∩C(t). Thus, if a customer
arrives in period t, then the customer chooses an alternative in the customer’s choice set
S(t) ∪ {0}. We assume that the collection of possible consideration sets form a partition
of J , such that each subset in the partition contains all the products for some subset of
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itineraries. For example, if each customer is interested in one origin-destination pair, then
the consideration sets form a partition of J with each subset in the partition consisting of
the products for itineraries for one origin-destination pair. Let H be an index set for the
collection of consideration sets (for example, H denotes the set of origin-destination pairs
in the network), and let {J (h) : h ∈ H} denote the partition of J . Then, for each t,
C(t) = J (h) for some h ∈ H. Each h ∈ H will also be called a market. Note that either
all the products for an itinerary g serve a market h or none of the products for itinerary g
serves market h, that is, if any product j ∈ J g satisfies j ∈ J (h), then J g ⊂ J (h), and
thus we sometimes write g ∈ J (h). In each period t, a customer arrives with consideration
set C(t) = J (h) with probability λh(t). With probability 1 −
∑
h∈H λh(t), no customer
arrives in period t. If a customer arrives in period t with consideration set C(t) = J (h),
then the customer chooses product j ∈ S(t) with probability P hj:S(t)(t) or chooses the no-














denote the conditional probability, given that a customer arrives in period t, that j is chosen
if A is offered, let




























denote the expected revenue per customer arrival if A is offered. The arrival types (no
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arrival or type h arrival) in different time periods are independent. Also, given the as-
sortments A(t) in different time periods t, the customer choices in the time periods are
independent.
Given the initial capacity c of each flight, the airline dynamically selects an assortment
for each period t in order to maximize the expected total revenue. We present a dynamic
programming model of the revenue management problem. Let cf (t) denote the remaining
capacity of flight f at time t, and let c(t) := (cf (t), f ∈ F) ∈ Zm+ . For any c ∈ Zm+ ,
let Jc := {j ∈ J : cf ≥ ajf ∀ f ∈ F} denote the set of products that can be offered
with remaining capacities given by c. Let Vt : Zm+ → R denote the optimal revenue-to-go



































rj − (Vt+1(c)− Vt+1(c− aj))
]
+ Vt+1(c). (2.1)
The boundary conditions are Vt(0) = 0 for all t and VT+1(c) = 0 for all c ∈ Zm+ . In the
remainder of the chapter, we omit the time index t, because time-dependence is easy to
incorporate in the model and in the results at the cost of more cumbersome notation.
2.4 The Spiked-MNL Choice Model
In this section, we define the spiked-MNL choice model and discuss its properties. The
spiked-MNL choice model is adopted from the modified MNL model in [5] and [36] to
capture the effect of cheapest fare spikes. To simplify notation, in this section we omit the
market index h, since each customer is associated with one market h.
11
For every product j ∈ J , the model has two parameters wj > 0, vj > 0. The quantity
wj represents the special preference weight of product j when it is the cheapest available
fare class for its itinerary; otherwise, product j has a regular preference weight of vj . We
assume that the cheapest fare spikes are nonnegative, i.e., wj ≥ vj > 0 for all products
j ∈ J . This is consistent with the airline data that motivated this model. The preference
weight of the null alternative is denoted with v0 and is called the null preference weight.
Suppose the customer’s choice set is S ∪{0}. Let I(j, S) denote the indicator such that
I(j, S) = 1 if j is the cheapest available fare class in S for its itinerary, and I(j, S) = 0
otherwise. The spiked-MNL model specifies that product j ∈ S is chosen with probability
Pj:S =
vj(1− I(j, S)) + wjI(j, S)
v0 +
∑
j′∈S [vj′(1− I(j′, S)) + wj′I(j′, S)]
.





j′∈S [vj′(1− I(j′, S)) + wj′I(j′, S)]
.
Recall that in the MNL model, given a choice set S ∪ {0}, a customer chooses product











respectively. Therefore, in the spiked-MNL model, when wj = vj for all j ∈ J , the
spiked-MNL model reduces to the MNL model.
We observed that the spiked-MNL model defined above fits airline booking data better
than the MNL model. Figure 2.2 provides a typical example on using the MNL and the
spiked-MNL models to predict customer bookings . Specifically, in this example presented
by Figure 2.2, seven fare classes are open on a given flight. The solid black line corresponds
to the the actual fractions of bookings of the seven fare classes (conditioned on a booking
12
of this flight), as well as the predicted fractions of the MNL and the spiked-MNL models
calibrated with the same data. Clearly, the prediction of the spiked-MNL model is much
closer to the actual data compared to the prediction of the MNL model. We refer readers to
[5] for more examples and a discussion on the prediction performance of the spiked-MNL




















































Figure 2.2: Actual and estimated fractions of bookings under the MNL and the spiked-
MNL models
We would like to emphasize the difference between the MNL model and the spiked-
MNL model in the context of random utility model. Under the MNL model, the utility that
a customer associates with product j is given by Uj = Vj +εj , where Vj is the deterministic
component of the utility, and εj is an i.i.d. Gumbel random variable that introduces hetero-
geneity in the customer population. The deterministic component of the utility Vj is often
written as a linear combination of the individual feature values of product j. In contrast,
the spiked-MNL model assumes that the deterministic component Vj depends not only on
the features of the product itself, but also on the features of the other products that poten-
tially could be offered alongside product j. In our definition of the spiked-MNL model, the
deterministic component of the utility is affected by the prices of other products; namely,
if product j is the cheapest among a group of products offered, i.e., fare classes on the the
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same itinerary, its deterministic utility component Vj receives an additional spike. We also
provide discussions on several properties of the spiked-MNL model in Appendix A.1.
2.5 Efficient Assortments under the Spiked-MNL Model
In some settings, an optimal policy offers only assortments, called efficient sets, that are
Pareto optimal in terms of expected revenue and expected resource consumption. For
example, for single flight revenue management, an optimal policy offers efficient sets
only, and furthermore that under the MNL choice model, the efficient sets are nested-by-
revenue [15]. If each product uses a unit of capacity on one flight, as in the case of parallel
flight revenue management, then an optimal policy uses efficient sets only [17]. However,
an optimal policy does not in general use efficient sets only, because the displacement cost
Vt(c)− Vt(c− aj) in (2.1) is not in general linear in aj .
In this section, we show that under the spiked-MNL model, efficient sets are nested-by-
revenue. That is, if a fare class for an itinerary is open, then all fare classes for the same
itinerary with higher fares are also open. In Section 2.6 we consider a fluid approximation
of the network revenue management problem. For such problems, optimal solutions use
efficient sets only. Therefore, optimal solutions of the fluid approximation under the spiked-
MNL model offers only assortments that are nested-by-revenue.
2.5.1 Efficient Sets
First, we review the concept of efficient sets. In this section the time index t is omitted,
since the concept will be applied to each t.
Definition 2.1 (Efficient Sets). An assortment S ⊂ J is said to be inefficient if a mixture
of other assortments has strictly higher expected revenue with the same or lower expected
resource consumption. That is, there exists a set of weights {µ(A) : A ⊂ J } satisfying
14
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µ(A)R(A) and Qf (S) ≥
∑
A⊂J
µ(A)Qf (A) for all f ∈ F .
An assortment that is not inefficient is said to be efficient.
The following lemma gives a necessary condition for an assortment to be efficient, and
will be used to prove Theorem 2.4.
Lemma 2.2. If an assortment S is efficient, then there exists a γ ∈ Rn, satisfying γj > γj′









For single flight revenue management under the MNL model, the efficient sets are nested-
by-revenue, that is, if an efficient set contains a product j, then it also contains all products
with higher fares than j [15]. Moreover, the efficient sets are nested-by-revenue under
the MNL model even when the model parameters are uncertain [24]. Below we give the
natural extension of the concept of assortments that are nested-by-revenue for network
revenue management, and we show that the efficient sets under the spiked-MNL model are
nested-by-revenue.
Definition 2.3 (Nested-by-Revenue Assortments). An assortment S is nested-by-revenue if
for any product j ∈ S, all products associated with the same itinerary as j and with higher
revenues than j are also in the assortment. That is, S is nested-by-revenue if for any j ∈ S,
it holds that J(j) ⊂ S.
Theorem 2.4. Every efficient set under the spiked-MNL model is nested-by-revenue.
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The theorem implies that if we restrict our attention to efficient sets, the number of
possible assortments can be significantly reduced: for an itinerary g ∈ G that has n(g) fare
classes, rather than considering all 2n(g) possible combinations, we only need to consider
the n(g) nested-by-revenue fare class combinations. However, we note that the total num-
ber of efficient sets is still exponential in the number of itineraries. In Section 2.6, we will
show that the structural result from Theorem 2.4 leads to a tractable linear programming
formulation of the fluid approximation of the dynamic program, whose size is polynomial
in the number of itineraries.
Remark 2.5. Recall that we assume the spike effect is nonnegative throughout the chapter,
that is, wj ≥ vj . If wj < vj , then the result of Theorem 2.4 does not hold in general. See
the following counterexample.
Example 2.6. A seller sells three products: H, M, and L, with revenues rH = 5, rM = 3,
and rL = 2, using the same resource. The preference weights are vH = 5, vM = 10,
wH = 2, wM = 4, and wL = 1 (we don’t need to specify vL); the null preference weight is
v0 = 10. Figure 2.3 shows the plot of (Q(S), R(S)) and its convex envelope. This convex
envelope represents the Pareto-optimal frontier. By Definition 2.1, all efficient sets are on
the Pareto-optimal frontier. Note that assortment {H,L} is on the Pareto-optimal frontier
and hence an efficient set, but it is not nested-by-revenue.
2.6 Deterministic Approximation and Static Booking Limit Control
The dynamic program (2.1) is intractable for large networks due to the curse of dimension-
ality. This motivates us to consider a fluid approximation of the dynamic program. A fluid
approximation often used in the revenue management literature is the choice-based deter-
ministic linear program (CDLP), that we present in Section 2.6.1. For both general choice
models and the spiked-MNL model, the CDLP has exponentially many variables. In Sec-
tion 2.6.2 we present a compact formulation which is equivalent to the CDLP and has only
16

















Figure 2.3: Efficient sets under a spiked-MNL model with wj < vj
n variables. Solutions of the compact formulation can be used to construct various booking
control policies, including static booking limit policies that are studied in Section 2.7.
2.6.1 Choice-Based Deterministic Linear Program
The choice-based deterministic linear program (CDLP) is an approximation of dynamic
program (2.1) in which customer arrivals and choices are replaced by their means, and
capacity and demand are modeled as real-valued rather than integer valued [16]. Let deci-
sion variable α(A) denote the fraction of time that assortment A ⊂ J is offered, and let




























j:A∩J (h) ≤ cf ∀ f ∈ F . (2.3c)
The objective (2.3a) of the CDLP is the expected total revenue over the horizon. Con-
straint (2.3b) specifies that the sum of the fractions of time that different assortments are
offered is less than 1. In the remaining 1−
∑
A⊂J α(A) fraction of time, all the fare classes
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are closed and the company offers an empty set. Constraint (2.3c) enforce seat capacity
constraints.
The authors of [17] showed that optimal solutions of problem (2.3) use efficient sets
only. Theorem 2.4 established that every efficient set under the spiked-MNL model is
nested-by-revenue. Thus, under the spiked-MNL model, if assortment A is not nested-by-
revenue, then decision variable α(A) can be omitted. Therefore the number of decision












is the number of fare classes on itinerary g ∈ G. However, the reduced number of decision
variables still is exponential in the number of itineraries. This motivates us to develop an
equivalent LP formulation with a polynomial size in the next section.
2.6.2 Sales-Based Linear Program
Under the MNL model, there is an LP formulation called the sales-based linear program
(SBLP), which has a polynomial number of variables and constraints, and which is equiv-
alent to the CDLP [18]. An SBLP formulation is developed for the spiked-MNL model
in [5]. Next we use the result of Theorem 2.4 to develop an SBLP formulation for the
spiked-MNL choice model that has fewer variables and constraints than its counterpart
in [5].
Our SBLP formulation takes into account that all assortments offered by an optimal
solution are nested-by-revenue. Let xj denote the sales of product j when j is the cheapest
available product for its associated itinerary, and let x := (xj, j ∈ J ). Consider any
assortment A that is nested-by-revenue, and such that j is the cheapest available product
in A for its associated itinerary. Note that J̄(j), the set of products associated with the
same itinerary as product j and that have equal or higher fares than product j, satisfies
J̄(j) ⊂ A. Then, for the market h such that j ∈ J (h) and for any j′ ∈ J(j), it holds
that P hj′:A∩J (h)/P
h
j:A∩J (h) = vj′/wj , which is the same for all A satisfying the conditions
above. Therefore, at the same time that xj units of product j is sold when j is the cheapest
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available product for its associated itinerary, (vj′/wj)xj units of each product j′ ∈ J(j)
is sold. Let xh0 denote the number of customers in market h who choose the no-purchase
alternative, and let x0 := (xh0 , h ∈ H).






































∀ h ∈ H, g ∈ J (h) (2.4d)
x ≥ 0, x0 ≥ 0.
The objective (2.4a) is the total revenue. Constraint (2.4b) represents the fact that, for
each market, the number of bookings plus the number of no-purchase customers equals the
number of arrivals. Constraint (2.4c) is the seat capacity constraint for each flight. Con-
straint (2.4d) is a generalization of the scale constraint in [18] to include the spike effect.
The quantity xj/wj is proportional to the amount of time that product j is the cheapest
available product for its associated itinerary. Since the null alternative is always available,
the constraint states that the total amount of time that different products are the cheapest
available products for an itinerary cannot exceed the total amount of time that the null alter-
native is available. The SBLP formulation above applies to a time-homogeneous demand
model and a single booking channel. It is easy to extend the SBLP formulation to a piece-
wise constant time-varying demand model and multiple booking channels. This extension
is used in our numerical experiments based on real-world airline data (Section 2.8).
The following result establishes that the SBLP formulation (2.4) is equivalent to the
19
CDLP formulation (2.3) under the spiked-MNL model.
Theorem 2.7. Under the spiked-MNL model, given an optimal solution of the CDLP (2.3),
an optimal solution of the SBLP (2.4) can be constructed in polynomial time, and vice
versa. Moreover, the CDLP (2.3) has an optimal solution that consists of a nested sequence
of assortments, each of which is nested-by-revenue.
The proof of Theorem 2.7 is constructive: we give an algorithm that converts optimal
solutions between the two formulations in polynomial time. In addition, the algorithm is
designed to produce an optimal CDLP solution that consists of a nested sequence of assort-
ments, each of which is nested-by-revenue. That is, the algorithm constructs a sequence
of assortments S1 ⊃ S2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sk, each of which is nested-by-revenue, and an optimal
CDLP solution (α(S), S ⊂ J ), such that α(S) > 0 only if S ∈ {S1, . . . , Sk}.
Note that, unlike the case for a single flight, for a network of flights, a set of assortments
that are nested-by-revenue might not form a nested sequence — a simple counterexample
is the following two nested-by-revenue assortments for two parallel flights: one assortment
contains the highest fare class for the first flight only, and the other contains the highest
fare class for the second flight only. The observation that there exists an optimal CDLP
solution that consists of a nested sequence of assortments plays an important role in the
construction of static booking limit controls that we discuss next.
2.7 Static Booking Limit Controls
Booking limits are widely used by airline reservation systems for controlling availability
of fare classes. With a partitioned booking limit policy, a number of seats, called the
partitioned booking limit (or just booking limit), is allocated to each product, and a product
is closed for bookings once the number of units of that product sold reaches its booking
limit. With a nested booking limit policy, a number of seats, called the nested booking
limit, is allocated to each subset J(j) ∪ {j}, j ∈ J , of products that is nested-by-revenue.
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A nested booking limit policy can be implemented using either standard nesting or theft
nesting [15, 34]. Under standard nesting, product j is closed if, for any product j′ ∈ J̄(j),
it holds that the number of units sold in subset J(j′)∪ {j′} has reached the nested booking
limit of that subset. Under theft nesting, product j is closed if the total number of units
of all products for the associated itinerary sold has reached the booking limit of subset
J(j)∪{j}. Under both nested booking limit policies, a higher revenue product is available
whenever a lower revenue product is available. If there were no cancellations, then under
any of the three booking limit policies above, once a product is closed, it would remain
closed until the end of the horizon.
2.7.1 Booking Limits from the SBLP Solution
By Theorem 2.7, an optimal solution for SBLP (2.4) can be used naturally to obtain booking
limits, where the booking limit for each product or each nested subset of products is given
by the optimal sales of that product or that nested subset of products for the SBLP (2.4). In
particular, let x∗ = (x∗j : j ∈ J ) be an optimal solution for SBLP. The resulting amount of















j ≤ cf . We thus define a (static) partitioned booking limit policy by
setting the booking limit of product j to b∗j . We also define a (static) nested booking limit





In this way, an optimal solution for SBLP (2.4) provides three static booking limit policies:
• a partitioned booking limit policy, using the sales given by (2.5) as booking limits;
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• a standard nested booking limit policy, using booking limits given by (2.6);
• a theft nested booking limit policy, also using booking limits given by (2.6).
Under any of the static booking limit policies, and under any sample path of customer
arrivals and choices, a sequence of assortments S1, S2, . . . , SK are offered such that S1 ⊃
S2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ SK . If all the random variables in the system associated with customer arrivals
and choices were replaced by their expectations, then the resulting sequence of assortments
would correspond to an optimal CDLP solution, arranged to form a nested sequence of
assortments (Theorem 2.7).
2.7.2 Asymptotic Optimality of the Static Partitioned Booking Limit Policy
We study the asymptotic properties of the partitioned booking limit policy defined above.
In the asymptotic setting, it is convenient to consider the continuous time version of the
problem. Thus, in this section, we assume that customers arrive according to a Poisson
process instead of a Bernoulli process; the Bernoulli process considered in Section 2.3 can
be viewed as an approximation of the Poisson process if the probability that more than one
customer arrives in a period is negligible. We study the partitioned booking limit policy
under the following asymptotic regime often considered in the revenue management litera-
ture. Let c denote the baseline capacity, and let λ denote the baseline arrival rate. Consider
a sequence of revenue management problems indexed by θ = 1, 2, . . ., with capacity θc
and arrival rate θλ, respectively. Other model parameters remain constant when θ grows.
We refer to an revenue management problem scaled by θ as the θ-scaled problem. Let zθOPT
denote the optimal expected revenue for the θ-scaled problem. Note that for the θ-scaled
problem, the optimal objective value of the corresponding CDLP is θzCDLP, where zCDLP
denotes the optimal objective value of the baseline CDLP (2.3). Then zθOPT ≤ θzCDLP. Let
Zθ denote the objective value, that is the (random) revenue, for the θ-scaled problem under
the partitioned booking limit policy. The following result establishes that the partitioned
booking limit policy is asymptotically optimal under fluid scaling.
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Therefore, when customer demand and seat capacities are large, the partitioned booking
limit policy is near optimal.
The proof of Theorem 2.8 can be found in Appendix A.5. Importantly, our proof does
not use the standard asymptotic optimality for the time-based CDLP-based policy [17]
due to the following reason. The time-based policy divides the time horizon into intervals
according to the CDLP solution, and offers a fixed assortment in each interval. The analysis
is relatively simple, because the customer choices are i.i.d. in each interval. In contrast,
the customer choices under a booking limit policy are more complicated: earlier customer
choices can cause products to close, which affect later assortments, which in turn affect later
customer choices. This complication does not exist for the independent demand model, for
example, in the analysis of a static booking limit policy under the independent demand
model in [37]. Therefore, a new technique was used to prove Theorem 2.8.
Our proof is based on the following approach. First, using the CDLP solution, we divide
the time horizon into intervals given by time points t0 < t1 < · · · < tk. Then, we add some
“padding” around each time ti, given by t−i = ti − ν−i ε and t+i = ti + ν+i ε for some small
ε > 0 (see Figure 2.4). We show that with high probability, the assortments offered by the
booking limit policy outside the intervals (t−i , t
+
i ) are the same as the assortments offered
by the CDLP solution. The booking process within intervals (t−i , t
+
i ) can be complex, but
we derive upper and lower bounds on the deviation of the booking process from the CDLP
prediction. We show by induction that the booking quantities at the end of the time horizon
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is O(ε) away from the static booking limit given by (2.5), and since we can choose ε to be
arbitrarily small as θ →∞, this proves the asymptotic result.
𝑆1 𝑆2 …𝑆3 𝑆𝑘
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1(𝑡1 − 𝑡0) 𝜆𝑗
2(𝑡2 − 𝑡1) 𝜆𝑗
3(𝑡3 − 𝑡2) 𝜆𝑗
𝑘(𝑡𝑘 − 𝑡𝑘−1)
Figure 2.4: Segments of the time horizon for asymptotic analysis
2.8 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we first demonstrate the hazard of using an MNL model when the true
underlying model is actually spiked-MNL. Then we compare the revenue performance
under different booking control policies using real-world airline data.
2.8.1 Comparison between the MNL and the Spiked-MNL Models
We first consider a simple one-resource two-product example, where we demonstrate the
evolution of revenue performance when we gradually learn consumer choice behavior and
set controls accordingly. We observe a non-negligible gap in revenue between using an
MNL model and a spiked-MNL model when the true underlying choice model is spiked-
MNL.
Evolution of average revenue. A seller can offer two products H and L, which
use the same resource and have price rH = 3 and rL = 2. We assume that over each
selling season (one iteration in the simulation), the expected number of arriving customers
is λT = 1000. Customers make their choices according to a true underlying choice model
with probabilities PH:{H,L} = 1/4, PL:{H,L} = 1/2 and PH:{H} = 2/3. Here we only
consider nested-by-revenue assortments as they are the efficient sets under the MNL and
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the spiked-MNL models. We control the fractions of time offering assortments {H,L}
and {H}. More specifically, we offer assortment {H,L} for a fraction αHL of the selling
season, and then we offer assortment {H} for the remaining time until we run out of stock
or the selling season ends. Initially, we set the fraction of time offering {H,L} as αHL =
0.5 and run iterations of simulation to get sales data. Then we estimate both MNL and
spiked-MNL choice models using maximum likelihood estimation with the data generated
so far and solve the CDLP to get the optimal control on α∗HL. We update our control
using αnewHL = (1 − κ)αoldHL + κα∗HL. In the equation, parameter κ ∈ (0, 1) is a learning
rate on control and we set κ = 0.05; αoldHL is the control we use in the current iteration of
simulation; αnewHL is the control we will use in the next iteration. We run the simulation
for 100 iterations and keep track of the revenue collected in each iteration. This gives us
a trajectory of evolving revenue over one simulation run. We conduct multiple simulation
runs and calculate the trajectory of average revenue.
Figure 2.5 shows the trajectories of average revenue over 200 simulation runs under
the MNL and the spiked-MNL model, with different settings of capacity. The plot on the
left shows a case where the average revenue under the MNL model deteriorates over time
while the average revenue under the spiked-MNL model increases. The plot on the right
shows a case where the average revenue under the MNL model slightly increases over time.
However, there is a non-negligible gap between the average revenue under the MNL model
and that under the spiked-MNL model.
Revenue performance with an airline dataset. We calibrate both the MNL model
and the spiked-MNL model with a real-world airline dataset and examine the revenue per-
formance under both models. The dataset is provided by an airline, containing an important
origin-destination market with more than 30 parallel flights per day. In this market, the host
airline operates 20 of these flights on each day, and each flight has the same fare class struc-
ture with 13 fare classes. There are 5 booking channels. The selling horizon is divided into
200 intervals. We consider different customer segments by allowing the choice parameters
25















































Figure 2.5: Trajectories of average revenues under the MNL and the spiked-MNL models
to vary along the booking horizon and across different booking channels. That is, within
each interval-channel combination, we have a separate customer segment.
We model and estimate customer demand as follows. Let N denote the set of booking
requests, including those who requested bookings with the host airline and other airlines,
for any of the parallel flights on a specific departure date. Request τ ∈ N arrives via
channel cτ in interval `τ , and is offered an assortment Sτ by the host airline. Let xτ,j
denote a feature vector containing information about request τ and product j. For exam-
ple, product-specific features include price, change fees, and frequent flyer mileage gain;
request-specific features include booking channel and booking time. In the spiked-MNL
model, xτ,j contains a binary variable indicating whether product j is the cheapest available
fare class on the associated flight. Let v(xτ,j) denote the preference weight of product j
given feature vector xτ,j . Quantity v0(cτ , tτ ) denotes the null preference weight, which
depends on the assortments offered by competitors. Then request τ chooses alternative
j ∈ Sτ with probability
Pj:Sτ =
v(xτ,j)





The parameters in (2.7) are estimated with the airline data using maximum likelihood esti-
mation.
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We calibrate an MNL model and a spiked-MNL model with the data of Monday flights
in 2011, solve the CDLP problem under both models and derive the control heuristics
accordingly, which specify the fractions of time offering different assortments. By default,
we offer larger assortments first to each segment of customers. We also calibrate a spiked-
MNL model with the data of Monday flights in 2012, and use this model in the simulation
to evaluate the revenue performance of the controls derived under the MNL and the spiked-
MNL models previously calibrated.
We consider the following performance metric. For a given booking control policy ψ,
let E[Zψ] denote the expected revenue achieved using policy ψ. Since the CDLP opti-
mal value zCDLP is an upper bound of the optimal expected revenue of optimization prob-
lem (2.1), we use the revenue ratio ρψ := E[Zψ]/zCDLP as the performance metric of policy
ψ. A good policy should yield a ratio ρψ that is close to 1.
Table 2.1 shows the revenue ratio ρψ averaged over 100 simulation runs with 95%
confidence interval under the MNL and the spiked-MNL models. We see that the average
revenue under the spiked-MNL model surpasses that under the MNL model by 5-7%.
Table 2.1: Average revenue ratio under the MNL and spiked-MNL models
model avg. revenue ratio to CDLP 95% CI
MNL 0.891 [0.888, 0.895]
spiked-MNL 0.954 [0.952, 0.957]
2.8.2 Comparison between Different Booking Control Policies
In this subsection, we examine the performance of the booking control policies using the
same airline data described previously. Again, we calibrate demand models with the data
of Monday flights in 2011, using the spiked-MNL model. Then we use the calibrated
demand models and calculate the booking control policies. We next calibrate demand
models with the data of Monday flights in 2012, and use these demand models in the
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simulation to evaluate the performance of the booking control policies. We use the revenue
ratio ρψ = E[Zψ]/zCDLP as the performance metric, where E[Zψ] denote the expected
revenue achieved using policy ψ. A good policy should yield a ratio ρψ close to 1.
We test the following booking control policies.
• EMSR-b: The nested booking limit heuristic proposed by [38], which is a popular
heuristic used in airline reservation systems.
• SBLP: The nested booking limit heuristic proposed in Section 2.7, where the booking
limits are constructed from the optimal solution of the SBLP.
• CDLP: This policy offers different assortments to different segments of customers over
specified fractions of time, with fractions specified by the optimal solution of the CDLP.
By default, we offer larger assortments first to each customer segment.
Note that SBLP and EMSR-b are all nested booking limit policies. There are two vari-
ants of nested booking limit policies, i.e., standard nesting and theft nesting. We implement
both variants on the booking limit heuristics and use “-s” and “-t” to distinguish them. A
detailed discussion on standard versus theft nesting can be found in [39] and [40].
Revenue performance of different policies. Figure 2.6 shows the revenue ratios ρψ
of the policies, with 95% confidence intervals, over 100 simulation runs. The CDLP-based
heuristic has the best average performance among all the policies tested. However, we note
that the CDLP-based heuristic specifies the fractions of time offering each assortment to
each customer segment, and it is not directly implementable in current airline IT systems.
The SBLP-based booking limit heuristics perform slightly worse, but they outperform the
EMSR-b heuristics currently used in the airline industry, capturing an additional 2-4%
revenue.
Robustness of different policies. Next, we tweak the model parameters and show
the robustness of different policies. We follow the strategy proposed in [17] and evaluate
the policies under different load factors. Specifically, we scale the capacity by a factor
k1 ∈ {0.8, 1.0, 1.2} and the null preference weight by a factor k2 ∈ {0.8, 1.0, 1.2}. We
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Figure 2.6: Revenue ratios over a real-world dataset under different policies
Table 2.2: Revenue ratios under different capacity and null preference weight scaling
k1 k2 EMSRb-s EMSRb-t SBLP-s SBLP-t CDLP
0.8 0.8 0.929 0.941 0.928 0.939 0.888
1.0 0.911 0.925 0.920 0.929 0.916
1.2 0.894 0.915 0.916 0.924 0.930
1.0 0.8 0.909 0.932 0.929 0.943 0.955
1.0 0.903 0.925 0.932 0.942 0.956
1.2 0.905 0.921 0.934 0.938 0.958
1.2 0.8 0.882 0.911 0.909 0.929 0.961
1.0 0.886 0.907 0.911 0.924 0.965
1.2 0.895 0.907 0.917 0.921 0.967
report in Table 2.2 the revenue ratios ρψ under these scalings, averaged over 100 simulation
runs. We observe that although on average the CDLP-based heuristic performs well, there
are cases where it fails to beat the booking limit policies. The revenue performance under
the booking limit policies, the EMSR-b and the SBLP-based heuristics, is robust against
the scaling of capacity and null preference weight. And SBLP-based heuristics achieve up
to 5% gains in revenue over the EMSR-b heuristics.
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2.9 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we consider a network revenue management problem under the spiked-
MNL choice model. The spiked-MNL model is a variant of the MNL model and is moti-
vated by the phenomenon of the spike effect observed by airlines. We show that efficient
sets under the spiked-MNL model are nested-by-revenue assortments. We also consider de-
terministic approximations under the spiked-MNL model and propose static booking limit
heuristics, which are shown to be near-optimal.
Future research can explore other forms of spike effects along dimensions other than
price. Considering pricing problems under the spiked-MNL model is another interesting
research avenue to follow.
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CHAPTER 3
DYNAMIC PRICING FOR TRUCKLOAD TRANSPORTATION
MARKETPLACES
3.1 Overview
Truck transportation is an important part of supply chains and the overall economy. Ac-
cording to the American Trucking Associations (ATA), the US trucking industry generated
a total of $796.7 billion revenue in 2018. The truck transportation market can be clas-
sified into parcel transportation, private trucking, less-than-truckload transportation, and
for-hire truckload transportation. Of these, for-hire truckload transportation has a share of
about 50% of all trucking revenues in the US. Also, truckload transportation exhibits much
smaller economies of scale than parcel and less-than-truckload transportation. Therefore,
whereas the parcel and less-than-truckload transportation markets are concentrated with a
few large carriers, the for-hire truckload transportation market is fragmented with thou-
sands of small carriers, many of which operate only a few trucks or are owner-operators
(i.e., individual drivers with a single truck). As of May 2019, the number of for-hire
truckload carriers on file with the US Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration totaled
892,078, with 91.3% operating less than six trucks [41]. This fragmentation creates an
opportunity for market makers in the for-hire truckload transportation market, who serve
as intermediaries between carriers and shippers.
Traditionally, truckload brokers and freight forwarders have been such market makers,
and they performed their functions in a labor-intensive manner, involving time-consuming
relationship building and communication. Information technology facilitates the possibil-
ity of automating some of the labor-intensive market-making activities, and the prevalence
of mobile telecommunication enables even traveling drivers to interact directly with market
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makers. Therefore, it is not surprising that both traditional truckload brokers and new tech
companies such as Uber Freight, Amazon Freight, and Convoy are building online truck-
load marketplaces that streamline the matching process between the demand side (shippers)
and the supply side (carriers) and automate activities such as price quotation and booking.
While known as “Uber for trucks,” the pricing model of for-hire truckload marketplaces
differs from that of ride-hailing marketplaces (e.g., Uber and Lyft) in two major aspects.
First, ride-hailing marketplaces usually offer dynamic prices to both riders and drivers in
real time. In contrast, it is typical for a truckload market maker to negotiate contracts with
shippers that specify prices (or more generally price formulas) for truckload shipments, also
known as loads. Each contract remains in effect for a long period of time, usually a year,
and covers all loads offered by a shipper during that time. When the marketplace receives
a load transportation request from a shipper, the market maker chooses a price to offer to
carriers and publishes the load data as well as the offered price on the marketplace. The
load data includes the pickup location, delivery location, cargo classification, and scheduled
pickup time (or time window, usually not more than a few hours in length — here we treat
the start of the time window as the pickup time). Under the contract, the market maker
is responsible for acquiring transportation service for the load before its scheduled pickup
time. The market maker may have to increase the load’s offered price if it cannot find a
carrier willing to accept the offer — sometimes, if supply is small relative to demand, this
price may even go above the contract price that the shipper pays. Clearly, this business
model exposes the market maker to risks associated with carrier supply uncertainty.
Second, ride-hailing marketplaces often determine how to match drivers and riders and
do not allow drivers to choose among the riders in the marketplace. In contrast, truckload
marketplaces allow carriers to choose among the loads in the marketplace. This is because
it is more important for a truckload carrier than for a ride-hailing driver to evaluate many
factors before choosing a load, such as the load’s origin and destination, pickup time, cargo
classification, deadhead miles (empty miles from the delivery location of the truck’s pre-
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Figure 3.1: A truckload marketplace app. (source: convoy.com)
vious load or the truck’s current location to the pickup location of the new load), etc. For
example, the truck driver may not be able to pick up a load at the scheduled pickup time
due to the truck’s current location or due to hours of service regulations. Also, a truck has
a specific type of trailer that can handle only some cargo classes, and the truck driver often
has preferences regarding pickup and delivery locations, shippers, cargo types, and sched-
ule. Therefore it is more practical to let carriers choose among loads than for the market
maker to determine the matching of trucks and loads. Although the market maker does not
determine the assignment of trucks to loads, the market maker influences the choices of
carriers through pricing.
To illustrate a carrier’s interaction with a marketplace, Figure 3.1 shows some mobile
app screens of a typical truckload marketplace. The first screen shows a list of loads cur-
rently available on the marketplace among which a carrier can choose, with data such as
price, origin and destination, pickup and drop-off time. The list of loads can be filtered by
attributes such as their pickup time relative to the current time, which can range from a few
hours to several weeks. The second and third screens show more details of a specific load,
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including the type of trailer needed, total load weight, and total distance between the pickup
and delivery locations. A carrier can choose and book a load immediately. Since carriers
can choose among different loads, it is important for the market maker to take into account
carriers’ choice behavior when it sets prices. Nevertheless, we noticed that some pricing
models used by these market makers consider each load separately, without accounting for
carriers’ choices among the available loads [42, 43].
This chapter considers a dynamic pricing problem for such for-hire truckload trans-
portation marketplaces, where we incorporate carriers’ choice behavior among available
loads. In the model both loads and carriers arrive randomly to the marketplace. Each load
has a deadline, and the market maker wants to get a carrier to accept the load before its
deadline. If a load expires, i.e., it is not accepted by a carrier before its deadline, the market
maker incurs a penalty. The time until a load expires is called the load’s lead time. The
market maker offers a price for each load currently available, where the price of a load can
vary based on its lead time and the market conditions, e.g., how many loads are available
in total. Carriers arrive to the marketplace and view the available load data such as price,
origin-destination locations, cargo class, schedule, etc. Then the carrier makes a booking
choice or leaves without accepting any load. The market maker can dynamically adjust the
price for each load to minimize the expected cost, including the price paid to carriers and
penalty costs incurred by expiring loads.
In most of the chapter, we assume that loads are partitioned into types based on load
data other than the loads’ lead times, and that there is a separate marketplace for each type
of load. For example, loads can be partitioned based on the origin-destination zones and
the type of trailer needed. With such a partitioning, one load type can include all loads
that need a dry van (an enclosed truck trailer) on a certain shipping lane (e.g., from Atlanta
to New York). From the point of view of the market maker, the two major factors that
distinguish loads of the same type are their prices and lead times. A carrier may also take
into account other load data that distinguish loads of the same type, such as the identity
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of the shipper or the exact pickup and delivery locations. Thus, the market maker uses a
choice model in which the load attributes are lead time and price, but carriers may have
preferences among loads with the same lead time and price. This basic model captures the
main effect of lead time on the pricing of loads. In the extension section, we discuss how
to extend the basic model to the setting in which carriers choose among multiple types of
loads, e.g., dry van shipments on multiple shipping lanes to different destinations.
Main Contributions: We formulate the market maker’s dynamic pricing problem as a
discrete-time, infinite horizon, average cost Markov decision process (MDP). Unlike pre-
vious models of dynamic pricing for a single load [42, 43], we consider a model in which
carriers choose among available loads of the same type. More specifically, the problem
includes a multinomial logit choice model, in which each available load is an alternative,
and the preference weight of each load is determined by its lead time and its price.
Optimal Policy Structure. We show that the optimal price in each state of the MDP
can be computed by solving a convex optimization problem, given the marginal cost of
each load. Thus, when using iterative methods, such as relative value iteration, to solve the
MDP, in each iteration the optimization problem for each state can be solved efficiently.
Regarding the structure of the optimal pricing policy, we show that the optimal prices are
higher for loads with shorter lead times (Theorem 3.3).
Discrete-Time Fluid Model and Asymptotically Optimal Policy. The MDP has a state
space that increases exponentially with the number of lead times. Therefore we consider
an approximation of the MDP, which we call the discrete-time fluid model (DTFM). We
propose a tractable reformulation of the DTFM, and we show that its optimal objective
value provides a lower bound on the long-run average cost of the MDP under any stationary
policy (Theorem 3.4). Based on the DTFM, we propose a simple pricing policy for the
MDP that is easy to compute. The pricing policy specifies a price for each lead time that
does not vary over time. Even though the price for each lead time is time invariant, the
price of a load still varies as it comes closer to its deadline. We show that the proposed
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policy is asymptotically optimal with a loss ratio of order O(1/θ), where θ represents the
scale of shipper demand and carrier supply (Theorem 3.8). In contrast, in the existing
dynamic pricing literature, it is more typical to obtain loss ratios of order O(1/
√
θ) from
fluid approximations (e.g. [44]). We provide some intuition to explain this distinction.
Continuous-Time Fluid Model. We also present a continuous-time fluid model (CTFM)
as an approximation of the MDP. We show that the CTFM can be reformulated with a con-
vex objective and linear constraints. We also examine the structure of the optimal solution
of the CTFM (Theorem 3.12). We show that, for an arbitrary load arrival pattern and general
carrier preferences, the optimal prices always increase as lead time decreases. We discuss
extensions of the CTFM to incorporate various practical considerations.
3.2 Related Literature
Many papers have studied dynamic pricing for perishable products (e.g., seasonal goods,
airline seats) under choice models. The most widely used choice model in revenue manage-
ment is the multinomial logit choice model. For example, [21] and [45] studied dynamic
pricing problems for substitute products under the multinomial logit model and established
structural properties for the optimal pricing policy. Reference [46] used the multinomial
logit model to study a dynamic pricing problem with a horizontally differentiated assort-
ment and show that individual product availability drives pricing. The authors of [47] stud-
ied a dynamic pricing problem in which different customer segments have disjoint consid-
eration sets, and customers in each segment choose from its consideration set according to
a multinomial logit model. Dynamic pricing problems with other types of choice models,
such as the nested logit model [48, 26] and generalized extreme value models [49], have
also been studied. In most of these papers, sales of the perishable products start at the same
time and end at the same time, so the system state simply represents the current inventory
level of each product. In truckload transportation pricing, an interesting feature is that at
any point in time different loads have different deadlines, which adds another dimension to
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the system state.
Another related stream of research is inventory management of perishable products
when the demands are differentiated based on the freshness of products. For example,
such problems arise in the management of blood products such as blood platelets, where
different levels of blood freshness are required for different medical procedures [50, 51].
Although many dynamic pricing problems can be formulated as MDPs, these formula-
tions are often computationally intractable because the number of dimensions of the state
space is large, usually because the number of products is large. A popular family of heuris-
tics uses deterministic fluid approximations of the MDP, in which random variables are
replaced by their means. For example, [44] and [52] considered fluid approximations of
finite horizon dynamic pricing problems, and solved the fluid problems to obtain prices
for static-pricing heuristics. The authors of [44] showed that the resulting heuristics are
asymptotically optimal with a total loss of order O(
√
θ) when both customer demand and
inventory supply are scaled by a factor of θ. Similar asymptotic results have been estab-
lished for revenue management problems with choice models [17]. The O(
√
θ) loss rate
is tight for any static policy; in order to improve this rate, the fluid problem can be re-
optimized during the time horizon to obtain a more adaptive pricing policy [53, 54, 55,
56]. Reference [57] proposes a policy that requires a single optimization at the beginning
of the selling horizon and that adjusts the prices of specified products according to a price
adjustment that is linear in the observed demand. Our approach to truckload transportation
pricing is related to this line of research. We consider a fluid approximation of the dynamic
pricing problem and use the optimal solution of the fluid problem to construct a pricing
policy with a time invariant price for each lead time. We show that this policy achieves
O(1/θ) loss ratio, as opposed to the usual O(1/
√
θ) loss ratio.
Research about marketplaces from the point of view of market makers has increased re-
cently, especially motivated by the ride-hailing industry. Pricing problems for ride-hailing
marketplaces and compared static and dynamic pricing policies have been studied [58, 59,
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60, 61, 62, 63, 64]. For example, [59] proposed a state independent pricing policy in a
closed queueing network and showed that the policy approaches the optimal one as the
number of vehicles in the system grows. Researchers have also considered matching prob-
lems for ride-hailing marketplaces and investigated the asymptotic performance of several
policies [65, 66]. The problem of joint matching and pricing in ride-hailing marketplaces
has been studied in [67], and the authors argued that joint optimization leads to a significant
performance improvement.
For truckload transportation marketplaces, [43] and [42] considered dynamic carrier
pricing with application to Uber Freight and Amazon Freight, respectively. However, both
of these works considered pricing of each load separately without accounting for carriers’
choice behavior, whereas this chapter considers dynamic pricing for all available loads
in the marketplace taking carriers’ choice behavior into account with a discrete choice
model. Another stream of research considered truckload pricing and load assignment from
a carrier’s perspective. For example, [68, 69], and [70] proposed models to optimize carrier
pricing and load assignment.
3.3 Problem Formulation
We consider a truckload transportation marketplace with a market maker that sells truck-
load transportation to shippers and buys truckload transportation from carriers. Contracts
between the market maker and the shipper that specify the prices that shippers pay to the
market maker for transportation services have already been established. Shippers submit
load transportation requests to the marketplace at random times. Each load has a scheduled
pickup time, also called the load’s deadline, and different loads enter the marketplace with
different amounts of time to go until the load’s deadline. For each load in the marketplace
the market maker sets a price that is offered to carriers for transporting the load, and the
market maker can adjust these prices dynamically. Carriers check the available loads in the
marketplace and their attributes, including prices, at random times. A carrier can choose
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to accept a load, in which case the load is booked for transportation by the carrier, the load
is removed from the marketplace, and the market maker pays the carrier the price that was
offered at the time of the booking. A carrier can also choose not to accept any load in
the marketplace. If a load reaches its deadline without being booked by a carrier, then we
say that the load expires, the load is removed from the marketplace, and the market maker
pays a penalty. We consider the problem from the point of view of the market maker. The
market maker wants to determine a policy for offering prices to carriers that maximizes the
market maker’s long-run average profit per unit time. Since the prices that shippers pay to
the market maker are fixed by contracts, and loads enter the marketplace according to an
exogenous process, the objective is equivalent to minimizing the market maker’s long-run
average cost per unit time.
We partition time into discrete periods with sufficiently small length, such that in each
period at most one new load enters the marketplace and at most one carrier arrives to check
the available loads in the marketplace. Then we formulate the dynamic pricing problem
as a discrete-time, infinite horizon, average cost Markov decision process (MDP). In each
period, the following sequence of events occurs: (1) either one new load enters the mar-
ketplace with probability λ ∈ (0, 1), or no load enters the marketplace with probability
1 − λ; (2) the market maker sets a price for each load in the marketplace, excluding the
expiring loads; (3) either one carrier arrives to check the available loads in the marketplace
with probability µ ∈ (0, 1), and the carrier chooses which load to book or the carrier leaves
without booking a load, or no carrier arrives with probability 1 − µ; (4) the market maker
pays the carrier according to the offered prices if a carrier booked a load, as well as the
penalty cost C for each expiring load.
The number of periods until a load expires is called the (discrete) lead time of the load.
New loads can have different initial lead times. The maximum initial lead time is L. A new
load has initial lead time ` ∈ {1, . . . , L} with probability ψ`; we let ψ0 := 0 for notation
consistency. Therefore, the lead time of any load can take value ` ∈ {0, . . . , L}, where
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` = 0 corresponds to the case that the load expires.
In a period, after (1) any new load has entered the marketplace, and before (2) the
market maker has set a price for each load in the marketplace, let x` ∈ N denote the
number of loads with lead time ` in the marketplace. Let x := (x`, ` = 0, . . . , L) denote
the state vector, and let supp(x) := {` ≥ 1 : x` > 0} denote the lead times ` ≥ 1 with
a positive number of loads. Let p` denote the price that the market maker offers for each
load with lead time `. Let p := (p`, ` = 1, . . . , L) denote the corresponding price vector.
Let P ⊂ RL denote the set of feasible price vectors. Of course, only loads with lead times
` ∈ supp(x) can be booked, so the prices p` for ` /∈ supp(x) will not affect carrier bookings
or market maker costs. Also, the quantity x0 represents the number of loads that expire in
this period, which cannot be booked, so the market maker does not specify a price for lead
time ` = 0.
A carrier who checks the available loads in the marketplace chooses to book a load with
lead time ` with probability f`(p,x) for ` = 1, . . . , L. If x` = 0, then f`(p,x) = 0. Thus
a carrier chooses not to book a load with probability f0(p,x) = 1−
∑L
`=1 f`(p,x).
For ` = 0, . . . , L, let e` ∈ {0, 1}L+1 denote a vector with the `-th entry being 1 and all
other entries being 0, and let 0 ∈ {0, 1}L+1 denote a vector with all 0 entries. Let random
variable A`(t) = 1 if a load enters the marketplace with initial lead time ` in period t, and
letA`(t) = 0 otherwise. Note thatA0(t) = 0 and
∑L
`=1 A`(t) ≤ 1. LetA(t) := (A`(t), ` =
0, . . . , L) denote the random load arrival vector in period t. For ` = 0, . . . , L, letX`(t) ∈ N
denote the random number of loads with lead time ` in period t after any new load enters
the marketplace. Let X(t) := (X`(t), ` = 0, . . . , L) denote the random state vector in
period t. Let p(t) ∈ P denote the random price vector set by the market maker in period t.
Let random variable M`(t) = 1 if a carrier books a load with lead time ` in period t, and let
M`(t) = 0 otherwise. Note thatM0(t) = 0 and
∑L
`=1 M`(t) ≤ 1. LetM (t) := (M`(t), ` =
0, . . . , L) denote the random load booking vector in period t. We assume that {A(t)} are
independent and identically distributed. Also, A(t) is independent of the history H(t −
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1) := {(A(τ),X(τ),p(τ),M (τ)), τ = 0, . . . , t − 1} of the process. Specifically, given
any history H(t− 1) of the process, the load arrival probabilities are P[A(t) = e` |H(t−
1)] = λψ` for ` = 0, . . . , L, and P[A(t) = 0 |H(t− 1)] = 1− λ. Furthermore, given any
history H(t − 1) of the process, that the load arrival in period t is A(t), that the available
loads in the market place is X(t), that the market maker set prices p(t) for period t, and
that a carrier arrived in period t to check the available loads in the marketplace, the driver
choice probabilities are P[M(t) = e` |H(t − 1),A(t),X(t),p(t)] = f`(p(t),X(t)) for
` = 1, . . . , L, and P[M (t) = 0 |H(t− 1),A(t),X(t),p(t)] = f0(p(t),X(t)).
As time passes, the lead time of each load decreases, e.g., a load with lead time ` in the




x`+1, ` = 0, . . . , L− 1,
0, ` = L.
Then, the system dynamics is given by
X(t+ 1) = S (X(t)−M (t)) +A(t+ 1).
Figure 3.2 provides a graphical illustration of the dynamics.
Dynamic Program Formulation. We consider the dynamic pricing problem over an
infinite horizon. Assume that the initial state is X(1) = 0. We aim to find an optimal
stationary pricing policy that minimizes the long-run average cost (payments to carriers
plus expiration penalties) per period for the market maker. Given the current state x, a
stationary policy ϕ : NL+1 7→ P specifies the price vector ϕ(x) = (ϕ`(x), ` = 1, . . . , L)










Figure 3.2: Illustration of the load dynamics in the MDP
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Remark 3.1. A sufficient condition for the long-run average cost per period γϕ to not
depend on the initial state is the existence of a special state such that, for all initial states
and all policies, the special state is recurrent (see, e.g., Theorem 5.5.1 in [71]). For the
system dynamics specified above, the state x = 0 is such a special state because λ < 1,
since starting from any initial state there is a positive probability (1 − λ)L+1 that no new
load arrives in L + 1 consecutive periods and the system state becomes x = 0. Therefore
the assumption that the initial state isX(1) = 0 is without loss of generality.
Let γ∗ := infϕ γϕ denote the optimal long-run average cost per period, and let h∗(x)







































∗ (S (x) + ek)+ (1− λ)h∗ (S (x))} for all x ∈ NL+1, (MDP)
where terms on the right side of equality (a) represent the penalty cost incurred by expired
loads, the expected cost if a carrier makes a booking, and the expected cost if no load is



























for ` ∈ supp(x).
Intuitively, the displacement cost ∆`(x) represents the marginal cost in state x for an extra





f`(p,x) [p` −∆`(x)] ,




∗ (S (x) + ek)+ (1− λ)h∗ (S (x)) .
Then the optimality equation can be written concisely as
γ∗ + h∗(x) = inf
p∈P
G(p,x) +H(x) for all x ∈ NL+1.
Since H(x) does not depend on p, it suffices to optimize G(p,x) to get an optimal price
vector for state x.
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3.4 Optimal Dynamic Pricing under the Multinomial Logit Model
Next, we consider the dynamic pricing problem under the multinomial logit model. First,
we specify the multinomial logit model used by the market maker. Then we show how to
derive the optimal price vector as a function of the displacement costs. Finally, we establish
some structural properties of the optimal pricing policy.
3.4.1 Multinomial Logit Model
The market maker uses the following multinomial logit model of carriers’ choice behavior
among available loads. Given a price p, a load with lead time ` has a preference weight
v`(p) := exp(βp+ β
0
` ), (Heterogeneous Preference)
where β > 0 denotes the price sensitivity coefficient, and β0` represents a carrier’s mean
non-monetary utility for a load with lead time `. The parameter β0` is allowed to depend
on the lead time `. This is called the Heterogeneous Preference setting. For example,
everything else being equal, carriers may prefer loads with closer pickup times (i.e., smaller
lead times), in which case β0` is decreasing in `.
In the special case in which a carrier’s mean non-monetary utility depends only on
price but not on lead time, we denote β0` = β0 for all `. This is called the Homogeneous
Preference setting. In this case, given a price p, a load with lead time ` has a preference
weight
v`(p) = exp(βp+ β0). (Homogeneous Preference)
A carrier may choose not to book a load in the marketplace. The preference weights
are scaled so that the preference weight of this null alternative is normalized to 1. Then,
according to the multinomial logit model [1, 2], given any state x ∈ NL+1 and price vector
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p ∈ P , the probability that a carrier books a load with lead time ` is given by
f`(p,x) =
x` v`(p`)∑L
k=1 xk vk(pk) + 1
,
and the probability that a carrier choose not to book a load in the marketplace is given by
f0(p,x) =
1∑L
k=1 xk vk(pk) + 1
.
Note that if x` = 0 for some `, then the choice probability f`(p,x) = 0, meaning that a
carrier cannot choose a load with lead time ` /∈ supp(x), since no such load is available in
the marketplace.
3.4.2 Deriving the Optimal Price in Each State
Next we derive an expression for the optimal price vector. Given state x and displacement




In the discussion below, the state x is fixed, so we write the displacement cost as ∆ =
∆(x) to simplify notation.
The objective function of (3.1) is non-convex, therefore we introduce the following
change of variables. Let
u` =
x` v`(p`)∑
k∈supp(x) xk vk(pk) + 1
and u0 =
1∑
k∈supp(x) xk vk(pk) + 1
, (3.2)
and let u := (u`, ` = 1, . . . , L). Note that
∑
`∈supp(x)





= x`v`(p`) = x` exp(βp` + β
0


















































where equality (a) follows from variable substitution (3.2) and (3.4), and equality (b)
follows from arranging terms and (3.3). The right side of equality (b) is convex in (u, u0).

































∈ P for ` ∈ supp(x). (3.5c)
Given an optimal solution (u∗, u∗0) for problem (3.5), one can compute an optimal price p
∗












for ` ∈ supp(x).
For some feasible price sets P , problem (3.5) is a convex optimization problem. For exam-
ple, with lower and upper bounds on prices, that is, if P = [p
1
, p1] × · · · × [pL, pL], then
constraint (3.5c) reduces to
exp(βp
`
+ β0` )x`u0 ≤ u` ≤ exp(βp` + β0` )x`u0 for ` ∈ supp(x).
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Then problem (3.5) has a convex objective and linear constraints. In Appendix B.6, we
further study the structure of the optimal solution for problem (3.5) when P = RL+, and for
some special cases we derive a closed-form expression for the optimal price as a function
of ∆. In the remainder of the paper, we let all prices be unconstrained, that is, P = RL.
The motivation is that if the input of the optimization problem, including the arrival rates of
loads and carriers and the carrier choice model, are accurate, then the optimization problem
should produce good solutions without additional price constraints.
Remark 3.2. When defining the optimal price vector p in the MDP, we implicitly assume
that all loads with the same lead time ` ∈ {1, . . . , L} must be offered at the same price,
namely p`. This assumption is without loss of generality: It can be shown that under the
multinomial logit model, it is never optimal to offer different prices for two loads with the
same lead time. A proof is given in Appendix B.1.
3.4.3 Structure of the Optimal Prices
Next we study the structure of the optimal prices under the multinomial logit model. Op-
timal prices exhibit the following monotonicity structure in the Homogeneous Preference
setting: In any state, the optimal price is higher for loads with a shorter lead time.
Theorem 3.3. In the Homogeneous Preference setting, in any state, the optimal price is
higher for loads with a shorter lead time than for loads with a longer lead time. That
is, for a given state x, if p∗(x) is an optimal price vector, then p∗i (x) ≥ p∗j(x) for any
i, j ∈ supp(x) such that i < j.
The proof is given in Appendix B.1. A consequence of this result is that if the market is
thick and the system state varies little over time, then a load’s price will tend to increase over
time until it is booked. We consider this setting more formally in Section 3.7. The result
above does not necessarily hold in the more general Heterogeneous Preference setting, in
which carriers’ mean non-monetary utility depends on the lead time. For example, loads
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with a shorter lead time may be more attractive to some carriers. In such a case, it may not
be optimal to post higher prices for loads with shorter lead times; see Appendix B.7 for a
counter-example.
3.5 Discrete-Time Fluid Approximation
In the formulation of the MDP, we choose the time periods small enough for the assumption
that at most one load arrives and at most one carrier arrives in each time period to be
accurate enough in a practical application. Thus, in an application the number of lead
times L may be large. Unfortunately, the MDP is intractable when L is large, as the size of
the state space is Ω(2L). This motivates us to consider a discrete-time fluid approximation
of the MDP. In this fluid approximation, the number of loads per lead time can be fractional,
and we consider the system in steady state. That is, the fluid system state does not vary as
loads are arriving and are being booked. The resulting fluid optimization problem is a
single-stage optimization problem.
First, we formulate a discrete-time fluid model with price as the control. Then, we
transform the problem into a convex optimization problem. We show that the optimal
objective value of the fluid optimization problem is a lower bound for the long-run average
cost per period for the MDP under any stationary policy. In Section 3.6, we propose a
pricing policy for the MDP based on the optimal solution of the fluid optimization problem,
and we establish performance guarantees for this pricing policy.
3.5.1 Discrete-Time Fluid Model
First we present the dynamics of the fluid model. In each period, the following sequence
of events occurs: 1) new loads enter the marketplace, with λψ` new loads arriving for lead
time `, resulting in x` loads in the marketplace with lead time `; 2) the market maker sets
a price p` for each lead time `; 3) carriers check the offers in the marketplace and book
µf`(p,x) loads for each lead time `; 4) the market maker pays the carriers and incurs the
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penalty cost due to expiring loads, and all remaining loads in the system will have their






𝜆𝜓ℓ decreasing lead time
Figure 3.3: Illustration of the load dynamics in the discrete-time fluid model.
We consider the fluid system in a steady state; that is, the system state x and the price
control p stay the same from period to period. This results in the following single-stage







k=1 xk vk(pk) + 1
+ C x0 (DTFM)
s.t. x` − x`−1 = µ
x` v`(p`)∑L
k=1 xk vk(pk) + 1
− λψ`−1 ∀` ≥ 1 (3.6a)
xL = λψL (3.6b)
x` ≥ µ
x` v`(p`)∑L
k=1 xk vk(pk) + 1
∀` ≥ 1 (3.6c)
The objective of the DTFM minimizes the cost per period, where the first term represents the
payment to carriers as they book loads, and the second term Cx0 represents the penalty cost
incurred due to expiring loads. Constraints (3.6a) and (3.6b) represent the system dynamics
shown in Figure 3.3. The change in state during a time period is governed by two opposing
forces: carriers booking available loads and new loads entering the marketplace. For lead
time L, the system state (which is observed before carriers book loads during the time
period) is solely determined by the number of new loads entering the marketplace with
lead time L. Constraint (3.6c) states that the number of bookings for any given lead time
cannot exceed the number of loads that are currently available.
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3.5.2 Convex Reformulation
Both the objective and constraint (3.6a) in the DTFM are nonconvex, and therefore we
consider a convex reformulation below.
We make the following change of variables, similar to Section 3.4.2. Let
u` =
x` v`(p`)∑L
k=1 xk vk(pk) + 1
for ` ≥ 1, and u0 =
1∑L
k=1 xk vk(pk) + 1
. (3.7)
Since v`(p`) > 0, x` = 0 if and only if u` = 0. Also,
u`
u0














for all x` > 0. (3.8)








































− (1− u0) ln(u0)
]
+ C x0,





















− (1− u0) ln(u0)
]
+ C x0.
We let u` ln(u`/x`) = 0 if u` = 0, hence this term is continuous at any point where u` = 0
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and x` ≥ 0 (in particular, the continuity at u` = x` = 0 is implied by constraint (3.9d)
that will be defined below). As a result, g is continuous on its domain. Moreover, it can be
verified that g is convex.
Thus, the DTFM is reformulated as follows, which we refer to as the convex discrete-



















(1− u0) ln(u0) + C x0
}
(Convex DTFM)
s.t. x` − x`−1 = µu` − λψ`−1 ∀` ≥ 1 (3.9a)
xL = λψL (3.9b)
L∑
`=1
u` + u0 = 1 (3.9c)
x` ≥ µu` ∀` ≥ 1. (3.9d)
The Convex DTFM has a convex objective and linear constraints and can be solved effi-
ciently. The DTFM and the Convex DTFM are equivalent, in the sense that given a feasible
solution for one problem one can compute a feasible solution with the same objective value
for the other problem using (3.7) and (3.8). Moreover, because the objective function is
continuous and the feasible set is closed and bounded, an optimal solution exists by the
extreme value theorem. Let (x̂, û, û0) be an optimal solution for the Convex DTFM. Then












for ` ∈ supp(x̂).
3.5.3 DTFM Gives a Lower Bound of Optimal Cost
We establish that the optimal objective value of the DTFM gives a lower bound for the
long-run average cost per period for the MDP under any stationary policy. Without loss
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of generality, we restrict the state space of the MDP to the states communicating with the
empty state x = 0. (This set of states is the same for all policies — see Remark 3.1). This
restricted state space is finite, since starting from the empty state, there can be at most L
loads in the system at any time. Thus, under any stationary policy ϕ, there exists a unique
stationary distribution of the state X . Then, for any stationary policy ϕ, the long-run











where the expectation is taken with respect to the stationary distribution ofX under policy
ϕ.
Theorem 3.4. The optimal objective value of the discrete-time fluid model (DTFM) is a
lower bound for the long-run average cost per period of the MDP under any stationary
policy ϕ, i.e., R̂ ≤ R(ϕ) for all ϕ.
The proof is given in Appendix B.2.
3.6 Open-Loop Pricing Policy and Its Asymptotic Optimality
In this section, we consider the pricing policy that applies in all states the prices obtained
from an optimal solution of the discrete-time fluid model (DTFM). We show that this state-
independent (open-loop) pricing policy achieves asymptotic optimality under a fluid scaling
asymptotic regime. This provides theoretical support for using the open-loop pricing policy
in practice. We also demonstrate the performance of the policy in numerical experiments.
3.6.1 Open-Loop Pricing Policy
We propose an open-loop pricing policy that sets a fixed price for each lead time, regardless
of what other loads are available in the marketplace. The term “open-loop” indicates that
the prices do not depend on the state of the system, as opposed to prices of a “closed-loop”
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policy. Note that, under an open-loop policy, the price of a given load may still change
over time, because the lead time of a given load changes over time and the price of a load
depends on the current lead time of the load.
The open-loop pricing policy considered uses the optimal prices for the DTFM. Specif-
ically, let (x̂, p̂) be an optimal solution for the DTFM. The open-loop pricing policy ϕ̂ sets
price p̂` for all loads with lead time `, regardless of the system state x, i.e., ϕ̂`(x) = p̂` for
all x.
3.6.2 Asymptotic Regime
We evaluate policy ϕ̂ in the following asymptotic regime. Consider a sequence {MDPθ} of
problem instances scaled by a factor θ = 1, 2, · · · . In instance MDPθ, the arrival rates per
unit clock time of loads and carriers are θλ and θµ, respectively. Therefore, the factor θ can
be viewed as a measure of the market size. As the market size increases, the range of lead
times, measured in clock time (as opposed to discrete time periods), remains unchanged.
Without loss of generality, let this range be [0, 1]. The lead times of newly arriving loads
are i.i.d. with cumulative distribution function Φ : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1].
In the instance MDPθ, the lead time range [0, 1] is partitioned into θ intervals, each with
length 1/θ. In the discrete-time model MDPθ, the length of “one period” — the length of
one lead time interval — is equal to 1/θ in clock time. Thus, the load arrival rate in each
period (of length 1/θ) of the discrete-time model MDPθ is λ, and the arrival rate per unit
clock time is θλ. Given a new load arrival, the probability that the load has discrete lead
time ` ∈ {1, . . . , θ} is given by ψθ` := Φ(`/θ)− Φ((`− 1)/θ), and we let ψθ0 := 0.
The multinomial logit model for the instance MDPθ is as follows. The price sensitivity
parameter is β for all θ. For the mean non-monetary utility, consider a continuous function
b0 : [0, 1] 7→ R. Let bmax := maxt∈[0,1] b0(t). For the instance MDPθ, the parameter βθ0,` is
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given by βθ0,` := b0(`/θ). Thus the preference weights for the instance MDP
θ are given by
vθ` (p) := exp(βp+ β
θ
0,`) for ` = 1, . . . , θ.
In addition, as the market size scales up, the preference weight of the null alternative in
the multinomial logit model also scales up. Otherwise, if the null alternative weight is a
constant (e.g. 1), then the probability of choosing the null alternative will converge to zero
as θ increases, and the problem will become trivial. Therefore, for the instance MDPθ, the
preference weight of the null alternative is θ. Hence, given state xθ := (xθ` , ` = 0, 1, . . . , θ)
and price pθ := (pθ` , ` = 1, . . . , θ), and given that a carrier checks the offers in the






























Consider any stationary pricing policy ϕθ : Nθ+1 7→ Rθ for MDPθ. As shown in Sec-
tion 3.5.3, there is a unique stationary distribution for the system state under policy ϕθ. Let
Xθ ∈ Nθ+1 denote a random system state with distribution equal to the unique stationary















































+ C xθ0 (θ-scaled DTFM)













− λψθ`−1 ∀` ≥ 1 (3.11a)
















∀` ≥ 1 (3.11c)
Let (x̂θ, p̂θ) denote an optimal solution to the θ-scaled DTFM. The open-loop policy
ϕ̂θ sets price p̂θ` for all loads with lead time `, i.e., ϕ̂
θ
`(x
θ) = p̂θ` for all x





where the second inequality follows from Theorem 3.4. To establish the asymptotic opti-
mality of policy ϕ̂θ, we bound the loss of policy ϕ̂θ relative to the optimal objective value
R̂θ of the θ-scaled DTFM, which is a lower bound for the optimal long-run average cost




→ 0 as θ → ∞. (3.12)
The following result shows that the prices p̂θ` are decreasing in `, and the bounds are
used in the asymptotic optimality proof.
Lemma 3.5. An optimal solution (x̂θ, p̂θ) for the θ-scaled DTFM satisfies x̂θ` ≤ λ for
` = 0, . . . , θ and p̂θ` ≤ C for ` = 1, . . . , θ. Also, preference weight v̂θ` := vθ` (p̂θ`) ≤ Kv :=
exp(βC + bmax) for all ` = 1, . . . , θ and all θ.
The proof is given in Appendix B.3.
We make the following two assumptions to facilitate further analysis, one on the optimal
prices for the θ-scaled DTFM and the other on the parameter µ.
55
Assumption 3.6. The optimal prices for the θ-scaled DTFM are bounded away from 0.
That is, there is a constant p > 0 such that p̂θ` ≥ p for all θ ∈ N and all ` = 1, . . . , θ.
Assumption 3.7. It holds that µKv < 1/4.
The first assumption requires that the output of the θ-scaled DTFM be sensible, as a
solution with zero or negative price implies that model inputs are chosen inappropriately.
The second assumption can be satisfied by choosing the length of each time period short
enough, so that µ (i.e., the probability that a driver arrives in one period) is sufficiently
small. We suspect that the condition of Assumption 3.7 is simply an artifact of our analysis
technique, and the result in this section should hold in general without this assumption.
Theorem 3.8. The open-loop pricing policy ϕ̂θ is asymptotically optimal. More specifi-






where K depends on the load and carrier arrival rates λ, µ, the choice model parameters
β, bmax, the penalty cost C, and the lower bound p.
The result above confirms that the open-loop pricing policy ϕ̂θ is effective when the
market size is large. Although the asymptotic optimality of open-loop (static) pricing poli-
cies has been established for various problems in the revenue management literature, it is
typical for the loss ratio, defined as in (3.12), to be O(1/
√
θ) in these papers, e.g. [44, 52].
The intuition for these results follows from the central limit theorem: when the supply and
demand processes are scaled up by θ, some O(
√
θ) term due to the random variation in
the system is ignored by the (deterministic) fluid approximation. Thus, it is surprising that
open-loop policy in our model setting obtains a much better loss ratio of O(1/θ).
We present the key steps of the proof below to show the intuition of the O(1/θ) bound
in the asymptotic optimality result. The proofs of supporting results are given in Ap-
pendix B.4.
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3.6.4 Proof of Theorem 3.8
Consider a state variable Xθ = (Xθl , l = 0, 1, . . . , θ) of the θ-scaled system under the
open-loop pricing policy ϕ̂θ. The first step of our proof is to show that under the stationary
distribution, the variance of a weighted sum of the loads in the system is bounded by O(θ).
Lemma 3.9. Suppose µKv < 1/4. Let Xθ denote the state vector under the stationary
distribution of the open-loop pricing policy ϕ̂θ. For any k = 1, . . . , θ and any sequence of









≤ (θ − k + 1)Kc, (3.13)
where Kc := 2/(1− 4µKv).
We note that the proof of Lemma 3.9 would have been easy if Xθj and X
θ
` are mutu-
ally independent for any j 6= `, as Var(Xθ` ) can be bounded by an absolute constant (see
Lemma B.3). However, the challenge is that because of drivers’ choice behavior, Xθj and
Xθ` are not mutually independent, and analyzing their covariance is very complicated. Our






directly, using an induction over the
time index and the ergodicity of the Markov chain induced by the open-loop pricing policy
ϕ̂θ.
Our next step is to bound the expected long-run average cost of the open-loop pricing

























for ` = 1, . . . , θ. Then the long-run average cost per discrete period of instance MDPθ
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where the expectations are with respect to the stationary distribution under the open-loop
pricing policy ϕ̂θ.
Denote the mean of the state variable under the stationary distribution by x̄θ = E[Xθ].




with rθ(p̂θ, x̄θ), but they are not equal because
the function rθ(p̂θ,xθ) is nonlinear. However, we can bound the difference between them
using Lemma 3.9, by leveraging the structure of the MNL choice model and a trick from
[72] that bounds the expected ratio of two random variables.













∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Kfθ , for any 1 ≤ k ≤ θ,
and
∣∣E [rθ(p̂θ,Xθ)]− rθ(p̂θ, x̄θ)∣∣ ≤ µCKf
θ
.
Using Lemma 3.10, we derive the last lemma we need, which bounds the difference
between the mean system state under the open-loop pricing policy and the solution for the
θ-scaled DTFM, i.e., x̄θ and x̂θ. The proof of Lemma 3.11 again exploits the structure of
θ-scaled DTFM, in particular its convex reformulation.
Lemma 3.11. There is a constantKx := µ(1+Kv)Kf > 0 such that for all ` = 0, 1, · · · , θ,





Finally, putting everything together, we establish our main result in Theorem 3.8.
Proof of Theorem 3.8. ConsiderRθ(ϕ̂θ) (the expected cost of the open-loop pricing policy)
























































































































































































where step (a) uses Lemma 3.10 and the definition of function rθ(p̂θ,xθ), and step (b) uses
Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.11.
Since all loads (arriving with rate λ per period) are either booked by some driver later
or eventually expire, by Assumption 3.6 and Lemma 3.5, the optimal objective value of the













and putting everything together, we have
Rθ(ϕ̂θ)− R̂θ
R̂θ









Numerical experiment in this section will give further insight into the structure of the open-
loop pricing policy and its asymptotic performance. We consider the following simulation
setup. Let θ be the scaling factor in the associated asymptotic regime. The arrival proba-
bilities of loads and drivers in each period are λ = 0.2 and µ = 0.3 respectively. When a
new load arrives, its initial lead time is θ. We consider a Homogeneous Preference setting
under the multinomial logit model, with price coefficient β = 0.5 and non-monetary utility
β0 = −5. The penalty cost of an expiring load is C = 20.
Long-Run Average Cost:
We compare the long-run average cost between our proposed open-loop pricing policy
(Static) and the optimal policy (Dynamic) obtained by solving the corresponding MDP. We
conduct 100 replicates of simulation trials of 10,000 periods to compute the average per
period cost under both policies while varying θ ∈ {3, 9, 15}.
Figure 3.4 shows the simulated long-run average costs per period with 95% confidence
intervals. We observe that the cost under the Static policy is very close to that under the
Dynamic policy, with an opimality gap within 1.7% even for a small scaling factor (θ = 3),
and a an opimality gap of 0.6% for a moderate scaling factor (θ = 15). We also report the
theoretical lower bound of the average costs under any stationary policy derived from the
θ-scaled DTFM, i.e., R̂θ. It can be observed that the gap between the simulated costs under
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Figure 3.4: Long-run average costs under the (optimal) Dynamic and Static policies (95%
confidence interval).
Order of the Loss Ratio:





is of order O(θ−1). We conduct 100 replicates of simulation trials of 2, 000 × θ peri-
ods, discarding the first half of the simulated periods and using the remainder to com-
pute the average per period cost under the open-loop pricing policy ϕ̂θ while varying
θ ∈ {10, 12, 15, 20, 30, 50, 100}. In Figure 3.5, the horizontal axis corresponds to 1/θ
and the vertical axis represents the loss ratio. We observe that our estimate on the order
of the loss in Theorem 3.8 holds numerically for this setup. The solid line reports the fit-
ted line of loss ratio against 1/θ, which is Loss Ratio = 0.3451/θ, and the coefficient of
determination R2 = 0.9769.
Optimal Static Price Trajectory:
Figure 3.6 plots the optimal static prices as a function of the lead time for the θ-scaled
DTFM, with scaling factor θ ∈ {10, 20, 30}. The horizontal axis correspond to lead time
and the vertical axis correspond to optimal static prices. The figure shows that the prices
are strictly decreasing in lead time, which intuitively means that the platform has to offer
a higher price if a load gets closer to the expiration time. Moreover, as the scaling factor θ
increases, we observe that the price curves from the θ-scaled DTFM converge to a smooth
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Figure 3.5: The order of loss ratio as a function of the scaling factor θ (95% confidence
interval).
price trajectory. This motivates us to study a continuous-time fluid model (CTFM), which
is presented in the next section.
Figure 3.6: Optimal static prices for different scaling factors (θ).
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3.7 Continuous-Time Fluid Model
While the convex discrete-time fluid model (Convex DTFM) is tractable, it is not easy to
analyze the final solution explicitly as a function of the lead time. Inspired by the θ-scaled
discrete-time fluid model (θ-scaled DTFM) for the θ-scaled stochastic system as discussed
in Section 3.6, we introduce a continuous-time fluid model (CTFM) in this section. We will
show that the CTFM can be transformed into an optimal control problem with linear con-
straints and a convex objective. Analyzing the resulted optimal control problem provides
managerial insights in the pricing problem and the associated open-loop pricing policy.
3.7.1 Formulation
As discussed in Section 3.6.2, we normalize the range of possible lead time to [0, 1]. Recall
that function Φ represents the CDF of the initial lead time of a load. We further assume Φ
is a continuous distribution, possibly with a point mass on 1. Let Φ(1−) = limx→1− Φ(x).
We let φ : [0, 1) 7→ R+ be the corresponding probability density function, which is assumed
to be continuous. Also, recall that b0 ∈ C0 represents the non-monetary utility for a load
with respect to its lead time. We further define a continuous preference weight function
v : [0, 1]× R 7→ R+ given by
v(τ, p) = exp(βp+ b0(τ)),
where τ represents the continuous lead time, p is the offered price, and β is the price sensi-
tivity coefficient. Similar to the Homogeneous Preference setting with discrete lead time,
if drivers are indifferent to lead time, we have b0(τ) ≡ β0 for some β0. When the con-
text is clear, we also refer to such setting with continuous lead time as the Homogeneous
Preference setting.
Revisiting the θ-scaled DTFM and letting the length of each lead time period ∆τ θ =
1/θ → 0 as θ → ∞, we derive a deterministic optimization problem with continuous lead
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time. More specifically, we let x : [0, 1] 7→ R+ be the deterministic system state, which
represents a load intensity function over the interested range of continuous lead time. One
can imagine a system of fluid flowing from location τ = 1 to location τ = 0, where
x(τ) corresponds to the volume of fluid that flows by location τ instantaneously. We let
p : [0, 1] 7→ R be the system control, which represents the offered price over lead time. We
further confine state x to be continuously differentiable, i.e., x ∈ C1, and control p to be
continuous. Letting ẋ represent the first order derivative of function x, we formulate the






p(τ) x(τ) v(τ, p(τ))∫ 1
0
x(τ ′) v(τ ′, p(τ ′)) dτ ′ + 1
dτ + C x(0) (CTFM)
s.t. ẋ(τ) = µ
x(τ) v(τ, p(τ))∫ 1
0
x(τ ′) v(τ ′, p(τ ′)) dτ ′ + 1
− λ φ(τ) ∀τ ∈ [0, 1], (3.14a)
x(1) = λ (1− Φ(1−)) (3.14b)
x(τ) ≥ 0 ∀τ ∈ [0, 1]. (3.14c)
The objective of the model is to minimize the instantaneous cost of the underlying deter-
ministic system. The integral term corresponds to the expected instantaneous payment to
drivers as they choose loads under the multinomial logit model, and the term C x(0) rep-
resents the instantaneous penalty cost incurred by expiring loads. Constraint (3.14a) is the
state equation, which governs the dynamics of the system state, representing the rate of
change in load intensity over lead time. There are two opposing forces that decide the rate
of change in load intensity, i.e., drivers booking available loads and new loads arriving into
the system. This constraint takes the form of an ordinary differential equation. We note
that its right hand side involves an integral term over the range of lead time, which makes
the constraint complex. Constraint (3.14b) defines the boundary condition on the system
state. Constraint (3.14c) is the nonnegativity constraint on the state.
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3.7.2 Alternative Formulation as An Optimal Control Problem
The CTFM seems difficult to solve at first glance. So, we change its variables to transform
the CTFM into a more tractable formulation. We follow a similar routine as described
in Section 3.5.2. We omit the details of the deduction process but report below the final
formulation.
We let x : [0, 1] 7→ R+ be the system state, and let u : [0, 1] 7→ R+ and u0 ∈ R+ be
the control. We further confine x ∈ C1 and u ∈ C0. Then, an alternative formulation to the



















(1− u0) ln(u0) + C x(0) (3.15a)
s.t. ẋ(τ) = µ u(τ)− λ φ(τ) ∀τ ∈ [0, 1], (3.15b)
x(1) = λ (1− Φ(1−)) (3.15c)
x(τ) ≥ 0, u(τ) ≥ 0 ∀τ ∈ [0, 1], (3.15d)∫ 1
0
u(τ)dτ + u0 = 1. (3.15e)
Although problem (3.15) is convex, it is an optimal control problem with complex path
constraint (3.15e). So, we further introduce an auxiliary state variable y : [0, 1] 7→ R+ such
that y ∈ C1, and translate constraint (3.15e) into
ẏ(τ) = − u(τ) with y(0) = 1.



















(1− y(1)) ln(y(1)) + C x(0)
(3.16a)
65
s.t. ẋ(τ) = µ u(τ)− λ φ(τ) ∀τ ∈ [0, 1], (3.16b)
ẏ(τ) = − u(τ) ∀τ ∈ [0, 1], (3.16c)
x(1) = λ (1− Φ(1−)), y(0) = 1 (3.16d)
x(τ) ≥ 0, y(τ) ≥ 0, u(τ) ≥ 0 ∀τ ∈ [0, 1], (3.16e)
where constraints (3.16b) and (3.16c) are state equations, describing the system dynamics
together with boundary condition (3.16d); constraint (3.16e) ensures nonnegativity on the
state and control variables. We note that problem (3.16) is in the form of an optimal control
problem with linear constraints and a convex objective.
Before further analyzing the structure of the optimal solution for problem 3.16, we
discuss how to recover the optimal price for the (CTFM) and the corresponding open-loop
pricing policy. Letting (x∗, y∗, u∗) be the optimal solution for the CTFM and u∗0 = y
∗(1),













Similar to the discussion in Section 3.6, we can use p∗ to set up a open-loop pricing policy
that offers a fixed price for loads with any continuous lead time. The open-loop pricing
policy can be regarded as a limiting case of the pricing policy for the θ-scaled stochastic
system as we let θ →∞, which achieves near optimal performance.
3.7.3 Structure of the Optimal Solution
To analyze the structural of the optimal solution for problem (3.16), we let π1 : [0, 1] 7→ R
and π2 : [0, 1] 7→ R be the costate variables to the state equations (3.16b) and (3.16c). The
costate variables can be viewed as Lagrange multipliers associated with the state equations
or the shadow prices [73, 74]. A solution is optimal for the optimal control problem (3.16)
if its Hamiltonian and the costate variables satisfy certain conditions, see details in Ap-
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pendix B.5 and [75].
We first discuss the properties of the optimal solution under a general initial lead time
CDF Φ. While a closed-form expression for the optimal solution is difficult to find, these
properties provide insights into the structure of the optimal solution and are interesting in
themselves.
Theorem 3.12. Suppose an optimal solution (x∗, y∗, u∗) for problem (3.16) exists. Let
(x∗, p∗) be the corresponding optimal solution for the CTFM. We have the following state-
ments:
a) The solution (x∗, y∗, u∗) is a global optimal solution.
b) There is a costate π∗1 to the state equation (3.16b) such that π
∗
1 is increasing with
π∗1(0) = −C.





− ln (u∗0) for
some u∗0 ∈ [0, 1].
d) The optimal price trajectory p∗ is decreasing.
By Theorem 3.12, we know that the optimal price trajectory is decreasing in lead time.
Recall that in Theorem 3.3, we require Homogeneous Preference for the optimal price for
the MDP to be decreasing in lead time in each state, and the property does not generally
hold when we consider Heterogeneous Preference. Here, in the fluid model, we are op-
timizing a static price trajectory from an averaging perspective. So, regardless of drivers’
preference toward lead time, the platform should always post a higher price for loads with a
shorter lead time under the open-loop pricing policy, which is consistent with our intuition.
Next, we discuss an interesting special case, in which all arriving loads have the same
lead time and drivers have homogeneous preference toward lead time. A closed-form ex-
pression for the optimal solution can be obtained for this case. Surprisingly, in the optimal
solution, we can show that the loads remaining in the system will decrease at a linear rate
once they arrive to the platform.
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Corollary 3.13 (Same Initial Lead Time). In the Homogeneous Preference setting, i.e.,
b0(τ) ≡ β0, and with all new loads arriving with lead time equal to 1, i.e., Φ(1−) = 0, an
optimal solution (x∗, y∗, u∗), if existing, for problem (3.16) is given in the following form:
x∗(τ) = [λ− µ(1− u∗0)] + µ(1− u∗0)τ, y∗(τ) = 1− (1− u∗0)τ, and u∗(τ) = 1− u∗0,






[λ− µ(1− u∗0)] + µ(1− u∗0)τ
λ− µ(1− u∗0)
)









where u∗0 ∈ (0, 1) and λ > µ(1− u∗0). And, u∗0 is determined by solving a convex program.
3.7.4 Numerical Experiment
We use simulation to show how different arrival and preference patterns change the solu-
tions for the CTFM. Throughout the section, we assume the arrival rates of loads and drivers
are λ = 0.2 and µ = 0.3 respectively. The penalty cost of an expiring load is C = 20.
Different Arrival Patterns:
We consider three different settings on the initial lead time of a new load. Setting A:
All loads arrive with the largest lead time, i.e., Φ(1−) = 0 and Φ(1) = 1. Setting B: The
initial lead time is uniformly distributed, i.e., Φ(τ) = τ for τ ∈ [0, 1]. Setting C: The initial
lead time is distributed with cumulative distribution function Φ(τ) = τ 2 for τ ∈ [0, 1].
Drivers are indifferent toward lead time with preference weight v(τ, p) = exp(0.5×p−5).
Figure 3.7 shows the optimal state and price trajectories for the CTFM in the above settings.
As shown by Corollary 3.13, the optimal state trajectory in Setting A is a straight line.
Interestingly, in Settings B and C, we observe that the optimal state trajectories first increase
than decrease, which reflects the balance between new loads arriving and drivers booking
loads over the lead time. In all three settings, the optimal prices are decreasing with lead
time, which validates property d) of Theorem 3.12.
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Setting A
(Max Initial Lead Time)
Setting B
(Uniform Initial Lead Time)
Setting C
(Biased Initial Lead Time)
Figure 3.7: CTFM solutions with different load arrival patterns
Different Preference Patterns:
The initial lead time of a new load follows a triangle distribution with mode 0.5 over
the range [0, 1]. We consider three different settings on the preference weight function
v(τ, p) over lead time τ ∈ [0, 1]. Setting I: Drivers prefer loads with a shorter lead time,
with preference weight v(τ, p) = exp(0.5× p− 4− 2τ). Setting II: Drivers are indifferent
toward lead time with preference weight v(τ, p) = exp(0.5×p−5), i.e., the Homogeneous
Preference setting. Setting III: Drivers prefer loads with a longer lead time, with preference
weight v(τ, p) = exp(0.5×p−6+2τ). We note that the average values of the non-monetary
utility over lead time in the above three settings are the same.
Figure 3.8 shows the optimal state and price trajectories for the CTFM in the above
settings. We observe that as drivers prefer loads with a shorter lead time, the state trajectory
is biasing leftward with a higher peak, and the price trajectory is biasing downward, which
implies a lower average cost.
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Setting I




(Prefer Longer Lead Time)
Figure 3.8: CTFM solutions with different driver preference patterns
3.8 Extensions
As shown in Section 3.7, the continuous-time fluid model (CTFM) provides a unified for-
mulation to set a open-loop pricing policy if we consider continuous lead time. Established
tools in the optimal control theory can be used to analyze and solve this fluid model. In
this section, we further consider some practical settings arisen in the implementations for
pricing in the truckload marketplace. We show that the CTFM can be easily extended to
accommodate these settings. We note that all the resulted formulations can be further trans-
formed into tractable formulations using similar tricks as discussed in Section 3.7.2, so we
only present below the formulations with the original control variable on price.
3.8.1 Heterogeneous Load Types
In the previous sections, for simplicity, we considered pricing for loads with a homoge-
neous type (e.g., same origin and destination). However, both the MDP and the fluid mod-
els can easily incorporate loads of different types (e.g., different origins and destinations),
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if we assume all loads can be categorized into finitely many types. Here we consider the
CTFM studied in Section 3.7.
Let q = 1, . . . , Q index the (finite) load types. Correspondingly, we add one dimension
on load type, represented by subscript q, to the state variable x, the control variable p, the
preference weight v, penalty cost C and parameters λ, Φ, φ. This leads to the following






















′)vq(τ ′, pq(τ ′))dτ ′ + 1
− λq φq(τ)
for τ ∈ [0, 1], q = 1, . . . , Q,
xq(1) = λq (1− Φq(1−)) for q = 1, . . . , Q,
xq(τ) ≥ 0 for τ ∈ [0, 1], q = 1, . . . , Q.
3.8.2 Periodic Arrival Patterns
For the the basic model, we assume that the load demand rate λ and the driver supply rate
µ are constants in the long-run. In practice, the truckload market faces strong seasonality
patterns in both load shipment demand and trucker supply [76]. Let Tλ and Tµ denote the
periods of the loads and the drivers arrival patterns respectively and assume Tλ = Tµ = T
without loss of generality. We note that we can let T be sufficiently large so the setting
handles general arrival patterns.
Adding a new dimension of clock time, indexed by t, to the corresponding variables and








p(τ, t)x(τ, t)v(τ, p(τ, t))dτ∫ 1
0










x(τ, t)v(τ, p(τ, t))∫ 1
0
x(τ ′, t)v(τ ′, p(τ ′, t))dτ ′ + 1
− λ(t) φ(τ)
for τ ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [0, T ], (3.18b)
x(1, t) = λ(t) (1− Φ(1−)) for t ∈ [0, T ], (3.18c)
x(τ, 0) = x(τ, T ), p(τ, 0) = p(τ, T ) for τ ∈ [0, 1], (3.18d)
x(τ, t) ≥ 0 for τ ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.18e)
In the above formulation, the objective (3.18a) minimizes the total cost incurred within a
cycle of T units of clock time. Constraint (3.18b) represents the dynamics of the system,
which is defined by a directional derivative over state x. The direction taken by the direc-
tional derivative has opposing signs before lead time τ and clock time t, since the lead time
of any load decreases as time passes. Constraint (3.18c) sets the boundary condition on
state x. Constraint (3.18d) ensures that the values of the state x at the beginning and the
end of the cycle match, and so do the values of the control p. Constraint (3.18e) enforces
nonnegativity.
3.9 Concluding Remarks
We study a dynamic pricing problem for online truckload marketplace where carriers choose
among available loads on the platforms. We formulate the problem as an infinite horizon,
discrete-time, average cost Markov decision process and incorporate a multinomial logit
model to depict carriers’ choice behavior. We consider a deterministic approximation of
the problem and formulate a discrete-time fluid model (DTFM). A near optimal pricing
policy based on the solution of the DTFM is proposed, which exhibits a loss ratio of order
O(1/θ) when the market size is scaled by θ. We further formulate a continuous-time fluid
model (CTFM) and discuss several extensions.
There are several potential avenues for future research. In our study, the arrivals of new
loads are exogenous, i.e., how we charge shippers does not affect the load arrivals. One can
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relax this assumption and study the corresponding pricing problems. Also, we assume that
drivers are myopic and do not wait in the system for prices to change. It would be interest-
ing to examine settings where drivers are strategic to the pricing policy and find remedies
to combat strategic behaviors. Lastly, we put less emphasis on the calibration of the under-
lying choice model. It would be helpful to work with the industry to validate the eligibility
of the multinomial logit model or find alternative choice models.
73
CHAPTER 4
REVENUME MANAGEMENT UNDER A MIXTURE OF MULTINOMIAL
LOGIT AND INDEPENDENT DEMAND MODELS
4.1 Overview
A growing body of literature indicates that using choice models to capture customer sub-
stitution between products can provide significant improvements in the revenues [39, 77].
However, an inherent tension is involved in picking a choice model with which to capture
the choice process of the customers. A more sophisticated choice model may capture the
choice process of the customers more faithfully, whereas a simpler choice model may re-
sult in tractable optimization problems when finding the optimal assortment of products to
offer or prices to charge.
We consider assortment optimization problems under a mixture of multinomial logit
and independent demand models. The multinomial logit model is arguably one of the most
prevalent choice models for capturing customer choice behavior. In the multinomial logit
model, each customer associates a random utility with each product and the no-purchase
option, choosing the available alternative with the largest utility. The independent demand
model has been a reliable workhorse, which is relatively simple to estimate and often yields
tractable models for making operational decisions [78]. In the independent demand model,
a customer arrives into the system with a particular product in mind. If this product is
unavailable, then she leaves without a purchase. In this chapter, we mix these two very
common demand models, which is, perhaps, the most natural approach to combine the rep-
resentational power of both models. Some customers make a purchase under the multino-
mial logit model, whereas others do so under the independent demand model. The demand
emerges as a mixture of these two customer segments.
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Main Contributions: We give algorithms for numerous assortment problems, charac-
terize the structure of optimal assortments, and check the prediction effectiveness of our
choice model.
Assortment Optimization. In the single-shot assortment optimization problem, we have
a certain revenue for each product. Customers choose among the offered products ac-
cording to our mixture choice model. The goal is to find an assortment of products that
maximizes the expected revenue obtained from a customer. We show that we can solve a
polynomial-sized linear program (LP) to find the optimal assortment (Theorem 4.2). Thus,
the assortment optimization problem under our mixture choice model is efficiently solv-
able. Assortment optimization problems under mixtures of choice models are notoriously
difficult. For example, the assortment optimization problem under a mixture of just two
multinomial logit models is NP-hard [29]. To our knowledge, we are the first to give an
efficient method for assortment optimization under a mixture of choice models.
Combinatorial Algorithm. We show that if a product, all else being equal, has a larger
purchase probability in the independent demand model or a smaller preference weight in the
multinomial logit model, then it becomes more attractive to offer in the optimal assortment
(Theorem 4.3). Besides shedding light on the structure of the optimal assortment, this
result allows us to give a combinatorial algorithm for assortment optimization. Although a
combinatorial algorithm exists, our LP formulation ultimately becomes useful for network
revenue management.
Network Revenue Management. We consider assortment-based network revenue man-
agement problems, where we have resources with limited capacities and the sale of each
product consumes a combination of resources. The goal is to find a policy for deciding
which assortment of products to offer to each arriving customer to maximize the total ex-
pected revenue over a finite selling horizon. We consider a previously proposed LP ap-
proximation in which the decision variables are the probabilities with which we offer each
subset of products to the customers. Thus, the number of decision variables increases ex-
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ponentially with the number of products. We show that if the customers choose according
to our mixture choice model, then we can immediately reduce the LP approximation to a
compact LP whose numbers of decision variables and constraints increase only quadrati-
cally with the number of products (Theorem 4.4). We show that we can recover an optimal
solution to the original LP approximation by using an optimal solution to the compact LP
(Theorem 4.6). Lastly, in our computational experiments, we demonstrate that our compact
LP substantially reduces the computation times.
4.2 Related Literature
The optimal assortment under the multinomial logit model is nested by revenue [16, 15],
including a certain number of products with the largest revenues. This structure does not
hold under our mixture choice model. The assortment optimization problem under a mix-
ture of multinomial logit models is NP-hard even when there are only two multinomial logit
models in the mixture [28, 79, 29]. The authors give approximation schemes and integer
programming formulations. Also, it is NP-hard to approximate the problem within a factor
of O(1/m1−ε) for any ε > 0 [80], where m is the number of multinomial logit models in
the mixture.
Researchers have developed LP formulations for assortment optimization problems,
e.g., [18] for the generalized attraction model and [30] for the Markov chain choice model.
One can build on these LP formulations to obtain compact LP formulations for network
revenue management problems. The multinomial logit model is a special case of both the
generalized attraction and Markov chain choice models, but our mixture of multinomial
logit and independent demand models is not a special case of these choice models. Thus,
we resort to entirely different techniques to obtain the LP formulations in this chapter. A
compact formulation is given in [22] for a nonlinear program that appears when jointly
making product stocking and assortment decisions under the multinomial logit model. In
[81], the authors give an LP formulation for assortment optimization under the multinomial
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logit model when there are constraints on the offered assortment that can be captured by a
totally unimodular constraint matrix.
Motivated by online retail, in which customers examine search results page by page,
[82], [83] and [84] develop extensions of the multinomial logit model that allow the cus-
tomers to incrementally view the products in batches. The authors give algorithms for
finding the optimal sequence of product batches to offer. Consideration sets are incorpo-
rated in [85], [86] and [87], where each customer focuses only on the set of products in
her consideration set and chooses within the consideration set under the multinomial logit
model. Dynamic assortment optimization problems under the multinomial logit model are
considered in [88] and [89], where the assortments offered to the customers are dictated
by the inventory remaining on the shelf. We focus our literature review on the multino-
mial logit model, but assortment optimization has been studied under other choice models.
For representative approaches, we refer to [31], [90], [91], and [92] for rank-based choice
model, [93] for the Markov chain choice model, [25], [94], [27], and [95] for the nested
logit model, and [96] for the paired combinatorial logit model.
Incorporating customer choice into network revenue management problems is an active
area of research. LP approximations are given in [16] and [17] for these problems. The
number of decision variables in their LP approximation increases exponentially with the
number of products. Under our mixture choice model, we are able to reduce the size of
their LP dramatically. Other approaches to these problems are based on approximating the
value functions. For such approaches, we refer to reference [97, 19, 98, 99, 100].
4.3 Problem Formulation
The set of products is N = {1, . . . , n}. There are two customer segments. The customers
in the first segment make a purchase according to the multinomial logit model. In the
multinomial logit model, we use vi > 0 to denote the preference weight of product i. We




to capture the total preference weight of the products in the subset S ⊆ N . In this case,
if we offer the subset S ⊆ N of products, then a customer in the first segment purchases
product i ∈ S with probability vi/(1 + V (S)). The customers in the second segment make
a purchase according to the independent demand model. In the independent demand model,
we use θi > 0 to denote the probability that a customer is interested in product i. In this
case, if we offer the subset S ⊆ N of products, then a customer in the second segment
purchases product i ∈ S with probability θi. The probability that an arriving customer is
in the first segment is β. Thus, if we offer the subset S ⊆ N of products, then a customer
purchases product i ∈ S with probability β vi
1+V (S)
+ (1 − β) θi. For notational brevity,
throughout the chapter, we normalize the size of the first segment to one, in which case the
size of the second segment relative to the first one is λ = (1 − β)/β. Thus, if we offer
the subset S ⊆ N of products, then a customer purchases product i ∈ S with the scaled
probability vi
1+V (S)
+λ θi. If a customer purchases product i, then we obtain a revenue of ri.
Our goal is to find a subset, or an assortment, to offer that maximizes the expected revenue












Since we normalize the size of the first segment to one, we can have vi
1+V (S)
+ λ θi > 1, but
we can recover the purchase probabilities by scaling vi
1+V (S)
+ λ θi for all i ∈ N with β.
Working with such a mixture of the multinomial logit and independent demand models
in the Mixture problem introduces nontrivial challenges. If we do not have the indepen-
dent demand model in the mixture, then we can express the expected revenue under the
multinomial logit model as a fraction, whose numerator and denominator are both linear
functions, allowing us to use fractional programming techniques when solving the assort-
ment optimization problem. We lose this fractional structure in the Mixture problem, but we
will show that we can still solve this problem efficiently. Moreover, under only the multi-
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nomial logit model, there exists an optimal assortment that is nested by revenue, where
we offer a certain number of products with the largest revenues. We lose the nested-by-
revenue structure of the optimal solution in the Mixture problem. In Table 4.1, considering
a problem instance with n = 3, (r1, r2, r3) = (50, 10, 5), (v1, v2, v3) = (0.5, 5, 0.01),
(θ1, θ2, θ3) = (0.05, 0.25, 0.7), and λ = 1, we show the expected revenue provided by each
assortment. The optimal assortment is {1, 3}, which does not offer the product with second
largest revenue, but offers the product with the smallest revenue. In this problem instance,
noting that θ3 = 0.7, the customer segment with the independent demand model is inter-
ested in product 3 with a relatively large probability, so we offer product 3 to exploit this
relatively large probability. Moreover, noting that v2 = 5, the customer segment with the
multinomial logit model associates a relatively large preference weight with product 2, but
the revenue of product 2 is much smaller than that of product 1. Thus, product 2, if offered,
attracts a significant fraction of the customer segment with the multinomial logit model
while providing much smaller revenue than product 1, so we do not offer product 2. In the
next section, we show that, roughly speaking, an optimal solution to the Mixture problem
prioritizes product i when θi/vi is larger, so a larger value for θi and a smaller value for
vi make product i more attractive to offer, which is consistent with the observation from
Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Expected revenue provided by all possible assortments
Assort. Exp. Rev. Assort. Exp. Rev.
∅ 0 {1, 2} 16.54
{1} 19.17 {1, 3} 22.59
{2} 10.83 {2, 3} 14.33
{3} 3.55 {1, 2, 3} 20.03
Lastly, the multinomial logit model is a special case of the Markov chain choice model
[30]. An example in Appendix C.1 shows that the mixture of multinomial logit and inde-
pendent demand models is not a special case of the Markov chain choice model. Thus,
existing results under the Markov chain choice model do not apply to our problem.
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4.4 Assortment Optimization
In this section, we give an LP formulation for the Mixture problem and show that there
exists an optimal solution that gives high priority to product i when θi/vi is large. Using


















vi xi = 1,
xi ≤ x0 ∀ i ∈ N,
yij ≤ xi ∀ i, j ∈ N, yij ≤ xj ∀ i, j ∈ N
}
.
Before showing that we can obtain an optimal solution to the Mixture problem by using the
Assortment LP, we provide some intuition regarding the LP above. Using 1(·) to denote the
indicator function, given a solution Ŝ ⊆ N to the Mixture problem, we construct a solution
(x̂0, x̂, ŷ) to the Assortment LP by setting x̂0 = 11+V (Ŝ) , x̂i = 1(i ∈ Ŝ) x̂0, and ŷij =
1(i ∈ Ŝ, j ∈ Ŝ) x̂0. Noting that
∑
i∈N vi x̂i = x̂0
∑
i∈N vi 1(i ∈ Ŝ) = x̂0 V (Ŝ), we have
x̂0 +
∑
i∈N vi x̂i = x̂0 (1+V (Ŝ)) = 1, so the solution (x̂0, x̂, ŷ) satisfies the first constraint
in the Assortment LP. Moreover, since 1(i ∈ Ŝ) ≤ 1, 1(i ∈ Ŝ, j ∈ Ŝ) ≤ 1(i ∈ Ŝ), and
1(i ∈ Ŝ, j ∈ Ŝ) ≤ 1(j ∈ Ŝ), the solution (x̂0, x̂, ŷ) satisfies the remaining constraints in
















(vi + λ θi) 1(i ∈ Ŝ) + λ θi
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vi + λ θi + λ θi
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j∈N
vj 1(j ∈ Ŝ)
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vi + λ θi (1 + V (Ŝ))
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which is the objective function of the Mixture problem evaluated at Ŝ. Thus, given a solu-
tion to the Mixture problem, we can construct a feasible solution to the Assortment LP, and
the objective values of the two solutions match. To show that the Assortment LP is equiva-
lent to the Mixture problem, we need to show the converse statement as well, which is what
we do next. Note how collecting the terms λ θi x̂i and λ θi
∑
j∈N ŷij above surprisingly
yields the purchase probability of product i in the customer segment with the independent
demand model.
To establish the converse statement, we build on the next lemma, which shows an im-
portant property of the basic feasible solutions to the Assortment LP.
Lemma 4.1 (Extreme Point Solutions). Let (x̂0, x̂, ŷ) be a basic feasible solution to the
Assortment LP. Then, we have x̂i ∈ {0, x̂0} for all i ∈ N .
The proof of Lemma 4.1 follows by showing that if x̂i ∈ (0, x̂0) for some i ∈ N , then
we can perturb the solution (x̂0, x̂, ŷ) to obtain two feasible solutions to the Assortment
LP such that (x̂0, x̂, ŷ) is a convex combination of the two feasible solutions. Note that
perturbing x̂i may require perturbing the other elements of the solution (x̂0, x̂, ŷ) to ensure
feasibility. We give the proof in Appendix C.2. In the next theorem, we use the above
lemma to show that we can obtain an optimal solution to the Mixture problem by using an
optimal solution to the Assortment LP.
Theorem 4.2 (LP Formulation). For a basic optimal solution (x∗0,x∗,y∗) to the Assort-
ment LP, let S∗ = {i ∈ N : x∗i > 0}. Then, S∗ is an optimal solution to the Mixture prob-
lem.
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Proof. Let Ŝ be an optimal solution to the Mixture problem providing the optimal objective
value ẑ, and let z∗LP be the optimal objective value of the Assortment LP. By the discus-
sion at the beginning of this section, given the solution Ŝ to the Mixture problem, we can
construct a feasible solution to the Assortment LP with the objective value of ẑ. Therefore,
we have z∗LP ≥ ẑ. On the other hand, by Lemma 4.1, we have x∗i = x∗0 for all i ∈ S∗ and
x∗i = 0 for all i ∈ N \S∗. Since (x∗0,x∗,y∗) is a feasible solution to the Assortment LP, by









= x∗i for all i ∈ S∗. In
this case, by the last two constraints, we also get y∗ij ≤ 11+V (S∗) for all i, j ∈ S
∗. If i 6∈ S∗
or j 6∈ S∗, then x∗i = 0 or x∗j = 0, so we have y∗ij = 0. Let Q∗ = {i ∈ S∗ : ri < 0},
and recall that z∗LP is the optimal objective value of the Assortment LP and ẑ is the optimal
objective value of the Mixture problem. Since x∗i = 0 when i 6∈ S∗ and y∗ij = 0 when i 6∈ S∗







(vi + λ θi)x
∗












(vi + λ θi)x
∗












(vi + λ θi)x
∗













vi + λ θi












(vi + λ θi)x
∗





















(vi + λ θi)x
∗





















(vi + λ θi)x
∗













(vi + λ θi)x
∗








Here, (a) holds since ri ≥ 0 and x∗i = 11+V (S∗) for all i ∈ S
∗ \ Q∗ and y∗ij ≤ 11+V (S∗) ,
whereas (b) holds since S∗ \Q∗ is a feasible but not necessarily an optimal solution to the
Mixture problem.
Noting that ri < 0 for all i ∈ Q∗, we have
∑










i∈Q∗ ri ((vi + λ θi)x
∗




ij) < 0, then the above chain of inequalities
yields z∗LP < ẑ, contradicting the fact that z
∗
LP ≥ ẑ, which we established at the beginning
of the proof. Therefore, we have
∑






ij) = 0, but since
x∗i > 0, r
∗
i < 0 and vi + λ θi > 0 for all i ∈ Q∗, for the last equality to hold, we must
have Q∗ = ∅. Since Q∗ = ∅, noting that zLP ≥ ẑ, all the inequalities in the above chain of
inequalities hold as equalities. In particular, since (b) holds as an equality and Q∗ = ∅, the
objective value provided by the solution S∗ \Q∗ = S∗ for the Mixture problem is ẑ, so S∗
is an optimal solution to the Mixture problem. 
The proof of Theorem 4.2 also shows that the Mixture problem and the Assortment LP
have the same optimal objective values. In the proof of the theorem, we do not assume
that the revenues of the products are non-negative. We will build on Theorem 4.2 when
examining network revenue management problems. In that setting, the revenues of the
products will be adjusted by the opportunity costs of the capacities used by the products,
in which case, the revenues of some of the products can be negative. Nevertheless, when
we focus only on solving the Mixture problem, we can a priori drop from consideration
all products with nonpositive revenues, since if we drop such products, then the expected
revenue from any assortment stays at least as large.
Prioritization of Products in an Optimal Assortment:
We give a result to intuitively suggest that there exists an optimal solution to the Mixture
problem that prioritizes product i when ri is larger or when θi/vi is larger. Besides pro-
viding insight into the structure of the optimal assortment, this result allows us to construct
a combinatorial algorithm for solving the Mixture problem. We start by reformulating the
Mixture problem. Define the decision variables w = {wi : i ∈ N} ∈ {0, 1}n, where
wi = 1 if and only if we offer product i. Using z∗ to denote the optimal objective value of






























where the second equality follows by arranging the terms. As a function ofw, let G(w) be
the expression in the numerator of the fraction on the right side of (4.1).




for all w ∈ {0, 1}n, and the inequality holds as
equality at the optimal solution w∗ to the Mixture problem. Thus, for all w ∈ {0, 1}n, we
have






































where the first equality follows by using the definition of G(w). Once again, the inequality
above holds for all w ∈ {0, 1}n, and it holds as an equality at the optimal solution w∗
to the Mixture problem. Thus, an optimal solution to the Mixture problem is a maximizer
of the expression on the right side above over all w ∈ {0, 1}n. In other words, letting
F (w) =
∑







i∈N ri λ θiwi
)
capture the ex-
pression on the right side above as a function ofw,w∗ is an optimal solution to the problem
maxw∈{0,1}n F (w).
In the next theorem, we use the discussion in the previous paragraph to provide insight
into the structure of an optimal solution to the Mixture problem.
























Proof. By the discussion preceding the theorem, lettingw∗ be an optimal solution to prob-
lem (4.1), we have w∗ = arg maxw∈{0,1}n F (w). If we drop all products with nonposi-
tive revenues from an assortment, then the expected revenue from the assortment stays at
least as large, so we focus on the case where ri > 0 for all i ∈ N . For each i ∈ N ,
the only term in F (w) that depends on wi in a nonlinear fashion is vi ri λ θiw2i . Thus,
F (w) is directionally convex. In this case, we can relax the binary constraints to get







i∈N ri λ θiw
∗
i for no-


































(1 + V ∗)
)
− z∗ + Θ∗
)
.
We use fi(w∗) to denote the derivative above. To show the result by contradiction, assume
thatw∗k = 1 andw
∗
` = 0 for some k, ` ∈ N , and rk(1+λ
θk
vk
(1+V ∗)) ≤ r`(1+λ θ`v` (1+V
∗)).
Since w∗ = arg maxw∈[0,1]n F (w) and w∗k = 1, we have fk(w
∗) ≥ 0. Otherwise, a
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− z∗ + Θ∗





(1 + V ∗)
)




In this case, noting that rk(1 + λ θkvk (1 + V
∗)) ≤ r`(1 + λ θ`v` (1 + V
∗)), all the inequalities
above must hold as equalities. In particular, we have r`(1 + λ θ`v` (1 + V
∗))− z∗ + Θ∗ = 0.
Define the solution ŵ = {ŵi : i ∈ N} as ŵi = w∗i for all i ∈ N \ {`} and ŵ` = 1.
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Using the fact that the solutions ŵ and w∗ differ only in the decision variable w`, we have
F (ŵ)− F (w∗) = v`
(





+ (V ∗ + v`)(Θ








(1 + V ∗)
)
− z∗ + Θ∗
)
+ v` r` λ θ`
(a)
= v` r` λ θ` > 0,
where (a) holds since r`(1 + λ θ`v` (1 + V
∗)) − z∗ + Θ∗ = 0. Having F (ŵ) − F (w∗) > 0
contradicts the fact that w∗ is an optimal solution to the problem maxw∈[0,1]n F (w). 
By the theorem above, if product i has a larger value for ri or θi/vi, then the optimal as-
sortment prioritizes this product. Besides providing insight into the structure of the optimal
assortment, we can use Theorem 4.3 to construct a combinatorial algorithm for solving the
Mixture problem. If we knew the value of V (S∗), then letting t = V (S∗), we could index the
products such that r1(1 + λ θ1v1 (1 + t)) ≥ r2(1 +λ
θ2
v2
(1 + t)) ≥ . . . ≥ rn(1 +λ θnvn (1 + t)),
in which case an optimal assortment would be of the form {1, . . . , i} for some i ∈ N . Thus,
we would obtain an optimal assortment by checking the expected revenue from O(n) can-
didate assortments, each of which is of the form {1, . . . , i} for some i ∈ N . To deal with
the fact that we do not know the value of V (S∗), we adopt an approach from [23]. Note that
gi(t) = ri(1 + λ
θi
vi
(1 + t)) is a linear function of t. The n lines {gi(·) : i ∈ N} intersect
at O(n2) points. Let t1 ≤ t2 ≤ . . . ≤ tK with K = O(n2) be the intersection points of the
n lines {gi(·) : i ∈ N}. That is, for each k = 1, . . . , K, we have gi(tk) = gj(tk) for some
i, j ∈ N . Letting t0 = 0 and tK+1 =∞ for notational uniformity, for each k = 0, . . . , K, if
t takes values in the interval [tk, tk+1), then the ordering between the values {gi(t) : i ∈ N}
does not change. To capture this ordering, we let the permutation (σk1 , . . . , σ
k
n) ∈ Nn be
such that gσk1 (t) ≥ gσk2 (t) ≥ . . . ≥ gσkn(t) for all t ∈ [t
k, tk+1). In this case, we obtain the
optimal assortment by checking the expected revenue from O(n3) candidate assortments,
each of which is of the form {σk1 , . . . , σki } for some i ∈ N , k = 0, . . . , K.
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Thus, we can solve the Mixture problem without using an LP, but the Assortment LP
becomes critical when we work with network revenue management problems.
4.5 Network Revenue Management
In the network revenue management setting, we have a set of resources, each with limited
capacity. There is a finite number of time periods in the selling horizon. We choose the
assortment of products to offer at each time period. The customer arriving at a time period
chooses among the products according to a choice model. If the customer purchases a prod-
uct, then we consume the capacities of a combination of resources and generate a revenue,
both of which depend on the purchased product. The goal is to find a policy for choosing
the assortment of products to offer at each time period to maximize the total expected rev-
enue over the selling horizon. In [16] and [17], respectively, the authors formulate an LP
approximation for the network revenue management problem. In their LP approximation,
we have one decision variable for each assortment of products that we can offer to the cus-
tomers, capturing the frequency with which we offer each assortment. Thus, the number
of decision variables increases exponentially with the number of products, and it may be
computationally cumbersome to solve the LP approximation.
In this section, we show that if the customers choose according to a mixture of multi-
nomial logit and independent demand models, then we can formulate an equivalent LP
whose number of decision variables and constraints increases only quadratically with the
number of products. The optimal objective values of the two formulations are equal, and
we can recover an optimal solution to one formulation by using an optimal solution to the
other. To pin down the network revenue management problem, let T be the number of time
periods in the selling horizon. At each time period, we have one customer arrival. The
set of resources is M = {1, . . . ,m}. The capacity of resource q is cq. The set of products
is N = {1, . . . , n}. If we offer the assortment S ⊆ N of products, then a customer pur-
chases product i ∈ S with probability vi
1+V (S)
+ λ θi, in which case we generate a revenue
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of ri and consume aqi units of the capacity of resource q. We use the decision variables
w = {w(S) : S ⊆ N}, where w(S) is the probability that we offer assortment S at a time
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+ λ θi) is the expected revenue at a time period at which we
offer assortment S, the objective function above is the total expected revenue over the
selling horizon. The first constraint ensures that the total expected capacity consumption
of a resource does not exceed its capacity. The second constraint ensures that we offer an
assortment at each time period.
To give an equivalent formulation for the Choice-Based LP, using the decision variables
(x0,x,y) ∈ R× Rn+n
2































vi xi = 1,
xi ≤ x0 ∀ i ∈ N,
yij ≤ xi ∀ i, j ∈ N, yij ≤ xj ∀ i, j ∈ N
}
.
The objective function of the Compact LP is the total expected revenue over the selling
horizon. It turns out that we can use the expression (vi + λ θi)xi + λ θi
∑
j∈N vj yij to
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capture the expected number of purchases for product i at a time period. Remarkably, we
can capture the expected number of purchases for the products by associating one decision
variable with each product, as well as with each pair of products, rather than by associating
one decision variable with each assortment of products. The first constraint ensures that
the total expected capacity consumption of a resource does not exceed its capacity. The
remaining constraints ensure that the choices of the customers are governed by our mixture
choice model. We have 2n decision variables and m + 1 constraints in the Choice-Based
LP, but n2 + n+ 1 decision variables and 2n2 + n+m+ 1 constraints in the Compact LP.
While solving the Choice-Based LP almost always requires using column generation, we
may directly solve the Compact LP without using column generation.
There are heuristic policies that use an optimal primal or dual solution to the Choice-
Based LP to decide which assortment of products to offer at each time period. In a ran-
domized offer policy, letting w∗ be an optimal solution to the Choice-Based LP, we offer
assortment S with probability w∗(S), after adjusting the offered assortment to accommo-
date the availabilities of the resources [54]. On the other hand, in a bid-price policy, letting
µ∗ = {µ∗q : q ∈ M} be the optimal values of the dual variables associated with the
first constraint in the Choice-Based LP, we use µ∗q to capture the opportunity cost of a
unit of resource q. If a customer purchases product i, then the opportunity cost of the re-



















q), in which case we offer an assortment that maxi-
mizes this expected net revenue, once again after adjusting the assortment to accommodate
the availabilities of the resources [19]. The discussion in this paragraph indicates that it
is important to recover both optimal primal and dual solutions to the Choice-Based LP by
using the Compact LP. In the next theorem, we show that the optimal objective values
of the Choice-Based LP and Compact LP are equal and we can recover an optimal dual
solution to the former by using the latter. In the next section, we focus on recovering an
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optimal primal solution to the Choice-Based LP by using the Compact LP. It turns out that
relating the primal solutions of the two formulations will require more work. Lastly, we
note that the choice models that govern the choices of the customers at all time periods in
the Choice-Based LP have the same parameters. If the choices of the customers at differ-
ent time periods are governed by choice models with different parameters, then we need
to work with the decision variables {wt(S) : S ⊆ N, t = 1, . . . , T}, where wt(S) is the
probability that we offer assortment S at time period t. All of our results continue to hold
in this case.
Theorem 4.4. The optimal objective values of the Choice-Based LP and Compact LP are
the same. Furthermore, the optimal values of the dual variables for the first constraint in
the Choice-Based LP and Compact LP are the same.
Proof. Note that Compact LP is feasible and bounded, since setting x0 = 1, xi = 0 for all
i ∈ N and yij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N yields a feasible solution and all decision variables are
bounded. The last four constraints in the Compact LP are equivalent to the four constraints




(x0,x,y) ∈ R× Rn+n
2
+ : x0 +
∑
i∈N
vi xi = 1, xi ≤ x0 ∀ i ∈ N,
yij ≤ min{xi, xj} ∀ i, j ∈ N
}
.
We construct the Lagrangian for the Compact LP by associating the dual multipliers µ =














































In this case, using D(µ) to denote the dual function for the Compact LP as a function of
the dual multipliers µ, we have D(µ) = max(x0,x,y)∈P L(x0,x,y;µ).
The Compact LP is feasible and bounded, so strong duality holds. Thus, we can obtain
the optimal objective value of the Compact LP by solving the dual problem minµ∈Rm+ D(µ),
and an optimal solution to the last problem gives the optimal values of the dual variables









































































































In the chain of equalities above, (a) uses the fact that the LP on the left side of this
equality is equivalent to the Assortment LP after replacing the revenue of product i with
ri −
∑
q∈M aqi µq. Thus, we can obtain the optimal objective value of this LP by solving
the Mixture problem after replacing the revenue of product i with ri−
∑
q∈M aqi µq. On the
other hand, (b) holds, since picking one assortment that maximizes the expected revenue
in the Mixture problem is equivalent to randomizing over all possible assortments. The
optimal objective value of the last LP above gives the dual function for the Choice-Based
LP. Therefore, the Compact LP and Choice-Based LP have the same dual functions. In
this case, if we minimize the dual functions for the two LP formulations over all µ ∈ Rm+ ,
then we get the same optimal objective value, so the two LP formulations have the same
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optimal objective value. Furthermore, the minimizers of the dual functions for the two LP
formulations must be the same, which implies that the optimal values of the dual variables
for the first constraint in the two LP formulations are the same. 
By Theorem 4.4, we can solve the Compact LP to obtain the optimal dual variables of
the first constraint in the Choice-Based LP, in which case we can use these dual variables
to implement the bid-price policy. Considering the LP on the left side of (a) in the proof
of the theorem, we do not a priori know whether product i satisfies ri −
∑
q∈M aqi µq ≥ 0.
Therefore, as discussed immediately after the proof of Theorem 4.2, it is important that the
Assortment LP can recover the optimal objective value of the Mixture problem even when
some of the products have nonpositive revenues. To close this section, we iterate that we
can have vi
v0+V (S)
+ λ θi > 1, since we normalize the size of the customer segment with the
multinomial logit model to one. To recover the purchase probability of product i, we need
to scale vi
v0+V (S)
+ λ θi with β. Thus, the purchase probabilities in the Choice-Based LP
and Compact LP have implicitly been scaled with 1/β, so the resource capacities in these
LP formulations have implicitly been scaled with 1/β as well.
4.6 Recovering a Primal Solution
We focus on recovering an optimal primal solution to the Choice-Based LP by using
the Compact LP. Throughout this section, we follow the convention that if the Compact
LP has multiple optimal solutions, then we pick any one that has the largest value for
the decision variable x0. It is simple to implement this convention in practice. In par-
ticular, for ε > 0, we can add the additional term ε x0 to the objective function of the
Compact LP. If ε is small enough, then the additional term favors an optimal solution
with the largest value of x0. If it is not clear how small ε should be, then another ap-
proach would be to first solve the Compact LP and obtain its optimal objective value.
Letting z∗LP be the optimal objective value of the Compact LP, we can then solve an-




i∈N ri ((vi + λ θi)xi + λ θi
∑
j∈N vj yij) ≥ z∗LP, along with all constraints in the Com-
pact LP. In this case, we get a solution with the largest value for the decision variable x0,
providing an objective value of at least z∗LP, so it must be optimal. In the next lemma, we
establish a useful property of the basic optimal solutions to the Compact LP. The proof is
given in Appendix C.3.
Lemma 4.5 (Extreme Point Optimal Solutions). Let (x∗0,x∗,y∗) be a basic optimal solu-
tion to the Compact LP. Then, we have y∗ij = min{x∗i , x∗j} for all i, j ∈ N .
The proof, which is nontrivial, explicitly uses the fact that we pick a basic optimal
solution that has the largest value for the decision variable x0. We can generate examples
to show that we may not have y∗ij = min{x∗i , x∗j} for other basic optimal solutions. Also,
note that the last two constraints in the Compact LP do not immediately imply that y∗ij =
min{x∗i , x∗j}, since the first constraint in this LP may not allow setting y∗ij = min{x∗i , x∗j}
in a feasible solution to the Compact LP. Next, we focus on the main result of this section
and give a remarkably efficient approach for recovering an optimal primal solution to the
Choice-Based LP from an optimal solution to the Compact LP.
Let (x∗0,x
∗,y∗) be a basic optimal solution to the Compact LP. We index the products
so that x∗1 ≥ x∗2 ≥ . . . ≥ x∗n. Defining the set Si = {1, . . . , i} with S0 = ∅, for each
i = 0, 1, . . . , n, we set
ŵ(Si) = (x
∗
i − x∗i+1) (1 + V (Si)), (Recovery)
where we follow the convention that x∗n+1 = 0. Noting that x
∗
0 ≥ x∗i for all i ∈ N by the
third constraint in the Compact LP, we have ŵ(S0) = x∗0 − x∗1 ≥ 0.
We define the solution ŵ to the Choice-Based LP as follows. For all i = 0, 1, . . . , n,
we set ŵ(Si) as in the Recovery formula. For S 6∈ {S0, S1, . . . , Sn}, we set ŵ(S) = 0.
In the next theorem, we show that the solution ŵ that we construct by using the Recov-
ery formula as discussed above is an optimal solution to the Choice-Based LP.
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Theorem 4.6 (Recovering an Optimal Solution). For a basic optimal solution (x∗0,x∗,y∗)
to the Compact LP, let ŵ = {ŵ(S) : S ⊆ N} be constructed as in the Recovery formula
with ŵ(S) = 0 for all S 6∈ {S0, S1, . . . , Sn}. Then, ŵ is an optimal solution to the Choice-
Based LP.
Proof. For notational brevity, let Λ∗i = T (vi+λ θi)x
∗




ij . By Lemma 4.4,
the optimal objective values of the Compact LP and Choice-Based LP are equal. Let z∗LP be
their common optimal objective value. Noting the objective function of the Compact LP,




i . Furthermore, by the first constraint in the Compact LP, we have∑
i∈N aqi Λ
∗
i ≤ cq. We will show that
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S⊆N ŵ(S) = 1 and
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Thus, the solution ŵ provides an objective value of z∗LP for the Choice-Based LP, which
is the optimal objective value of this LP. Moreover, replacing ri with aqi in the chain of



















i ≤ cq, ŵ is a feasible solution to the
Choice-Based LP. Noting that ŵ provides an objective value of z∗LP for this LP, ŵ is an
optimal solution for the Choice-Based LP, as desired.
First, we show that
∑
S⊆N ŵ(S) = 1. By the definition of Si, we have V (Si) −
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where (a) holds since ŵ(S) = 0 for all S 6∈ {S0, S1, . . . , Sn}, (b) holds since x∗n+1 = 0,
and (c) holds since the solution (x∗0,x
∗,y∗) satisfies the second constraint in the Compact
LP.
Second, we show that
∑






ŵ(S) = Λ∗i . Noting the definition
of ŵ in the Recovery formula, for each k = 0, 1, . . . , n, we have
ŵ(Sk) = (x
∗
k − x∗k+1) (1 + V (Sk)) = x∗k − x∗k+1 + (x∗k − x∗k+1)V (Sk)
= x∗k − x∗k+1 +
∑
`∈N
1(` ≤ k) (x∗k − x∗k+1) v`,
where the last equality uses the fact that Si = {1, . . . , i} and V (S) =
∑
i∈S vi. By Lemma
4.5, we have y∗ij = min{x∗i , x∗j} for all i, j ∈ N . Thus, since we index the products such
that x∗1 ≥ x∗2 ≥ . . . ≥ x∗n, we have y∗ij = x∗i for i ≥ j and y∗ij = x∗j for i < j. In other
words, letting a ∨ b = max{a, b}, we have y∗ij = x∗i∨j . Using the last chain of equalities
displayed above, for each i ∈ N , we get
∑
k∈N




































where (d) holds since 1(k ≥ i) 1(` ≤ k) = 1 if and only if 1(k ≥ i ∨ `) and (e) holds by
canceling the telescoping terms in the first and third sums on the left side of the equality.
By the Recovery formula, we have
∑







































1(k ≥ i) 1
1 + V (Sk)
ŵ(Sk) + λ θi
∑
k∈N















where (f) follows from (4.2) and (g) holds by the definition of Λ∗i . Thus, the two identities
that we claim to hold at the beginning of the proof indeed hold. 
By the theorem above, noting the Recovery formula, after we solve the Compact LP,
recovering an optimal solution to the Choice-Based LP requires simply sorting the values
of the decision variables {xi : i ∈ N}. Furthermore, the Recovery formula implies that
there exists an optimal solution w∗ to the Choice-Based LP such that w∗(S) = 0 for all
S 6∈ {S0, S1, . . . , Sn}, so there exists an optimal solution to the Choice-Based LP that
offers at most n + 1 subsets. In this solution, since the sets {Si : i = 0, 1, . . . , n} satisfy
S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Sn, if w∗(S) > 0 and w∗(Q) > 0, then we have either S ⊇ Q or
Q ⊇ S. Putting the last two observations together, there exists an optimal solution to the
Choice-Based LP that offers at most n+ 1 assortments and these assortments are related to
each other in the sense that one assortment is included in another one.
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4.7 Numerical Experiments
We provide two sets of computational experiments. In the first set, we test the ability of the
mixture of multinomial logit and independent demand models to capture the choice process
of the customers. In the second set, we check the computational benefits of using the
Compact LP, instead of solving the Choice-Based LP directly by using column generation.
4.7.1 Prediction Ability of the Mixture Model
In this section, we test the benefits of using the mixture of multinomial logit and indepen-
dent demand models to predict the purchase behavior of the customers.
Experimental Setup:
We generate the past purchase history of customers under the assumption that the
choices of the customers are governed by a complex ground choice model that is very
different from the multinomial logit model. The past purchase history includes the assort-
ment of products offered to each customer and the product, if any, purchased within the
assortment. We split the purchase history into training and testing data. We fit a mix-
ture of multinomial logit and independent demand models to the training data and test the
performance of the fitted model on the testing data. As a benchmark, we also fit a pure
multinomial logit model to the same training data. In all of our test problems, we have
n = 10 products. In the ground choice model, we have p = 50 customer types. Indexing
the customer types by P = {1, . . . , p}, customer type ` is characterized by a preference list
of products σ` = (σ`(1), σ`(2), . . . , σ`(k`)), with σ`(i) ∈ N for all i = 1, . . . , k`, where
σ`(i) is the i-th most preferred product by a customer of type ` and k` is the number of
products in the preference list. A customer of type ` arrives into the system with probabil-
ity β`. An arriving customer chooses her most preferred available product in her preference
list. If no product in her preference list is available, then the customer leaves without a
purchase.
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The parameters of the ground choice model are the collection of preference lists {σ` :
` ∈ P} and the arrival probabilities {β` : ` ∈ P}. To generate these parameters, we
consider the case where the products have an inherent ordering 1  2  . . .  n, in
which product 1 has the highest quality and highest price, whereas product n has the lowest
quality and lowest price. A customer of a particular type has a maximum price she can
afford and minimum quality she accepts. In this case, the customer generally chooses
the highest-quality product that is available within this range, but we add some noise to
introduce some deviation from the inherent ordering of the products. In particular, for each
customer type `, we randomly choose an interval of products [i`, j`] with i` < j`, so that a
customer of type ` cannot afford products with price higher than that of product i` and does
not accept products with quality lower than that of product j`. Considering the ordered list
(γ`(1), γ`(2), . . . , γ`(k`)) = (i`, i` + 1, . . . , j`) with k` = j` − i` + 1, we make 20 random
swaps to change the position of a product with its successor so that the preference list only
roughly follows the inherent ordering of the products. In this way, we obtain the preference
list of products (σ`(1), σ`(2), . . . , σ`(k`)) for customers of type `. Following the approach
described so far in this paragraph, we generate the preference lists for p−n = 40 customer
types. The preference lists for the remaining n = 10 customer types is a singleton, each
including one of the products, so the customers of these types are unwilling to substitute
between the products. To come up with the arrival probabilities, sampling ζ` from the




whereas for all ` = p − n + 1, . . . , p, we set β` = Θ ζ`/
∑p
k=p−n+1 ζ
k, where Θ ∈ (0, 1)
is a parameter that we vary. In this case, we have
∑p
`=p−n+1 β
` = Θ, so Θ fraction of the
customers are unwilling to substitute between the products.
Once we generate the ground choice model as in the previous paragraph, we generate
the past purchase histories of customers who choose according to the ground choice model.
The past purchase history consists of the pairs {(St, it) : t = 1, . . . , τ}, where τ is the
number of customers in the history, St is the assortment that we offer to customer t, and it
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is the product that this customer chooses. If customer t does not purchase anything, then
we have it = 0. To generate the assortment St, we include each product in the assortment
St with probability ρ ∈ (0, 1), where ρ is another parameter that we vary. We sample the
product it among the products in St and the no-purchase option according to the ground
choice model.
We use maximum likelihood estimation to fit a mixture of multinomial logit and in-
dependent demand models to the past purchase history. Similarly, we use maximum like-
lihood estimation to fit a pure multinomial logit model without having an independent
demand model in the mixture.
Testing Prediction Performance:
Varying (Θ, ρ) ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}×{0.4, 0.5, 0.6}, we obtain 12 parameter combina-
tions. For each parameter combination, we generate the ground choice model as described
earlier in this section. Using the ground choice model, we generate the past purchase
history of τ customers. We vary τ ∈ {1250, 2500, 5000} to capture three levels of data
availability in the training data that we use to fit the choice models. Following the same
approach to generate the training data, we generate the past purchase history for another
10,000 customers to use as the testing data. For each combination of (Θ, ρ) and τ , we repli-
cate our results 50 times to get a better understanding of how much they change from one
replication to another. We regenerate the ground choice model in each of these replications.
We compare the two fitted choice models in terms of the out-of-sample log-likelihoods and
the deviation between the choice probabilities under each fitted choice model and the exact
ground choice model. Throughout this section, we use MIX to refer to the fitted mixture
of multinomial logit and independent demand models, whereas MNL to refer to the fitted
pure multinomial logit model.
In Table 4.2, we compare MIX and MNL in terms of their out-of-sample log-likelihoods.
In each of the 50 replications, after generating the ground choice model, we sample train-
ing data and testing data using the ground choice model. We fit MIX and MNL to the
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training data, and we compute the log-likelihood of the testing data under the fitted choice
models. The first column gives the parameter configuration (Θ, ρ). In the rest of the table,
there are three blocks, each with five columns. The three blocks correspond to the values
of τ ∈ {1250, 2500, 5000}, capturing three levels of data availability. In each block, the
first column gives the average out-of-sample log-likelihood of MIX, where the average is
computed over 50 replications. The second column gives the average out-of-sample log-
likelihood of MNL. The third column gives the average percent gap between out-of-sample
log-likelihoods of MIX and MNL. The fourth column gives the number of replications out
of 50 in which the out-of-sample log-likelihood of MIX is better than that of MNL, whereas
the fifth column gives the number of replications in which the outcome is reversed. Our
results indicate that the out-of-sample log-likelihoods of MIX are noticeably larger than
those of MNL. For the smallest training data availability with τ = 1250, there are a few
replications in which the out-of-sample log-likelihoods of MNL are larger than those of
MIX, but for τ = 2500 and τ = 5000, the out-of-sample log-likelihoods of MIX are quite
consistently larger than those of MNL.
Note that MIX has 2n parameters, whereas MNL has n parameters. Thus, MIX pro-
vides more flexibility for capturing the customer choice behavior. With its larger number of
parameters, however, MIX may overfit to the training data, resulting in poor out-of-sample
log-likelihoods, especially when we have too little training data. Thus, it is not guaranteed
that the out-of-sample log-likelihoods of MIX will be larger than those of MNL. Never-
theless, overfitting does not seem to be a concern for MIX, and the out-of-sample log-
likelihoods of MIX are larger than those of MNL in an overwhelming majority of our repli-
cations. The gap between the out-of-sample log-likelihoods of MIX and MNL becomes
more pronounced as the amount of training data increases, corresponding to larger values
for τ . Shortly, we demonstrate that such improvements in out-of-sample log-likelihoods
translate into significant improvements in expected revenues.
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Table 4.2: Out-of-sample log-likelihoods of the two fitted choice models
τ = 1,250 τ = 2,500 τ = 5,000
Param. MIX MNL Perc. MIX MNL MIX MNL Perc. MIX MNL MIX MNL Perc. MIX MNL
(Θ, ρ) Like. Like. Gap Better Better Like. Like. Gap Better Better Like. Like. Gap Better Better
(0.2, 0.4) -12,092 -12,195 0.85 46 4 -12,041 -12,167 1.05 50 0 -12,024 -12,158 1.12 50 0
(0.2, 0.5) -13,753 -13,832 0.57 47 3 -13,710 -13,807 0.71 50 0 -13,690 -13,796 0.78 50 0
(0.2, 0.6) -15,194 -15,250 0.37 45 5 -15,156 -15,224 0.45 49 1 -15,137 -15,214 0.51 50 0
(0.3, 0.4) -12,510 -12,596 0.69 48 2 -12,461 -12,570 0.88 50 0 -12,441 -12,561 0.96 50 0
(0.3, 0.5) -14,269 -14,345 0.54 49 1 -14,228 -14,321 0.66 50 0 -14,208 -14,310 0.72 50 0
(0.3, 0.6) -15,841 -15,904 0.40 46 4 -15,804 -15,880 0.48 50 0 -15,784 -15,870 0.54 50 0
(0.4, 0.4) -12,772 -12,867 0.74 49 1 -12,734 -12,847 0.88 50 0 -12,716 -12,838 0.96 50 0
(0.4, 0.5) -14,624 -14,705 0.55 48 2 -14,588 -14,686 0.67 49 1 -14,569 -14,677 0.74 50 0
(0.4, 0.6) -16,286 -16,358 0.44 48 2 -16,253 -16,341 0.54 50 0 -16,235 -16,332 0.60 50 0
(0.5, 0.4) -12,881 -12,966 0.66 50 0 -12,845 -12,946 0.79 50 0 -12,826 -12,938 0.87 50 0
(0.5, 0.5) -14,850 -14,932 0.55 50 0 -14,810 -14,912 0.69 50 0 -14,793 -14,903 0.74 50 0
(0.5, 0.6) -16,605 -16,689 0.50 50 0 -16,567 -16,669 0.61 50 0 -16,549 -16,659 0.67 50 0
Average 0.57 48 2 0.70 49.83 0.17 0.77 50 0
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Testing Revenue Performance:
In Table 4.3, we compare MIX and MNL in terms of their revenue performance. The
layout of this table is identical to that of Table 4.2, with three blocks capturing three lev-
els of data availability. In replication q, let φqi (S) be the choice probability of product i
within assortment S under the fitted MIX. We generate 100 samples of the product rev-
enues, sampling the revenue of each product from the uniform distribution over [1, 10].
In replication q, letting (rqk1 , . . . , r
qk
n ) be the revenues of the products in the k-th sam-
ple, we use Ŝqk to denote the optimal assortment to offer under the assumption that the







i (S). The customers, however, actually choose according to
the ground choice model. In replication q, letting let P qi (S) be the choice probability of
product i within assortment S under the ground choice model, we compute the actual ex-






i (S). Averaging over all the
100 revenue samples, in replication q, we capture the expected revenue performance of the






MIX. In each block, considering the 50 replications,
the first column gives the average of {RevqMIX : q = 1, . . . , 50}. The second column gives
the average of {RevqMNL : q = 1, . . . , 50}, where Rev
q
MNL captures the expected revenue
performance of the fitted MNL in replication q, computed in a fashion similar to RevqMIX.
The third column gives the percent gap between the first two columns. The fourth column
gives the number of replications in which the expected revenue performance of MIX is bet-
ter than that of MNL, whereas the fifth column gives the number of replications in which
the outcome is reversed.
Our results indicate that fitting MIX to the training data can provide assortments with
significantly larger revenues, when compared to fitting MNL to the training data. The im-
provements in the expected revenue provided by MIX are consistent over an overwhelming
majority of our replications and can exceed 6%. As τ gets larger and the amount of training
data increases, the improvements in the expected revenue by MIX become more noticeable.
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Table 4.3: Expected revenues obtained by using the two fitted choice models
τ = 1,250 τ = 2,500 τ = 5,000
Param. MIX MNL Perc. MIX MNL MIX MNL Perc. MIX MNL MIX MNL Perc. MIX MNL
(Θ, ρ) Rev. Rev. Gap Better Better Rev. Rev. Gap Better Better Rev. Rev. Gap Better Better
(0.2, 0.4) 5.79 5.67 2.04 48 2 5.81 5.67 2.48 50 0 5.82 5.67 2.64 50 0
(0.2, 0.5) 5.78 5.66 2.19 45 5 5.81 5.66 2.63 50 0 5.82 5.66 2.70 50 0
(0.2, 0.6) 5.78 5.66 2.05 46 4 5.81 5.66 2.47 49 1 5.82 5.66 2.67 50 0
(0.3, 0.4) 5.60 5.44 2.95 50 0 5.64 5.44 3.54 50 0 5.66 5.44 3.89 50 0
(0.3, 0.5) 5.64 5.46 3.17 50 0 5.66 5.46 3.60 50 0 5.67 5.46 3.84 50 0
(0.3, 0.6) 5.60 5.43 3.09 47 3 5.63 5.43 3.57 50 0 5.65 5.43 3.90 50 0
(0.4, 0.4) 5.51 5.25 4.62 50 0 5.53 5.26 4.98 50 0 5.54 5.26 5.19 50 0
(0.4, 0.5) 5.52 5.26 4.63 50 0 5.54 5.26 4.99 50 0 5.55 5.26 5.21 50 0
(0.4, 0.6) 5.50 5.25 4.63 50 0 5.53 5.24 5.09 50 0 5.54 5.24 5.29 50 0
(0.5, 0.4) 5.41 5.10 5.69 50 0 5.44 5.10 6.20 50 0 5.45 5.10 6.44 50 0
(0.5, 0.5) 5.41 5.10 5.75 50 0 5.43 5.10 6.22 50 0 5.45 5.09 6.48 50 0
(0.5, 0.6) 5.40 5.08 5.95 50 0 5.43 5.08 6.49 50 0 5.45 5.08 6.85 50 0
Average 3.90 48.83 1.17 4.35 49.92 0.08 4.59 50 0
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4.7.2 Computational Benefits of the Compact Formulation
In this section, we check the computational benefits of using the Compact LP in conjunction
with Theorem 4.6 to get an optimal solution to the Choice-Based LP, rather than solving
the Choice-Based LP directly by using column generation.
Experimental Setup:
We generate multiple instances of the network revenue management problem using the
following approach. The set of products is N = {1, . . . , n} with n = 100, and the set
of resources is M = {1, . . . ,m}, where m is a parameter that we vary. In the multino-
mial logit model, for each product i, we generate ηi from the uniform distribution over







j∈N ηj , where P0
is another parameter that we vary. In this case, if we offer all products, then the cus-






1+(1−P0)/P0 = P0. In the independent demand model, we generate γi
from the uniform distribution over [0, 1] and set the probability of demand for product i as
θi = γi/
∑
j∈N γj . In this case, the purchase probability of product i within assortment S
is φi(S) = β vi1+∑j∈S vj + (1− β) θi, where β is one more parameter that we vary.
We have T = 100 time periods. We sample the revenue ri of each product i from the
uniform distribution over [100, 500]. For each product i, we randomly choose a resource
qi and set aqi,i = 1. For the other resources, we set aqi = 1 with probability 1/5 and aqi =
0 with probability 4/5 for all q ∈ M \ {qi}. Thus, the expected number of resources
used by a product is 1 + (m − 1)/5. To come up with the capacities of the resources,
noting that φi(S) is the choice probability of product i within assortment S in the previous
paragraph, we let S∗ be an optimal solution to the problem maxS⊆N
∑
i∈S ri φi(S), which
is the assortment that maximizes the expected revenue under infinite resource capacities. If
we offer the assortment S∗ over the entire selling horizon, then the total expected capacity
consumption of resource q is T
∑
i∈S∗ aqi φi(S




∗), where κ is a last parameter that we vary.
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Computational Results:
Varying (m,P0, β, κ) ∈ {25, 50}×{0.1, 0.2}×{0.25, 0.75}×{0.6, 0.8}, we obtain 16
parameter combinations. For each parameter combination, we generate a problem instance
by using the approach in the previous two paragraphs. We obtain an optimal solution to
the Choice-Based LP for each problem instance by using two methods. First, we solve
the Choice-Based LP directly by using column generation. We refer to this method as
COG, which stands for column generation. Second, we solve the Compact LP and build
on Theorem 4.6 to use an optimal solution of this LP to recover an optimal solution of the
Choice-Based LP. We refer to this method as CLP, which stands for compact LP. We show
our results in Table 4.4. The first column gives the parameter combination. The second col-
umn gives the running time for COG to obtain an optimal solution to the Choice-Based LP
through column generation. The third column gives the running time for CLP to solve
the Compact LP and use an optimal solution to this LP to recover an optimal solution to
the Choice-Based LP. We use Gurobi 9.0 as our LP solver. The fourth column gives the
ratio of the running times in the second and third columns. Column generation may get
near-optimal solutions quickly but may take a while to close the remaining portion of the
optimality gap. To check for this possibility, the fifth column gives the running time for
COG to solve the Choice-Based LP with a 1% optimality gap. The sixth column gives the
ratio of the running times in the third and fifth columns. Our results indicate that CLP can
improve the running times for COG by up to a factor of 29.23. The average improvement
in the running times is a factor of 15.88. If we allow COG to terminate with a 1% optimal-
ity gap, but run CLP until it gets to the optimal solution, then CLP can still improve the
running times for COG by up to a factor of 9.05. The improvements in the running times
become more pronounced when m is larger. In our test problems, most of the running time
for COG is spent on solving the Compact LP. It takes less than one-tenths of a second to
recover an optimal solution to the Choice-Based LP by using an optimal solution to the
Compact LP through Theorem 4.6.
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Table 4.4: Running times for solving the Choice-Based LP through two methods
1%Gp. 1%Gp.
Param. COG CLP Secs. COG Secs.
(m,P0, β, κ) Secs. Secs. Ratio Secs. Ratio
(25, 0.1, 0.25, 0.6) 62.51 4.24 14.74 22.82 5.38
(25, 0.1, 0.25, 0.8) 58.34 5.09 11.46 21.06 4.14
(25, 0.1, 0.75, 0.6) 70.50 4.79 14.72 37.98 7.93
(25, 0.1, 0.75, 0.8) 72.07 7.72 9.34 31.94 4.14
(25, 0.2, 0.25, 0.6) 55.21 4.11 13.43 23.56 5.73
(25, 0.2, 0.25, 0.8) 52.23 5.37 9.73 20.03 3.73
(25, 0.2, 0.75, 0.6) 86.15 5.02 17.16 36.20 7.21
(25, 0.2, 0.75, 0.8) 74.90 9.80 7.64 31.43 3.21
Average 12.28 5.18
(50, 0.1, 0.25, 0.6) 101.38 6.02 16.84 29.63 4.92
(50, 0.1, 0.25, 0.8) 93.84 4.11 22.83 27.99 6.81
(50, 0.1, 0.75, 0.6) 128.20 6.95 18.45 46.15 6.64
(50, 0.1, 0.75, 0.8) 143.04 8.78 16.29 55.12 6.28
(50, 0.2, 0.25, 0.6) 139.19 5.15 27.03 29.62 5.75
(50, 0.2, 0.25, 0.8) 149.65 5.12 29.23 46.32 9.05
(50, 0.2, 0.75, 0.6) 145.13 10.32 14.06 55.17 5.35
(50, 0.2, 0.75, 0.8) 122.47 11.07 11.06 38.22 3.45
Average 19.47 6.03
We also compare the performance of COG and CLP for larger test problems with n =
500 products and m = 100 resources. For such test problems, COG does not reach an
optimal solution within one hour of running time. We give our results in Table 4.5. The
first column shows the problem parameters. The interpretation of the problem parameters
P0, β, and κ is the same as the one presented earlier in this section. The second column
shows the optimality gap for COG after one hour of running time. The third column shows
the running time for CLP to get the optimal solution. Over all the test problems, the average
optimality gap of the solutions obtained by COG after one hour of running time is 8.56%.
There are test problems for which COG terminates with more than a 14% optimality gap.
The average running time for CLP to obtain an optimal solution is about 23 minutes, the
longest running time not exceeding 41 minutes.
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Table 4.5: Optimality gaps and running times for the two methods for solving the Choice-
Based LP
COG COG
Param. % Opt. CLP Param. % Opt. CLP
(P0, β, κ) Gap. Secs. (P0, β, κ) Gap. Secs.
(0.1, 0.25, 0.6) 4.93 676.13 (0.2, 0.25, 0.6) 7.17 408.59
(0.1, 0.25, 0.8) 5.27 2139.15 (0.2, 0.25, 0.8) 4.71 1059.42
(0.1, 0.75, 0.6) 14.27 909.10 (0.2, 0.75, 0.6) 14.10 950.74
(0.1, 0.75, 0.8) 9.51 2420.80 (0.2, 0.75, 0.8) 8.53 2458.98
Average 8.49 1536.29 Average 8.63 1219.43
4.8 Concluding Remarks
We studied the single-shot unconstrained and cardinality-constrained assortment optimiza-
tion and assortment-based network revenue management problems under a mixture of
multinomial logit and independent demand models. Our mixture choice model is a natural
way to simultaneously improve the flexibility of both the multinomial logit and indepen-
dent demand models to capture the choice process of the customers, while ensuring that
the corresponding assortment optimization problems remain tractable.
There are several avenues for further research. Mixing the multinomial logit model
with the independent demand model results in efficiently solvable assortment optimization
problems, but our results closely exploit the structure of the multinomial logit model. One
can mix the independent demand model with other choice models and try to tackle the cor-
responding assortment optimization problems. Moreover, we focus on solving assortment
optimization problems, but our computational experiments indicate that our mixture choice
model can improve the modeling flexibility of the pure multinomial logit model in terms of
predicting the purchases of the customers. It would be useful to test the prediction ability
of our mixture choice model on data generated by real-world applications. Lastly, one can
work on enriching our mixture choice model by incorporating an incremental process for




APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Properties of the Spiked-MNL Model
There are several differences between the properties of the MNL and the spiked-MNL
models. First we introduce some additional notations. For any product j ∈ J , let g(j)
denote the itinerary that product j is associated with, and let J(j) := {j′ ∈ J g(j) : rj′ >
rj} denote the set of products associated with the same itinerary as product j and that have
higher fares than product j. Let J̄(j) := J(j)∪{j}, and let J(j) := {j′ ∈ J g(j) : rj′ < rj}
denote the set of products associated with the same itinerary as product j and that have
lower fares than product j.
A.1.1 Regularity
The regularity of a choice model states that the probability of choosing any alternative,
including the null alternative, from an assortment does not increase if the assortment is
enlarged [101]. More formally, the definition of a regular choice model is as follows.
Definition A.1. A choice model P is regular if for any two assortments S1 and S2 satisfying
S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ J and any alternative j ∈ S1 ∪ {0}, it holds that Pj:S1 ≥ Pj:S2 .
Regularity is a property commonly held by choice models in the assortment optimiza-
tion literature [102, 103]. Although the MNL choice model is regular, the spiked-MNL
choice model is not necessarily regular. Consider the following example:
Example A.2. A seller sells three products H, M, and L with revenues rH > rM > rL. Let
the preference weights of these products be vH = vM = wL = 1 and wM = 8 (we don’t
need to specify vL or wH in this example), and let the null preference weight be v0 = 1.
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Then PH:{H,M} = vH/(vH+wM+v0) = 1/10 and PH:{H,M,L} = vH/(vH+vM+wL+v0) =
1/4, which violates the regularity property.
In order to check whether the spiked-MNL model is regular, or to enforce regularity
when estimating a spiked-MNL model, we have the following necessary and sufficient
condition, whose proof is in Appendix A.2 The complexity of checking the regularity of a




Proposition A.3. The spiked-MNL model is regular if and only if for any two products j
and j′ for the same itinerary, with j′ more expensive than j, i.e., for any j′ ∈ J(j), it holds
that
wj + vj′ ≥ wj′ .
A.1.2 Submodularity
Given a choice model, let the demand function d : 2J 7→ R of the choice model be given by
d(S) :=
∑
j∈S Pj:S for any assortment S ⊂ J . Another property of many choice models
is the submodularity of their demand functions, which means that the marginal increment
in total choice probability decreases as the assortment enlarges [103]. More formally, the
definition of a submodular demand function is as follows.
Definition A.4. The demand function d of a choice model is submodular if
d(S2 ∪ {k})− d(S2) ≤ d(S1 ∪ {k})− d(S1), ∀ S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ J , k ∈ J \ S2. (A.1)
The demand function of the MNL choice model is submodular, but the demand function
of the spiked-MNL choice model is not necessarily submodular. Consider the following
example:
Example A.5. A seller sells three products H, M, and L with revenues rH > rM > rL. Let
the preference weights of the products be vH = 1, wH = 3, and vM = wM = wL = 2
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(we don’t need to specify vL); and let the null preference weight be v0 = 1. Consider
set S1 = {H}, set S2 = {H,L}, and product k = M . Then d(S2 ∪ {k}) − d(S2) =
d({H,M,L})−d({H,L}) = 5/6−3/4 = 1/12, and d(S1∪{k})−d(S1) = d({H,M})−
d({H}) = 3/4− 3/4 = 0. Therefore, the demand function is not submodular.
Any random utility model has a submodular demand function and is equivalent to a
certain stochastic preference model [103]. Our example shows that a spiked-MNL model
is not representable by a random utility model or stochastic preference model in general.
A.1.3 Revenue Gap between the MNL and the Spiked-MNL Choice Models
Next we show that using an MNL model instead of a spiked-MNL model in the presence
of the cheapest-fare spike effect can lead to arbitrarily bad relative revenue performance.
Setting. A seller can offer two products H and L with no capacity limits. The products
H and L sell at prices rH and rL > 0 respectively, with 0 < rL/rH ≤ ε. We consider
a sequence of selling seasons, indexed by k = 1, 2, 3, . . .. In each season k, the seller
offers one assortment A(k) ⊂ {H,L}. For reasons that will be explored in Section 2.5,
it suffices to consider either {H} or {H,L} for A(k). Customers make choices according
to a spiked-MNL model with parameters wH = wL > 0, vH = 0 and v0 = 1. Note
that vH = 0 corresponds to the so-called 100% buydown effect, where customers buy
only product L when both H and L are offered. It follows that rHwH/(v0 + wH) >
(rHvH+rLwL)/(v0 +vH+wL), and thus it is optimal to offer assortment {H}. In addition,
we assume that




As process primitives, consider the following 4 independent, i.i.d. sequences of random
variables: N (k)1 with mean λwH/(v0 + wH), representing the number of customers who
would choose H in season k if assortment {H} is offered; N (k)2 with mean λv0/(v0 +wH),
representing the number of customers who would choose 0 in season k if assortment {H}
is offered; N (k)3 with mean λwL/(v0+vH+wL), representing the number of customers who
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would choose L in season k if assortment {H,L} is offered; N (k)4 with mean λv0/(v0 +
vH +wL), representing the number of customers who would choose 0 in season k if assort-
ment {H,L} is offered.
Dynamics. After each season, the revenue manager calibrates an MNL model using
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with all historical sales data (including no-purchase
customers), and decides which assortment to offer in the next season based on the estimated
MNL model. The MNL model is specified with preference weights ṽH , ṽL, and v0 = 1.
For each season k, let n(k)H denote the sales of product H and let n
(k)
0 denote the number of
customers who choose not to purchase. One can show the following:
• Regardless of the assortments offered, the MLE estimated preference weight of prod-








0 . (To deal with the possibility that
the denominator may be zero for the first few seasons, assume that the denominator





• According to the estimated MNL model, it is optimal to offer assortment {H} if
ṽ
(k)
H ≥ η; otherwise, it is optimal to offer assortment {H,L}.
Next, we show that under the MNL model, the offered assortment converges to {H,L}
w.p.1. The long-run revenue loss ratio under this control is greater 1− ε. We consider two
cases.
Case 1: The revenue manager offers assortment A(1) = {H,L} in the first season.







0 = 0 < η. It follows by induction that the revenue manager will offer
assortment {H,L} and ṽ(k)H = 0 for all k.
Case 2: The revenue manager offers assortment A(1) = {H} in the first season. Note
that, if in any season k it holds that ṽ(k)H < η, then the revenue manager will offer assort-


































H < η, and it follows by induction that A
(k′) = {H,L} for
all k′ > k. Thus, either there is a K such that A(k) = {H,L} for all k > K, or ṽ(k)H ≥ η
and A(k) = {H} for all k. Next we show that the event that ṽ(k)H ≥ η and A(k) = {H} for
















2 /k → λv0/(v0 + wH) as k → ∞. Thus, if A(k) = {H} for all k, then,
































Therefore, the event that ṽ(k)H ≥ η and A(k) = {H} for all k is contained in the subset B
and thus has probability 0.










A.2 Proof of Proposition A.3
For any alternative j ∈ J ∪ {0} and assortment A ⊂ J , let
ṽ(j, A) :=

wjI(j, A) + vj(1− I(j, A)) if j ∈ A
v0 if j = 0
0 otherwise
(A.2)
denote the preference weight of j when A is offered, and let ṽ(A) :=
∑
j∈A ṽ(j, A) denote
the total preference weight of A.
Proof of Proposition A.3. (Sufficiency.) Suppose that, for any two products j and j′ for the
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same itinerary, with j′ ∈ J(j), it holds that
wj + vj′ ≥ wj′ .
We show that the spiked-MNL model is regular, that is, we show that for any two sets S ′
and S satisfying S ′ ⊂ S ⊂ J , it holds that Pj:S′ ≥ Pj:S for all j ∈ S ′∪{0}. Note that there
is a nested sequence of sets S ′ = S0 ⊂ S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ S|S\S′|−1 ⊂ S|S\S′| = S such
that |Si \ Si−1| = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , |S \ S ′|. Therefore, we consider the case in which
|S \S ′| = 1, and the regularity follows for general S ′ and S by induction. Let S \S ′ = {k}.
Case 1: k ∈ J(j) for some j ∈ S ′. Then the cheapest available fare class on each
itinerary remains the same when k is added to assortment S ′. Then regularity holds as for
the MNL model.
Case 2.1: k /∈ J(j) for any j ∈ S ′, and J(k) ∩ S ′ = ∅. This is similar to Case
1. Alternative k is the cheapest (and only) fare class for its itinerary in S. The cheapest
available fare class on each other itinerary remains the same when k is added to assortment
S ′. Then regularity holds as for the MNL model.
Case 2.2: k /∈ J(j) for any j ∈ S ′, and J(k) ∩ S ′ 6= ∅. Alternative k is the cheapest
fare class for its itinerary in S. Let l ∈ J(k)∩S ′ denote the cheapest fare class for itinerary
g(k) in assortment S ′. Recall that wk + vl ≥ wl by assumption, and thus ṽ(S) − ṽ(S ′) =
wk + vl − wl ≥ 0, i.e., ṽ(S) ≥ ṽ(S ′) ≥ 0. Next we consider three cases:
If j = l, then ṽ(j, S ′) = wl ≥ vl = ṽ(j, S).
If j ∈ S ′ \{l}, then ṽ(j, S ′) = vj(1−I(j, S ′))+wjI(j, S ′) = vj(1−I(j, S))+wjI(j, S) =
ṽ(j, S).
If j = 0, then ṽ(j, S ′) = ṽ(j, S) = v0.
Therefore, for any j ∈ S ′ ∪ {0}, it holds that ṽ(j, S ′) ≥ ṽ(j, S). It follows that
Pj:S′ =
ṽ(j, S ′)
ṽ(S ′) + v0
≥ ṽ(j, S)
ṽ(S) + v0
= Pj:S ∀ j ∈ S ′ ∪ {0}.
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(Necessity.) Suppose that there are two products j and j′ for the same itinerary, with
j′ ∈ J(j), such that
wj + vj′ < wj′ .
We show that in such a case the spiked-MNL model is not regular. Let S ′ = {j′} and






v0 + wj + vj′
= P0:S,
and thus the spiked-MNL model is not regular. 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.2 and Theorem 2.4
Proposition A.6 ([17]). An assortment S ⊂ J is efficient if and only if for some π ∈ Rm+ ,





Proof of Lemma 2.2. If a set S is efficient, then by Proposition A.6, there exists π ∈ Rm+















where γj := rj − π>aj . Note that if j ∈ J and j′ ∈ J(j), then j and j′ are associated
with the same itinerary, and thus aj = aj′ , hence π>aj = π>aj′ , and γj > γj′ since




is reduced to the
optimization problem in (2.2). 
Next we repeat the definition of efficient sets with specific reference to the set of prod-
ucts considered.
Definition A.7 (Relatively Efficient Sets). An assortment S ⊂ J is said to be inefficient
relative to J if a mixture of other assortments in J has strictly higher expected revenue
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with the same or lower expected resource consumption. That is, there exists a set of weights
{µ(A) : A ⊂ J} satisfying
∑





















































An assortment in J that is not inefficient relative to J is said to be efficient relative to J .
Next we show that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for an assortment S to be
efficient relative to J is that S ∩ J (h) is efficient relative to J (h) for each h.
Lemma A.8. If an assortment S is efficient relative to J , then S∩J (h) is efficient relative
to J (h) for each h ∈ H.
Proof. Suppose that there is an h′ ∈ H such that S ∩ J (h′) is inefficient relative to J (h′),































Then we show that S is inefficient relative to J . Consider the set of weights {µ(A) : A ⊂
J } constructed as follows. For eachA′ ⊂ J (h′), letA := A′∪(S \ J (h′)) and let µ(A) =
































































































































































j:A∩J (h) for all f ∈ F
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and thus S is inefficient relative to J . 
Lemma A.8 shows that a necessary condition for an assortment S to be efficient relative
to J is that S∩J (h) is efficient relative to J (h) for each h. Next we show that a necessary
condition for S ∩ J (h) to be efficient relative to J (h) is that S ∩ J (h) is nested by
revenue. First we streamline some notation. For a fixed assortment S ′ ⊂ J and a fixed
market h ∈ H, let A := S ′ ∩ J (h). For any S ⊂ J (h) and for a fixed itinerary g ∈ G, let
Sg := S ∩ J g, and let S−g := S \ Sg. Also, let v(S) :=
∑


















where ṽ(j, S) follows the definition in (A.2) and ṽ(S) :=
∑
j∈S ṽ(j, S).
Lemma A.9. Consider any assortment S ′ ⊂ J , any market h ∈ H, and any itinerary g ∈
G. Let n′ := |Ag|, and index the products in Ag such that {rj, j ∈ Ag} = {r1,g, . . . , rn′,g}
and r1,g > · · · > ri,g > · · · > rn′,g. Let Ag0 := ∅, and for i = 1, . . . , n′, let A
g
i :=
{(1, g), (2, g), . . . , (i, g)} ⊂ Ag. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n′}, it holds that Γ̃(Agi ∪ A−g) <
Γ(Agi , A
−g) if and only if Γ(Agi , A
−g) < Γ(Agi−1, A
−g).
Proof. It follows from w(i,g) ≥ v(i,g) that















































Lemma A.10. For any assortment S ⊂ J and any market h ∈ H, if S ∩ J (h) is efficient
relative to J (h), then S ∩ J (h) is nested by revenue.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume there is an assortment S ′ and a market h such that S ′ ∩
J (h) is efficient relative to J (h) but S ′ ∩J (h) is not nested by revenue. Since S ′ ∩J (h)
is efficient relative to J (h), it follows from Lemma 2.2 that there is a γ such that γj > γj′
for all j ∈ J (h) and all j′ ∈ J(j), and









Since A is not nested by revenue, there is an itinerary g ∈ G and a product j ∈ J g such
that j is not offered in A, but A includes a product for the same itinerary g as j that has
lower revenue than j, that is, j /∈ A and Ag ∩ J(j) 6= ∅.
We show that Γ̃(A ∪ {j}) > Γ̃(A), i.e.,
γ(Ag ∩ J(j)) + γjvj + γ̃(Ag ∩ J(j)) + γ̃(A−g)
v(Ag ∩ J(j)) + vj + ṽ(Ag ∩ J(j)) + ṽ(A−g) + v0
>
γ(Ag ∩ J(j)) + γ̃(Ag ∩ J(j)) + γ̃(A−g)




γ(Ag ∩ J(j)) + γ̃(Ag ∩ J(j)) + γ̃(A−g)
v(Ag ∩ J(j)) + ṽ(Ag ∩ J(j)) + ṽ(A−g) + v0
.
Since γj > γj′ for all j ∈ J (h) and all j′ ∈ J(j), it follows that γj > γ̃(Ag∩J(j))/ṽ(Ag∩




g ∩ J(j)) + γ̃(Ag ∩ J(j)) + γ̃(A−g)





g ∩ J(j)) + γ̃(A−g)




Case 1: Γ̃((Ag ∩ J(j)) ∪ A−g) ≥ Γ(Ag ∩ J(j), A−g).
It follows from (A.3) that Γ̃(A) ≥ Γ̃((Ag ∩ J(j)) ∪ A−g). Thus Γ̃(A) ≥ Γ(Ag ∩
J(j), A−g).
Case 2: Γ̃((Ag ∩ J(j)) ∪ A−g) < Γ(Ag ∩ J(j), A−g).
In this case Ag ∩ J(j) 6= ∅. Let n′ := |Ag ∩ J(j)|, and index the products in Ag ∩ J(j)
such that {rj, j ∈ Ag ∩ J(j)} = {r1,g, . . . , rn′,g} and r1,g > · · · > ri,g > · · · > rn′,g. Let
Ag0 := ∅, and for i = 1, . . . , n′, let A
g
i := {(1, g), (2, g), . . . , (i, g)} ⊂ Ag ∩ J(j). Let
i∗ := max
{






Lemma A.9, it follows that
Γ(Ag ∩ J(j), A−g) = Γ(Agn′ , A
−g) < Γ(Agn′−1, A
−g)
< · · · < Γ(Agi∗ , A−g) ≤ Γ̃(A
g
i∗ ∪ A−g) ≤ Γ̃(A).
Thus, in both cases, it holds that
Γ̃(A) ≥ Γ(Ag ∩ J(j), A−g)
⇔ γ(A
g ∩ J(j)) + γ̃(Ag ∩ J(j)) + γ̃(A−g)
v(Ag ∩ J(j)) + ṽ(Ag ∩ J(j)) + ṽ(A−g) + v0
≥ γ(A
g ∩ J(j)) + γ̃(A−g)





g ∩ J(j)) + γ̃(A−g)
v(Ag ∩ J(j)) + ṽ(A−g) + v0
.
We have shown that Γ̃(A ∪ {j}) > Γ̃(A), which contradicts (A.3). 
Proof of Theorem 2.4. Lemma A.8 shows that if assortment S ⊂ J is efficient (relative
to J ), then S ∩ J (h) is efficient relative to J (h) for each h. Lemma A.10 shows that if
S ∩ J (h) is efficient relative to J (h), then S ∩ J (h) is nested by revenue. Therefore, all
efficient sets under the spiked-MNL choice model are nested by revenue. 
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 2.7
A.4.1 From SBLP to CDLP
We provide a polynomial time algorithm (Algorithm 1) to convert a feasible solution of the
SBLP (2.4), denoted (x,x0), into a feasible solution of the CDLP (2.3), denoted α, with
the same objective value.
Algorithm 1 Converting a SBLP solution to a CDLP solution
Require: SBLP solution (x,x0)
1: Set α← 0, k ← 1
2: while there exists j ∈ J such that xj > 0 do
3: for all h ∈ H do
4: if xj = 0 for all j ∈ J (h) then
5: Ak(h)← ∅ and αk(h)← 0
6: else
7: for all g ∈ J (h) do
8: if xj = 0 for all j ∈ J g then
9: Y gk ← 0
10: else













14: Set Ak(h) ← ∪{g∈J (h) :Y gk >0}J̄(j
g
k), Yk(h) ← min {Y
g
k : g ∈ J (h), Y
g
k > 0},
and αk(h)← ṽ(Ak(h))+v0λhT Yk(h)
15: end if
16: end for
17: Set Ak ← ∪h∈HAk(h), and α(Ak)← min {αk(h) : h ∈ H, αk(h) > 0}
18: for all h ∈ H do
19: if Ak(h) 6= ∅ then
20: for all g ∈ J (h) do
21: if Y gk > 0 then














Lemma A.11. Given a feasible solution (x,x0) for SBLP (2.4), Algorithm 1 terminates in
O(|G|n) steps.
Proof. In each iteration of the while-loop (line 2–line 28), according to the definition of
Y gk , Yk(h), αk(h), and α(Ak), at least one of the positive components of x is reduced
to 0. Therefore, after at most n iterations of the while-loop, it holds that x = 0 and
the algorithm terminates. The for-loops in each iteration (line 3–line 16, line 18–line 26)
require at most O(|G|) steps. (The fare classes of each itinerary g can be sorted by revenue
in advance so that line 11 can be executed in constant time for each g. Also, for each
j ∈ J , one can compute the values of ṽ(J̄(j)) = wj +
∑
j′∈J(j) vj′ in advance, which can
be done inductively from the highest fare class for each itinerary to the lowest fare class
for the itinerary, in a total of O(n) steps. Then, in line 14, ṽ(Ak(h)) can be computed for
all h in O(|G|) steps as follows: ṽ(Ak(h)) =
∑
{g∈J (h) :Y gk >0}
ṽ(J̄(jgk)).) So Algorithm 1
terminates in O(|G|n) steps. 
Lemma A.12. The output of Algorithm 1 satisfies the following properties:
(1) For each iteration k, the assortment Ak defined in line 17 is nested by revenue.







subtracted from xjgk is equal to the expected sales quantity of
product jgk while assortment Ak is offered for α(Ak)T units of time.







for all h ∈ H and all j ∈ J (h). That is, for each product j, the sales quantity xj
while j is the cheapest available fare class for its itinerary specified by the SBLP
solution (x,x0) is equal to the sales quantity of j while j is the cheapest available
fare class for its itinerary resulting from CDLP solution α.
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Proof. (1) For each k and each h, Ak(h) is either ∅ or a union over itineraries g of nested
by revenue assortments J̄(jgk), so each Ak(h) is a nested by revenue assortment. Each Ak
is a union over markets h of nested by revenue assortments Ak(h), so each Ak is a nested
by revenue assortment.
(2) The expected sales quantity of jgk while assortmentAk is offered for α(Ak)T units of



























Proposition A.13. Given a feasible solution (x,x0) of SBLP (2.4), Algorithm 1 computes
a feasible solution α of CDLP (2.3), such that the sales quantity of each product is the
same in both solutions, and the two solutions have the same objective value.
Proof. First we show that (x,x0) satisfies SBLP constraint (2.4c) if and only ifα produced














































{j∈J (h) : I(j,Ak)=1}
















{j∈J (h) : I(j,Ak)=1}

































which is the left side of CDLP constraint (2.3c). The third equality holds because for any
j ∈ J and any j′ ∈ J(j) it holds that ajf = a
j′
f for all f ∈ F .
Next we show that if (x,x0) satisfies SBLP constraints (2.4b) and (2.4d), then α satis-
fies CDLP constraint (2.3b). Consider any h and any g ∈ J (h). In each iteration k, if there
is a product j ∈ J g such that xj > 0, then one such product jgk is chosen. Then the quantity






, and for all the other products j′ ∈ J g \ {jgk}, xj′
remains unchanged. Otherwise, if there is no product j ∈ J g such that xj > 0, then xj


































where the inequality follows from SBLP constraint (2.4d), and
∑























k > 0 for all k, and let h
∗ ∈ H be such that g∗ ∈ J (h∗). It follows from line 14 and


























































































where the last equality follows from SBLP constraint (2.4b).
Next we show that the objective values of the SBLP solution (x,x0) and the CDLP









































































Thus we have established that Algorithm 1 converts any feasible solution of SBLP (2.4)
into a feasible solution of CDLP (2.3), such that the sales quantity of each product is the
same in both solutions, and the two solutions have the same objective value. 
A.4.2 From CDLP to SBLP.
In this section we address the other direction: converting a CDLP solution into a SBLP
solution.
Proposition A.14. Consider any feasible solutionα of CDLP (2.3) with support on assort-
ments that are nested by revenue. Then there is a feasible solution (x,x0) of SBLP (2.4)
such that the sales quantity of each product is the same in both solutions, and the two
solutions have the same objective value.
Proof. Since α has support on assortments that are nested by revenue, it follows that for
any A ⊂ J such that α(A) > 0 and for any j ∈ A∩J (h), it holds that J(j) ⊂ A∩J (h).





and xh0 := λhT
{∑
A⊂J





























































P h0:A∩J (h) + ∑
{j∈J (h) :
I(j,A)=1}


















P h0:A∩J (h) + ∑
{j∈J (h) :
I(j,A)=1}




































































{j∈J (h) : I(j,A)=1}
ajf















{j∈J (h) : I(j,A)=1}
ajf















j:A∩J (h) ≤ cf ,
where the last equality holds because for any j ∈ J and any j′ ∈ J(j) it holds that ajf = a
j′
f



































































































































which is equal to the objective value of CDLP. 
Theorem 2.7 follows from Lemma A.11, Lemma A.12, Proposition A.13, and Proposi-
tion A.14.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 2.8
Proof of Theorem 2.8. First, we review some properties of the CDLP, and describe the as-
sociated partitioned booking limit policy. By Theorem 2.7, there is an optimal solution α∗
for the CDLP that is supported on a nested sequence of assortments S1 ⊃ S2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Sk,




∗(Si′)T . Thus, an optimal solution for the CDLP is to offer each assortment
Si during (ti−1, ti]. For the CDLP, the sales rate of product j during (ti−1, ti] is given by
λij := λPj:Si , and the corresponding sales quantity is λ
i
j(ti − ti−1). (Note that λij = 0 if



















For each i = 1, . . . , k and each j ∈ J , let




j := max{λPj:S : Si+1 ⊆ S ⊆ Si, j ∈ S},
where Sk+1 := ∅. Note that under the spiked-MNL model, λij > 0 if j ∈ Si. Also note
that λ
i
j ≥ λPj:Si+1 = λi+1j for all i and all j ∈ Si.
Given the times 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tk = T resulting from the CDLP solution, and
ε > 0, consider the times t−i := ti − ν−i ε and t+i := ti + ν+i ε, where ν−i , ν+i > 0 are
specified inductively as follows: Let ν−0 = ν
+
0 = 0, and let λ
0
j = 0 for all j ∈ J . Then, for




















































































We consider ε > 0 sufficiently small such that t+i−1 < t
−
i for all i = 1, . . . , k, and
ζ ijε < λ
i+1
j (ti+1 − ti) for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and all j ∈ Si+1. Since t+k > tk = T ,
for convenience, the analysis below considers a continuation of the booking process after
time T , but we will only count the total bookings up to time T towards the total revenue.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the quantities defined above.
Next we define the stochastic sales process for Poisson demand. For each i ∈ {0, . . . , k}
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and j ∈ J , let N̂ i−j := {N̂ i−j (t) : t ≥ 0} and N̂ i+j := {N̂ i+j (t) : t ≥ 0} denote Poisson
processes with rate 1, with all the Poisson processes {N̂ i±j : i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, j ∈ J } inde-
pendent. For any scaling factor θ, let Sθ(t) denote the assortment offered at time t under
the considered policy. Then, for each product j ∈ J , each i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, and each






































and similarly, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and each time t ∈ (t−i , t+i ], the total sales of






































Note that while the assortment is S, product j is sold according to a Poisson process
with rate θλPj:S . Let π denote a policy that, for each scaling factor θ and at each time t,
prescribes the assortment Sθ(t) to be offered at time t. Then the objective value under





































Now we describe the stochastic sales process and the offered assortments under the
partitioned booking limit policy. We ignore the probability 0 event that more than 1 arrival
of the Poisson processes {N̂ i±j : i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, j ∈ J } take place at the same time. Let
Sθ` denote the `th assortment offered under the partitioned booking limit policy (note that,
except for ` = 1, it does not hold in general that Sθ` = S`), and let assortment S
θ
` be offered
over time period (τ θ`−1, τ
θ
` ]. That is, S
θ(t) = Sθ` for t ∈ (τ θ`−1, τ θ` ]. For any i = 0, . . . , k − 1
and τ ∈ (τ θ`−1, T ], let
T θ+i,` :=

min{t−i+1, τ θ` } −max{t+i , τ θ`−1} if τ θ` > t+i and τ θ`−1 < t−i+1
0 otherwise
T θ+i,` (τ) :=

min{t−i+1, τ} −max{t+i , τ θ`−1} if τ > t+i and τ θ`−1 < t−i+1
0 otherwise











(τ θ`−1, τ ]. Similarly, for any i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and τ ∈ (τ θ`−1, T ], let
T θ−i,` :=

min{t+i , τ θ` } −max{t−i , τ θ`−1} if τ θ` > t−i and τ θ`−1 < t+i
0 otherwise
T θ−i,` (τ) :=

min{t+i , τ} −max{t−i , τ θ`−1} if τ > t−i and τ θ`−1 < t+i
0 otherwise
denote the duration of overlap between (t−i , t
+









(τ θ`−1, τ ], and let
T θ−k,` :=






T θ−k,` (τ) :=









` ], and between (t
−
k , T ] and
(τ θ`−1, τ ]. Specifically, let τ
θ
0 := 0, and let S
θ
1 := S1 denote the first assortment under the
partitioned booking limit policy. For each ` ∈ {1, 2, . . .} such that τ θ`−1 < T and Sθ` 6= ∅,
let
















































: j ∈ Sθ`
}}
denote the last time that assortment Sθ` is offered (with the convention that inf ∅ =∞). If
τ θ` < T , then let j
θ













































that is, jθ` denotes the first product in S
θ




` \ {jθ` }.
Let N θj (t) denote the quantity of product j sold up to time t under the partitioned book-
ing limit policy, that is, for t ∈ (τ θ`−1, τ θ` ],









































Thus, if τ θ` < T , then τ
θ
` satisfies




τ > τ θ`−1 : N
θ











































j (ti′ − ti′−1) + θζ ijε
}






F θ−i := F
θ+
i−1 ∩ Eθ−i




0 ≤ N θj (t+0 ) ≤ θζ0j ε
}
. That is, Eθ−i is the event that
for all products in Si, the booking quantity at time t−i is slightly below the CDLP quantity
at time ti, and Eθ+i is the event that for all products in Si, the booking quantity at time t
+
i
is equal to or slightly above the CDLP quantity at time ti. Note that, because the booking




j (ti′ − ti′−1), and the booking limit of




j (ti′ − ti′−1), the event F θ−i+1 := F θ+i ∩ Eθ−i+1 implies
that Sθ(t) = Si+1 for all t ∈ (t+i , t−i+1]; i.e., the assortment Si+1 is offered during (t+i , t−i+1].





θλi+1j (ti+1 − ti)− θη
i+1








i )) < θλ
i+1





















j (ti′ − ti′−1)
}
.
Proof. Consider any sample path in the event on the left. We show that the sample path
is in the event on the right. Recall that since the sample path is in F θ+i , it holds that
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Sθ(t+i ) = Si+1. Let ` be such that S
θ(t+i ) = Si+1 = S
θ
` .
We show by contradiction that, for the considered sample path, no product can reach
its booking limit during [t+i , t
−
i+1). Suppose that τ
θ
` ∈ [t+i , t−i+1). Thus jθ` ∈ Si+1 satisfies
N θ
jθ`





(τ θ` ) = N
θ
jθ`















































(ti+1 − ti)− θζ ijθ` ε
)
≤ θb∗jθ` .
The first inequality holds because the sample path is in F θ+i , the second inequality holds
because τ θ` < t
−
i+1, the third inequality holds because the sample path is in the event on the
left, and the fourth inequality holds because jθ` ∈ Si+1. This contradicts N θjθ` (τ
θ




Thus Sθ(t) = Si+1 for all t ∈ [t+i , t−i+1].
























j (ti′ − ti′−1)− θηi+1j ε.




















j (ti′ − ti′−1) + θζ ijε
)























j (ti′ − ti′−1).
Therefore the sample path is in the event on the right. 





























































Proof. Consider any sample path in the event on the left. We show that the sample path is in
the event on the right. Recall that since the sample path is in F θ−i , it holds that S
θ(t−i ) = Si.
Let ` be such that Sθ(t−i ) = Si = S
θ
` .
First we show by contradiction that it cannot hold that Sθ(t) = Si for all t ∈ (t−i , t+i ],
that is, at least one product j ∈ Si must reach its booking limit during (t−i , t+i ]. Suppose
that Sθ(t) = Si for all t ∈ (t−i , t+i ]. Consider any j ∈ Si \ Si+1. Then
N θj (t
+










i − t−i )
)












j (ti′ − ti′−1)− θηijε
)
+ θηijε = θb
∗
j .
The first inequality follows because the definition of λij implies that λPj:Si ≥ λij , and the
second inequality follows from the definition of the event on the left. Under the partitioned
booking limit policy it cannot hold that N θj (t
+
i ) > θb
∗
j , and therefore for any sample path in
the event on the left it cannot hold that Sθ(t) = Si for all t ∈ (t−i , t+i ]. Thus, τ θ` ∈ [t−i , t+i ).
Next we show that jθ` /∈ Si+1, that is, a product j ∈ Si+1 cannot be the first to reach its
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booking limit during (t−i , t
+
i ]. Consider any j ∈ Si+1. Then
N θj (τ
θ










` − t−i )
)






` − t−i )
)

















j (ti′ − ti′−1) + θλi+1j (ti+1 − ti) ≤ θb∗j .
The first inequality follows from the definition of λ
i
j , the second inequality follows since
τ θ` < t
+
i , the third inequality follows from the definition of the event on the left, the fourth
inequality follows from the assumption that ε > 0 is sufficiently small such that ζ ijε <
λi+1j (ti+1 − ti) for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and all j ∈ Si+1, and the fifth inequality follows
from j ∈ Si+1. Thus jθ` ∈ Si\Si+1, and hence Sθ`+1 = Sθ` \{jθ` } satisfies Si+1 ⊂ Sθ`+1 ⊂ Si.
Next, we continue by induction on `. Suppose that for some ˜̀≥ ` it holds that τ θ˜̀ < t+i
and Si+1 ⊂ Sθ˜̀+1 ⊂ Si. We consider two cases: either S
θ
˜̀+1
\Si+1 6= ∅ or Sθ˜̀+1 \Si+1 = ∅.
Case Sθ˜̀+1 \ Si+1 6= ∅: In this case we repeat the argument above. First we show by




i ], that is, at least one




i ]. Suppose that S
θ(t) = Sθ˜̀+1
for all t ∈ (τ θ˜̀ , t+i ]. Consider any j ∈ Sθ˜̀+1 \ Si+1. Note that j ∈ Si \ Si+1. Then
N θj (t
+
























(t+i − τ θ˜̀)
)












j (ti′ − ti′−1)− θηijε
)




The first inequality holds because Si+1 ⊂ Sθ`′ ⊂ Si and thus λPj:Sθ
`′
≥ λij for all `′ =
`, . . . , ˜̀+ 1, and the second inequality follows from the definition of the event on the left.
Under the partitioned booking limit policy it cannot hold that N θj (t
+
i ) > θb
∗
j , and therefore




i ]. Thus, τ
θ
˜̀+1
∈ (τ θ˜̀ , t+i ).
Next we show that jθ˜̀+1 /∈ Si+1, that is, a product j ∈ Si+1 cannot be the first to reach
its booking limit during (τ θ˜̀ , t
+




) = N θj (t
−















(τ θ`′ − τ θ`′−1)
)




























j (ti′ − ti′−1) + θλi+1j (ti+1 − ti) ≤ θb∗j .
The first inequality holds because Si+1 ⊂ Sθ`′ ⊂ Si and thus λPj:Sθ
`′
≤ λij for all `′ =
`, . . . , ˜̀+ 1, the second inequality holds since τ θ˜̀+1 < t
+
i , the third inequality follows from
the definition of the event on the left, the fourth inequality follows from the assumption
that ε > 0 is sufficiently small such that ζ ijε < λ
i+1
j (ti+1 − ti) for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and




hence Sθ˜̀+2 = S
θ
˜̀+1
\{jθ˜̀+1} satisfies Si+1 ⊂ S
θ
˜̀+2
⊂ Si. Hence, in the case Sθ˜̀+1\Si+1 6= ∅,
the induction continues.
Case Sθ˜̀+1 \ Si+1 = ∅: Then S
θ
˜̀+1
= Si+1. That is, for each j ∈ Si \ Si+1, it holds that
N θj (t
+










j (ti′ − ti′−1), and thus
N θj (t
−
















j (ti′ − ti′−1).
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Next we show by contradiction that Sθ(t) = Si+1 for all t ∈ (τ θ˜̀ , t+i ]. Suppose that
τ θ˜̀+1 < t
+
i . Thus j
θ
˜̀+1
∈ Si+1 satisfies N θjθ˜̀+1





(τ θ˜̀+1) = N
θ
jθ˜̀+1
















(τ θ`′ − τ θ`′−1)
)
≤ N θjθ˜̀+1



































(ti′ − ti′−1) + θλi+1jθ˜̀+1
(ti+1 − ti) ≤ θb∗jθ˜̀+1
.
The first inequality holds because Si+1 ⊂ Sθ`′ ⊂ Si and thus λPjθ˜̀+1:Sθ`′ ≤ λ
i
jθ˜̀+1
for all `′ =
`, . . . , ˜̀+ 1, the second inequality holds since τ θ˜̀+1 < t
+
i , the third inequality follows from
the definition of the event on the left, the fourth inequality follows from the assumption
that ε > 0 is sufficiently small such that ζ ijε < λ
i+1
j (ti+1 − ti) for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1
and all j ∈ Si+1, and the fifth inequality follows from jθ˜̀+1 ∈ Si+1. This contradicts
N θ
jθ˜̀+1




Thus, for each τ ∈ [t−i , t+i ] it holds that Si+1 ⊂ Sθ(τ) ⊂ Si. Hence, for each j ∈ Si+1, it





















i − t−i )
)
.










θζ ijε. Thereby it has been established that the sample path is in the event on the right. 
We will use the following concentration inequality for Poisson process [104]:
Lemma A.17 (Poisson tail bound). Let {N(t), t ≥ 0} be a Poisson process with unit rate.
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For any x > 0, t > 0, ε > 0, it holds that










where h(y) := (1 + y) log(1 + y)− y. (Note that h(y) > 0 for all y > 0.)















































Base Case: i = 0. Since t+0 = 0 and ζ0j = 0 for all j ∈ J , it holds that 0 ≤ N θj (t+0 ) ≤ θζ0j ,
so P[F θ+0 ] = 1.
Induction Step: from i to i+ 1. Suppose the result holds for i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. Then
P
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θλi+1j (ti+1 − ti)− θη
i+1








i )) < θλ
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θλi+1j (ti+1 − ti)− θη
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The first inequality follows from Lemma A.15, the third equality holds because N̂ i+j and
F θ+i are independent, the second inequality applies the union bound, the third inequality
follows from (A.6), and the fourth inequality follows from Lemma A.17.













































































































































































































































































































− θλij(ν−i + ν
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− θλij(t+i − t
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= 1− δθ+i .









j (ti′ − ti′−1) for all j ∈ Si, the
second inequality follows from Lemma A.16, the fifth equality holds because N̂ i−j and F
θ−
i
are independent, the third inequality applies the union bound, the fourth inequality holds
because Si+1 ⊂ Si, the fifth inequality follows from (A.6), and the sixth inequality follows
from Lemma A.17.









































Thus we have established (A.7). Since the expected sales quantity of any product during
[tk, t
+
k ] is bounded by θλ(t
+
k − tk) = θO(ε), it follows that
E
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j −O(ε) = zCDLP −O(ε).












≤ lim supθ→∞ 1θz
θ








APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3
The result below verifies the claim in Remark 3.2.
Claim B.1. Suppose there are at least two loads with lead time ` (where ` ∈ {1, . . . , L})
under a given state x, namely, x` ≥ 2. Then, under the MNL choice model, it is optimal to
set the prices for these loads to be the same.
Proof. Let I denote the set of loads that are currently in the system under state vector
x. For any load i ∈ I , we denote its lead time by L(i) and price by p(i). Consider any
two loads with lead time `, which have indices i1 and i2 in set I . Suppose a policy sets
different prices for these loads such that p(i1) < p(i2). We will prove that this policy is not
optimal.
Under the MNL choice model defined in Section 3.4, the probability that any of these
loads is booked in the current period is
P [Load 1 or load 2 is booked] = µ
v`(p(i1)) + v`(p(i2))∑
i∈I vL(i)(p(i)) + 1
.
Since function v`(p) is continuous, we can choose a new price p̄ ∈ [p(i1), p(i2)] such that
2v`(p̄) = v`(p(i1)) + v`(p(i2)). Let us change the prices of load i1, i2 both to p̄, while
keeping the prices of other loads. Then, the probability that load i1 or i2 is booked in the
current period remains the same:
P [Load i1 or load i2 is booked]
= µ
v`(p̄) + v`(p̄)∑
i∈I /{i1,i2} vL(i)(p(i)) + 2v`(p̄) + 1
= µ
v`(p(i1)) + v`(p(i2))∑
i∈I vL(i)(p(i)) + 1
.
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The probability that any other load j ∈ I (j 6= i1, i2) is booked also remains the same:
P [Load j is booked] = µ
vL(j)(p(j))∑
i∈I /{i1,i2} vL(i)(p(i)) + 2v`(p̄) + 1
= µ
vL(j)(p(j))∑
i∈I vL(i)(p(i)) + 1
.
So changing prices of load i1 and load i2 to p̄ does not affect the distribution of state
variables in the next period. However, the expected payment to carriers in the current
period is changed by
µ
2p̄v`(p̄)∑
i∈I vL(i)(p(i)) + 1
− µp(i1)v`(p(i1)) + p(i2)v`(p(i2))∑
i∈I vL(i)(p(i)) + 1
< 0.
The last inequality holds because p`(v) · v is strictly convex in v, where p`(v) is the inverse
function of v`(p) = exp(β0 + β`p), and because of the definition of v`(p̄). 
Then we establish the following monotonicity result for the optimal differential cost
function h∗:
Lemma B.2. In the Homogeneous Preference setting, for any state x, and for any lead
times k < `, it holds that h∗(x+ ek) ≥ h∗(x+ e`).
Proof. We show a partial ordering on states: given two states x+ek and x+e` with k < `,
the differential cost h∗(x + ek) ≥ h∗(x + e`). We note that h∗(x) represents the average
cost incurred as the system moves from state x to a reference state, e.g., x′ = 0, for the
first time. To show our desired result h∗(x+ ek) ≥ h∗(x+ e`), it suffices to show that the
following: initiating two chains with states x+ek and x+e` respectively, it is more costly
for the first chain to reach a common reference state. We prove the result by coupling the
two chains: 1) we apply the optimal price in each stage for the first chain; 2) we use the
same price in the second chain for loads corresponding to x and apply the price for the
load corresponding to ek in the first chain (denoted by k̂) to the load corresponding to e`
in the second chain (denoted by ˆ̀) until the stage that load k̂ in the first chain expires or is
chosen; 3) noting that the attraction of a load depends only on price but not on lead time
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in the Homogeneous Preference setting, we let the two chains be coupled such that they
have the same new arrivals in each period and drivers make the same choice if they choose
from x or choose load k̂ from the first chain and load ˆ̀ from the second chain with the
same probability; and 4) if load k̂ in the first chain is chosen before it expires, load ˆ̀ in the
second chain is also chosen; otherwise, recalling that k < j, we stop offering load ˆ̀ (e.g.,
by offering a very low price) in the second chain after load k̂ expires and let ˆ̀expire. From
the above construction, we see that both chains reach a common state eventually and incur
the same amount of cost. As we use the optimal price in each period for the first chain and a
suboptimal price in each stage for the second chain, it follows that h∗(x+ek) ≥ h∗(x+e`).

Theorem 3.3. In the Homogeneous Preference setting, in any state, the optimal price is
higher for loads with a shorter lead time than for loads with a longer lead time. That
is, for a given state x, if p∗(x) is an optimal price vector, then p∗i (x) ≥ p∗j(x) for any
i, j ∈ supp(x) such that i < j.
Proof. We show by contradiction that if there exist i′, j′ ∈ supp(x) such that i′ < j′ and
p∗i′(x) < p
∗
j′(x) for some state x, we can construct a better price that lowers the cost in
state x. We denote by pL = p∗i′(x) and pH = p
∗
j′(x).
Case 1: xi′ = xj′ .
We construct a new price, denoted by p̃(x), by perturbing the optimal policy with
interchanging the prices on lead time i′ and j′. That is, we set price p̃i′(x) = pH and
p̃j′(x) = pL, and p̃`(x) = p∗`(x) for ` 6= i′, j′ in the perturbed policy. In the Homogeneous
Preference setting and noting that xi = xj , the above swap in price shuffles the choice
probabilities of loads with lead time i′ and j′ but does not affect the choice probabilities of
loads with lead times other than i′ and j′.





∗ (S (x− e`)+ ek) + (1− λ)h∗ (S (x− e`)) ,
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which, after plugging the multinomial logit model and arranging terms, is equivalent to
v(pH)(hj′(x)− hi′(x)) ≥ v(pL)(hj′(x)− hi′(x)).
The last inequality holds as v(pH) > v(pL) and hj′(x) ≥ hi′(x) by our argument in the
first part of the proof. This contradicts the optimality assumption on the price p∗(x).
Case 2: xi′ > xj′ .
We show that we can also construct a better price in this case. First, for xj′ out of xi′
of the loads with lead time i′, we swap their price with the price of the xj′ loads with lead
time j′. Then we set a price pM for the xi′ loads with lead time i′ such that
xj′v(pH) + (xi′ − xj′)v(pL) = xi′v(pM). (B.1)
Then the new perturbed price p̃(x) is given by p̃i′(x) = pM and p̃j′(x) = pL, and p̃`(x) =
p∗`(x) for ` 6= i′, j′. We note that the choice probabilities of loads with lead times other
than i′ and j′, as well as the total choice probability, are not affected.















































Arranging terms in the above inequality yields
xj′v(pH)(pH − pM) + xj′v(pH)(hj′(x)− hi′(x))
≥ (xi′ − xj′)v(pL)(pM − pL) + xj′v(pL)(hj′(x)− hi′(x)).
Since xj′v(pH)(hj′(x)− hi′(x)) ≥ xj′v(pL)(hj′(x)− hi′(x)), it suffices to show that
xj′v(pH)(pH − pM) ≥ (xi′ − xj′)v(pL)(pM − pL)
⇐⇒ xj′v(pH)pH + (xi′ − xj′)v(pL)pL ≥ xj′v(pH)pM + (xi′ − xj′)v(pL)pM
(a)⇐⇒ xj′v(pH)pH + (xi′ − xj′)v(pL)pL ≥ xi′v(pM)pM ,
where (a) follows from (B.1). Letting α = xj′/xi′ and uk = v(pk) for k ∈ {H,M,L}, we
derive from (B.1) that
αuH + (1− α)uL = uM .




β0) is convex, we conclude by Jensen’s inequality that
αr̃(uH) + (1− α)r̃(uL) ≥ r̃(uM),
which is the result xj′v(pH)pH + (xi′ − xj′)v(pL)pL ≥ xi′v(pM)pM that we want. There-
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fore, we also have a contradiction in this case.
Case 3: xi′ < xj′ . Using similar reasoning as in the previous case, we have the same con-
clusion.
Putting things together, we conclude that the optimal price p∗(x) in any state x must
satisfy that p∗i (x) ≥ p∗j(x) for any i, j ∈ supp(x) such that i < j. 
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Recall that we let ϕ : NL+1 7→ RL+ denote a stationary pricing policy for the MDP. There
exists a unique stationary distribution of the system state X under any stationary policy
ϕ. Then, for any stationary policy ϕ, the average cost per discrete period for the platform











where the expectation is taken with respect to the stationary distribution ofX .


















(1− u0) ln(u0) + C x0 (B.2a)
s.t. x` − x`−1 = µu` − λψ`−1 for ` = 1, . . . , L, (B.2b)
xL = λψL (B.2c)
L∑
`=1
u` + u0 = 1 (B.2d)
x` ≥ µu` for ` = 1, . . . , L. (B.2e)
Theorem 3.4. The optimal objective value of the discrete-time fluid model (DTFM) is a
lower bound for the long-run average cost per period of the MDP under any stationary
policy ϕ, i.e., R̂ ≤ R(ϕ) for all ϕ.
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Proof. Let X be a steady state of the stochastic system, which follows the stationary dis-






k=1 Xk vk(ϕk(X)) + 1
+ C X0.
We perform variable substitution and define the following two functions ũ : R ×
{0, 1}L+1 7→ RL+ and ũ0 : RL × {0, 1}
L+1 7→ R+ given by
ũ`(p,x) =
x` v`(p`)∑L
k=1 xk vk(pk) + 1




k=1 xk vk(pk) + 1
.



















if X` > 0. (B.4)




































(1− U0) ln (U0) + C X0
(c)
= g(X,U , U0),
where equality (a) holds due to variable substitutions and (B.4); equality (b) utilizes the fact
(B.3); and equality (c) follows from the definition of function g. Noting that g(x,u, u0) is
convex in its arguments, by Jensen’s inequality, we have the long-run average cost
R(ϕ) = E [Z(ϕ(X),X)] = E [g(X,U , U0)] ≥ g(E[X],E[U ],E[U0]).
We let x̄ = E[X], ū = E[U ] and ū0 = E[U0]. Next, we show that (x̄, ū, ū0) satisfies
the constraints (B.2b)-(B.2e).
Given a current state X , which follows the stationary distribution under policy ϕ, we
let X̃ be the next system state and then we have
E[X̃`−1 |X] = X` − µ
X` v`(ϕ`(X))∑
k=1 Xk vk(ϕk(X)) + 1
+ E[A`−1] = X` − µU` + λψ`−1,
where A = (A`) represents the random arrival of new loads, which is independent of
X . Since X̃ also follows the stationary distribution by the property of stationary Markov
chain. Taking expectation with respect to the stationary distribution under policy ϕ on
both sides and using the fact that x̄ = E[X] = E[X̃], we see that (x̄, ū, ū0) satisfies
constraint (B.2b). Constraint (B.2c) holds trivially. And, constraint (B.2d) follows from
(B.3). Let M = (M`) represents the random bookings of loads given state X . Then,
constraint (B.2e) holds since
X` ≥ M` ⇒ EX` ≥ E [E [M` |X]]
⇒ EX` ≥ µE
[
X` v`(ϕ`(X))∑




Therefore, the tuple (x̄, ū, ū0) is a feasible solution for problem (B.2). Since solving
problem (B.2) minimizes the objective, we conclude that R(ϕ) ≥ R̂ for any stationary
policy ϕ. 
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Lemma 3.5. An optimal solution (x̂θ, p̂θ) for the θ-scaled DTFM satisfies x̂θ` ≤ λ for
` = 0, . . . , θ and p̂θ` ≤ C for ` = 1, . . . , θ. Also, preference weight v̂θ` := vθ` (p̂θ`) ≤ Kv :=
exp(βC + bmax) for all ` = 1, . . . , θ and all θ.
Proof. First, we give a convex reformulation of the θ-scaled DTFM. Let (xθ,uθ, uθ0) ∈























, ∀` ≥ 1.




















(1− uθ0) ln(uθ0) + C xθ0 (B.5a)








0 = 1. (B.5d)
xθ` ≥ µuθ`/θ ` = 1, . . . , θ (B.5e)
The θ-scaled DTFM problem and problem (B.5) are equivalent, in that we can derive a fea-
sible solution for one problem from a feasible solution for the other, with the two problems
having the same objective value.
Let (x̂θ, ûθ, ûθ0) be an optimal solution for the above problem and note that x̂
θ is also
optimal for the θ-scaled DTFM. We first bound x̂θ. Noting that x̂θθ = λψ
θ
θ ≤ λ, it follows
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λψθk ≤ λ for ` = 0, . . . , θ − 1.
Next, we bound p̂θ.
Part 1: Relating Optimal Prices to Dual Variables
Let πθ := (πθ` , ` = 1, . . . , θ), η
θ, ζθ and νθ := (νθ` , ` = 1, . . . , θ) ∈ Rθ+ be the dual
variables corresponding to constraints (B.5b)-(B.5e), respectively. Note that the objective
function implies (xθ,uθ, uθ0) > 0, we consider the Lagrangian function given by
Lθ(xθ,uθ, uθ0,πθ, ηθ, ζθ,νθ)


































` − xθ`−1 + λψθ`−1)






Let (π̂θ, η̂θ, ζ̂θ, ν̂θ) be optimal dual variables. Since problem (B.5) is convex, the optimal
solution satisfies the first order condition. We have


















− βθ0,` + 1
)
= 0




















−β(π̂θ` + νθ` ) + ln(ûθ0) +
ûθ0 − 1
ûθ0
+ βθ0,` − 1
)
for ` = 1, . . . , θ.














= − π̂θ` − νθ` −
1
βûθ0
≤ − π̂θ` for ` = 1, . . . , θ.
Part 2: Bounding Dual Variables
We first introduce auxiliary variables tθ = (tθ` , ` = 1, . . . , θ) and s. We introduce the
following constraints












which are conic representable. Replacing the corresponding nonlinear parts in the objec-
tive (B.5a) with −tθ and s and noting that as we are minimizing the objective, the in-













s + C xθ0





`) ∈ Kexp for ` = 1, . . . , θ,
(v, uθ0, w1) ∈ Kexp, (uθ0, v, w2) ∈ Kexp, s+ w1 + w2 = 0, v = 1,
xθ0 ≥ 0,
where Kexp = cl {(x1, x2, x3) : x1 ≥ x2 exp(x3/x2), x2 > 0} is the exponential cone.
We note that the signs of the variables other than xθ0 are implied by the conic constraints.
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i,3) for i ∈ {1, 2} be the corresponding dual variables for the last two conic
constraints. Let σθ be the dual variable to constraint v = 1. The dual problem to the above




−λψθ`−1πθ` + λψθθηθ + ζθ + σθ (B.6a)
s.t. − πθ1 ≤ C (B.6b)
yθ`,1 = π
θ



















for ` = 1, . . . , θ − 1 (B.6c)
























2,2 = − σθ
zθ1,2 + z
θ














where K∗exp = cl {(y1, y2, y3) : y1 ≥ −y3 exp(y2/y3 − 1), y1 > 0, y3 < 0} is the dual
cone of Kexp.
Either the primal conic program or its dual problem (B.6) is strictly feasible: There
exists a point in the relative interior of the feasible region of the problem. Then strong
duality holds. Let π̂θ = (π̂θi ) denote the optimal dual variables to (B.5b) and ν̂
θ = (ν̂θi ) ∈
Rθ+ denote the optimal dual variables to (B.5e), which satisfies (B.6b)-(B.6d). Noting that
−π̂θ1 ≤ C by (B.6b), then by recursively examining (B.6c), we have
ŷθ`−1,1 = π̂
θ
` − π̂θ`−1 − ν̂θ`−1 ≥ 0
⇒ − π̂θ` ≤ − π̂θ` + ν̂θ`−1 ≤ − π̂θ`−1 ≤ C for ` = 2, . . . , θ.
Conclusion
Putting the results in the above two parts together, we conclude that p̂θ` ≤ C for all `.









0,`) ≤ exp(βC + bmax) =: Kv
for ` = 1, . . . , θ and all θ, where bmax is an upper bound of function b0. 
B.4 Proofs of Lemma 3.9, Lemma 3.10, and Lemma 3.11
We recall and define notations that will be used throughout the proof. Recall that (x̂θ, p̂θ)
denote an optimal solution of the θ-scaled DTFM. The open-loop pricing policy ϕ̂θ sets
price p̂θ` for all loads with lead time `, i.e., ϕ̂
θ
`(x
θ) = p̂θ` for all x
θ and `. As prices are




`) for ` = 1, . . . , θ. Let X
θ denote the state of
the θ-scaled system, which follows the stationary distribution under the open-loop pricing
policy ϕ̂θ, and let x̄θ = E[Xθ].
Also, recall Assumption 3.6: There exists a positive constant p > 0 such that for all
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θ ∈ N and ` = 1, . . . , θ, we have p̂θ ≥ p.
B.4.1 Auxiliary Lemma B.3
Lemma B.3. Under the steady state distribution of the open-loop pricing policy, the mean










≤ 2 for all ` = 0, · · · , θ.
Proof. LetXθ(0) be a random variable in Nθ+1 following the stationary distribution under
the open-loop pricing policy ϕ̂θ. Let Xθ(t) denote the state at time t under the open-loop
pricing policy ϕ̂θ. Let Aθ(t) ≥ 0 and M θ(t) ≥ 0 denote the corresponding load arrivals
and bookings at time t respectively. We can express Xθ` (t) for t ≥ θ as




`+1(t− 1)−M θ`+1(t− 1)










Note that Aθ`+k(t − k) is equal to 1 with probability λψθ`+k and 0 otherwise. Additionally,




`+k(t − k) is the sum of













`+k(t − k). Using the result for Poisson binomial distribution (see,












































≤1 + 12 = 2.




≤ 1 and Var(Xθ` ) ≤ E
[(
Xθ`
)2] ≤ 2 for ` = 0, . . . , θ. 
B.4.2 Proof of Lemma 3.9
Lemma 3.9. Suppose µKv < 1/4 by Assumption 3.7. LetXθ denote the state vector under
the stationary distribution of the open-loop pricing policy ϕ̂θ. For any k = 1, . . . , θ and









≤ Kc(θ − k + 1), (B.7)
where Kc := 2/(1− 4µKv).
Proof. We prove the result by induction on the time index. Consider any initial state of
the system Xθ(0) that satisfies the condition (B.7) (for example, we can set Xθ(0) to
be any fixed state, which has zero variance). Note that the expectation used in the proof
below is with respect to this initial distribution. We will show that for any time index t, if
condition (B.7) holds forXθ(t), then it also holds for the state in the next periodXθ(t+1).
If this induction step is proved, the lemma immediately follows, because the state Xθ(t)
converges to the stationary distribution of the system (which is irreducible, aperiodic, and
positive recurrent), namelyXθ(t) d→Xθ, soXθ also satisfies the variance bound in (B.7).
LetM θ(t) = (M θ` (t)) be the random vector of bookings after drivers observingX
θ(t)
and the prices posted. Let Aθ(t) = (Aθ`(t)) be the random vector of newly arriving loads.
The sequence
(












a current stateXθ(t), the next system stateXθ(t+ 1) is given by the dynamics:
Xθ`−1(t+ 1) = X
θ
` (t)−M θ` (t) + Aθ`−1(t+ 1) for ` = 1, . . . , θ,
















i (t) + θ
for ` = 1, . . . , θ.























M θk (t) |Xθ(t)
])
















i (t) + θ
)
. (B.8)
Now, we prove the induction step. We assume the following induction hypothesis that









≤ Kc (θ − k + 1) .
We aim to show that at time t + 1, for any sequence (ã` : 0 ≤ ã` ≤ 1, ` = 1, . . . , θ) and









≤ Kc (θ − k + 1) .
159































































































where equality (a) holds due to the independence ofAθ(t+ 1) fromXθ(t) andM θ(t).






























`(t) represents the random arrival of a load with lead time









































































i (t) + θ
)
where equality (b) follows from (B.8), and inequality (c) applies the covariance inequality.

































i (t) + θ. Then, 0 ≤ Zθ1/Zθ2 ≤ 1 w.p.1.







































































































Inequality (d) uses the fact that for any constant a, E[(X−a)2] = E[(X−EX)2]+E[(EX−
a)2] ≥ E[(X − EX)2]. Inequality (e) follows from 0 ≤ Zθ1/Zθ2 ≤ 1. Inequality (f) follows
from the induction hypothesis. Therefore, our claim above holds.















































≤ Kc(θ − k) + 2 + 2µ
√
Kc(θ − k) ·
4KcK2v
θ
≤ Kc(θ − k) + 4µKvKc + 2.









≤ Kc(θ − k + 1),
which is the desired conclusion.
As t→∞, we haveXθ(t) d→Xθ, whereXθ follows the stationary distribution of the
Markov chain. Since the state space of this Markov chain is finite (since Xθ` (t) ≤ θ for all






















≤ Kc (θ − k + 1) ,
for any k = 1, . . . , θ and θ ≥ 1. 
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B.4.3 Auxiliary Lemma B.4
We prove a useful result to bound the expectation of the ratio of two random variables. The
proof can be found in [72]. For completeness, we state it below.
Lemma B.4 (Expectation of the Ratio of Two Random Variables). Let Z1 and Z2 be two
random variables with finite mean and variance. Let µ1 = E[Z1], µ2 = E[Z2]. Suppose
there exists a constant B > 0 such that 0 ≤ Z1
Z2































































where equality (a) recursively applies the identity.
Note that E [Z1(Z2 − µ2)] = Cov(Z1, Z2) and E [(Z2 − µ2)2] = Var(Z2) > 0. If 0 ≤
Z1
Z2
≤ B a.s., the last term is bounded by B Var(Z2)/µ22, which completes the proof. 
B.4.4 Proof of Lemma 3.10

























, ∀` ≥ 1,
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∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Kfθ , for 1 ≤ k ≤ θ,
and
∣∣E [rθ(p̂θ,Xθ)]− rθ(p̂θ, x̄θ)∣∣ ≤ µCKf
θ
,















































































and Var(Zθ) using Lemma 3.9. To using this
Lemma, we note that the coefficients in the summand is bounded by 0 ≤ v̂θ`/θ ≤ Kv/θ for
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(θ − k + 1)K2vKc
θ2















































for any 1 ≤ k1 ≤ k2 ≤ θ.
Let Kf := 2K2vKc, then the first part of the lemma is proved.









Again, it follows from Lemma B.4 that













∣∣Cov (W θ, Zθ)∣∣ + µC Var(Zθ).
Note that E[Xθ0 ] = x̄
θ




and rθ(p̂θ, x̄θ) cancels out.






≤ C. As before, we have















This completes the proof. 
B.4.5 Proof of Lemma 3.11
The lemma bounds the difference between the DTFM solution, x̄θ, and the expected system
state under the open-loop pricing policy generated from the DTFM solution, x̂θ.
Lemma 3.11. There is a constant Kx > 0 such that for all ` = 0, 1, · · · , θ,




where Kx := µ(1 +Kv)Kf .
Proof. The proof comprises of showing the following steps: (1) x̂θ satisfies a system of
equations (i.e., the constraints of DTFM); (2) x̄θ satisfies the same equations plus some
bounded perturbation on the right hand side; and (3) given the bound on the perturbation,
we bound the sup-norm ‖x̄θ − x̂θ‖∞ ≤ Kxθ for some Kx > 0.
(1) Equations for x̂θ.





























0 for ` = 1, . . . , θ,
and
ûθ := (ûθ` , ` = 1, . . . , θ).




x̂θ` − x̂θ`−1 = µ
ûθ`
θ














0 = 1. (B.9d)




























∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ µKfθ for any 1 ≤ k ≤ θ.
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Using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.4, we have
E[Xθθ ] = λψ
θ
θ ,











− λψθ`−1, for ` = 1, . . . , θ.




























0 for ` = 1, . . . , θ,
and
ūθ := (ūθ` , ` = 1, . . . , θ).




x̄θ` − x̄θ`−1 = µ
ūθ`
θ














0 = 1. (B.10d)





` − x̂θ` for ` = 0, 1, . . . , θ, and δθ := ūθ0 − ûθ0.
Then, trivially, ∆θθ = x̄
θ
θ − x̂θθ = 0, because (B.9a) and (B.10a) are the same. We aim to
bound δθ and
{
∆θ` , ` = 0, . . . , θ
}
.






































































δθ + εθ` . (B.11)
Similarly, comparing terms in (B.9d) and (B.10d), we have







































Assume θ is large enough such that 1− µv̂θ` ū0/θ ≥ 1− µv̂θ`/θ > 0 for all ` = 1, . . . , θ.
(Note that v̂θ` ≤ Kv and µ ≤ 1, so it suffices to take θ ≥ Kv.) Now, we derive ∆θ0 as a
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for ` = 0, . . . , θ. (B.13)
This can be proved by induction on the index `. For ` = θ, it can be verified that ∆θθ = 0














































































































































































∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ µKfθ · 1µ = Kfθ ,
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where the first inequality uses the fact that x̂θi ≥ 0 for any i, and the second inequality uses
Lemma 3.10.















∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ(1 +Kv)Kfθ for ` = 0, . . . , θ.
Letting Kx := µ(1 +Kv)Kf , we have the desired result that |x̄θ` − x̂θ` | = |∆θ` | ≤ Kx/θ for
` = 0, . . . , θ and for all θ ≥ Kv. 
B.5 Proof of Theorem 3.12 and Corollary 3.13
We define the following functions:











G1(x(τ), y(τ), u(τ), τ) = µ u(τ)− λ φ(τ)
G2(x(τ), y(τ), u(τ), τ) = − u(τ)
I1(x(τ), τ) = C x(τ)




The Hamiltonian function H is defined as
H (x(τ), y(τ), u(τ), π1(τ), π2(τ), τ) := F(x(τ), y(τ), u(τ), τ)
+ π1(τ) G1(x(τ), y(τ), u(τ), τ) + π2(τ) G2(x(τ), y(τ), u(τ), τ).
We can prove the optimality of a solution (x∗, y∗, u∗) by showing the following (see, e.g.,
page 208, Theorem 2 in [75]):
A) The solution (x∗(τ), y∗(τ), u∗(τ)) satisfies (3.16b)-(3.16e).
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B) The Hamiltonian is differentiable and convex in (x, y, u).
C) There exist differentiable costates π∗1 and π
∗
1 such that their dynamics are given by
π̇∗1(τ) = −

















as y(1) is free.
And, we have





Theorem 3.12. Suppose an optimal solution (x∗, y∗, u∗) for problem (3.16) exists. Let
(x∗, p∗) be the corresponding optimal solution for the CTFM. We have the following state-
ments:
a) The solution (x∗, y∗, u∗) is a global optimal solution.
b) There is a costate π∗1 to the state equation (3.16b) such that π
∗
1(τ) is increasing with
π∗1(0) = −C.





− ln (u∗0) for
some u∗0 ∈ [0, 1].
d) The optimal price trajectory p∗ is decreasing.
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Proof of Theorem 3.12. Examining the following first- and second-order derivative of the
Hamiltonian H , we have
∂ H (x(τ), y(τ), u(τ), π1(τ), π2(τ), τ)
∂ x
= − µ u(τ)
β x(τ)











− b0(τ) + 1
)
+ µπ1(τ)− π2(τ)












∂2 H (x(τ), y(τ), u(τ), π1(τ), π2(τ), τ)





 ∂2 H∂ x2 ∂2 H∂ x ∂ u
∂2 H









 is positive semidefinite,
and that state y is not presented in the Hamiltonian H , an optimal solution (x∗, y∗, u∗) to
the problem is guaranteed to be a global optimal solution. So, statement a) holds.










So, statement b) holds.
Noting that state y is not presented in the Hamiltonian H , we have π̇∗2(τ) ≡ 0, which
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implies that π∗2 is a constant. Then, we have




















letting u∗(1) = u∗0. So, statement c) follows.
Replacing π∗2 with the above expression in (B.14), arranging terms and noting the con-
















Then we have statement d) as π∗1(τ) is increasing. 
Corollary 3.13. In the Homogeneous Preference setting, i.e., b0(τ) ≡ β0, and with all new
loads arriving with lead time equal to 1, i.e., Φ(1−) = 0, an optimal solution (x∗, y∗, u∗),
if existing, for problem (3.16) is given in the following form:
x∗(τ) = [λ− µ(1− u∗0)] + µ(1− u∗0)τ, y∗(τ) = 1− (1− u∗0)τ, and u∗(τ) = 1− u∗0,






[λ− µ(1− u∗0)] + µ(1− u∗0)τ
λ− µ(1− u∗0)
)









where u∗0 ∈ (0, 1) and λ > µ(1− u∗0). And, u∗0 is determined by solving a convex program.
Proof of Corollary 3.13. The first part of the statement is easy to validate.




























(1− u0) ln ([λ− µ(1− u0)] + µ(1− u0)τ) dτ
− µ
β
(1− u0) ln(u0) + C(λ− µ(1− u0))
















λ− µ(1− u0)(1− τ)
µ(1− u0)
ln (λ− µ(1− u0)(1− τ))− τ
]1
0














[λ ln(λ)− (λ− µ(1− u0)) ln(λ− µ(1− u0))] .














































So, the optimal u∗0 is determined by solving the convex program {minu0 J(u0)}. 
B.6 Structure of the Optimal Price in Each State of the MDP
Recall the optimization problem in state x, given the corresponding displacement cost ∆






















u` + u0 = 1 (B.15b)
µu` ≥ µ exp(β0` )x`u0 for ` ∈ supp(x), (B.15c)
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where we have a multiplier µ on both sides of constraint (B.15c) for convenience. Letting
(u∗, u∗0) be the optimal solution to the above problem, we can compute the corresponding












for ` ∈ supp(x). (B.16)
We let ζ be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with constraint (B.15b) and σ` be
the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the nonnegativity constraint (B.15c) on price p`
for ` ∈ supp(x), and denote by σ = (σ`). Then, by the KKT condition, the necessary
and sufficient condition for (u∗, u∗0) to be optimal to problem (3.5) is that there exists









− β(∆` + σ∗` )− β0` + 1
)


















0 = 1 (B.17c)
µu∗` ≥ µ exp(β0` )x∗`u∗0 for ` ∈ supp(x), (B.17d)
σ∗` (µu
∗
` − µ exp(β0` )x∗`u∗0) = 0 for ` ∈ supp(x), (B.17e)
u∗0 ≥ 0, u∗` ≥ 0, σ∗` ≥ 0 for ` ∈ supp(x).





















` . Arranging terms in the above expression and
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∗)) + β0` − 1) for ` ∈ supp(x).





























∗)) + β0` − 1)
 ,
where W (·) is the Lambert W function. Leveraging the above result, we have the optimal
























xk exp(β(∆k + σ
∗
k +$(σ
∗)) + β0k − 1)
+ 1

for all ` ∈ supp(x), where equality (a) follows from (B.16) and equality (b) follows
by arranging terms in (B.18). Noting that complementary slackness (B.17e) can also be
expressed as p∗`σ
∗
` = 0, we observe that the optimal price p
∗ follows the same order as the
displacement cost ∆ in state x.
When the optimal price p∗ is strictly positive and there is at most one load of each lead
time, i.e., p∗` > 0 and x` ∈ {0, 1} for all ` ∈ supp(x), the expression of the optimal price is
simplified to










 for ` ∈ supp(x).
In [46], the authors considered a revenue maximization problem and derived a similar ex-
pression as the above one for the optimal price. Our approach of deduction also works for
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their setting and incorporates constraints on price.
B.7 Optimal Dynamic Pricing in the Heterogeneous Preference Setting
The example below shows that in the Heterogeneous Preference setting, it may not be
optimal to post a higher price for loads with a shorter lead time.
Example B.5. The number of lead times is L = 3. The probabilities of arrivals of new
loads and drivers within each period are given by λ = µ = 0.2. All new loads arrives
with initial lead time L. In the multinomial logit model, the price sensitivity coefficient is
β = 1 and the non-monetary utilities for loads of different lead times are given by β0 =
(−5, 1,−2). The penalty cost of each expiring load is C = 10. We let p∗ : {0, 1}4 7→ R3+
denote the optimal pricing scheme for the MDP. Computing the optimial pricing scheme,
we have p∗2(x) = 1.0564 > p
∗
1(x) = 1.0552 for state x = (0, 1, 1, 1).
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 Comparison with the Markov Chain Choice Model
We give an example to show that our mixture of multinomial logit and independent demand
models is not a special case of the Markov chain choice model. Under the Markov chain
choice model, a customer arriving into the system is interested in purchasing product i
with probability γi. If this product is available for purchase, then the customer purchases
it. Otherwise, the customer transitions from product i to product j with probability ρij
and checks whether product j is available for purchase. With probability 1 −
∑
j∈N ρij ,
the customer transitions to the no-purchase option, in which case, she leaves without a
purchase. In this way, the customer transitions among the products according to a Markov
chain until she visits a product that is available for purchase or she visits the no-purchase
option. The parameters of the Markov chain choice model are {γi : i ∈ N} and {ρij :
i, j ∈ N}. Given that we offer the assortment S ⊆ N of products, we let Pi(S) be the
expected number of times that a customer visits product i during the course of her choice
process. If i ∈ S, then a customer purchases product i as soon as she visits this product, so
for i ∈ S, Pi(S) is the purchase probability of product i when we offer the assortment S.
We can compute {Pi(S) : i ∈ N} by solving the system of equations
Pi(S) = γi +
∑
j 6∈S
ρji Pj(S) ∀ i ∈ N. (C.1)
We can intuitively justify (C.1) through a balance argument [30]. On the left side, Pi(S) is
the expected number of times that a customer visits product i during the course of her choice
process. For a customer to visit product i, she may arrive into the system with an interest to
purchase product i, which happens with probability γi. Alternatively, she may visit some
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product j 6∈ S and the expected number of visits to this product is Pj(S). In this case, if
she transitions from product j to product i, then the customer ends up visiting product i.
The probability of transitioning from product j to product i is ρji. If
∑
j∈N ρij < 1 for all
i ∈ N , then there exists a solution to the system of equations above for any S ⊆ N .
We consider an instance of the mixture of multinomial logit and independent demand
models with N = {1, 2, 3}, (v1, v2, v3) = (1, 1, 1), (θ1, θ2, θ3) = (0, 0, 1) and β = 34 .
Under this choice model, if we offer the assortment S, then a customer purchases product
i ∈ S with probability φi(S) = β vi1+V (S) + (1− β) θi. Note that we did not normalize the
size of the first customer segment to one. In Table C.1, we give the choice probabilities
{φi(S) : i ∈ S, S ⊆ N} for this instance of the mixture of multinomial logit and indepen-
dent demand models. We argue that there exists no Markov chain choice model such that
the choice probabilities under the Markov chain choice model for all products and for all
assortments match those under the mixture of multinomial logit and independent demand
models. In other words, there exist no parameters {γi : i ∈ N} and {ρij : i, j ∈ N}
for the Markov chain choice model such that Pi(S) = φi(S) for all S ⊆ N , i ∈ N . To
make this argument, by (C.1), note that Pi({1, 2, 3}) = γi for all i ∈ N . Thus, to ensure
that Pi({1, 2, 3}) = φi({1, 2, 3}) for all i ∈ N , we must choose {γi : i ∈ N} so that
γ1 = φ1({1, 2, 3}) = 316 , γ2 = φ2({1, 2, 3}) =
3
16
and γ3 = φ3({1, 2, 3}) = 716 , fixing the
values of the parameters {γi : i ∈ N}.
Consider an assortment of the form N \ {i}. Product i is the only one not in the
assortment N \ {i}, so by (C.1), we get Pk(N \ {i}) = γk + ρik Pi(N \ {i}) for all
k ∈ N . Using the last equality with k = i, we get (1 − ρii) Pi(N \ {i}) = γi, so the
equality Pk(N \ {i}) = γk + ρik Pi(N \ {i}) is equivalent to Pk(N \ {i}) = γk + ρik γi1−ρii ,
which, in turn, is equivalent to ρik = 1−ρiiγi (Pk(N \ {i}) − γk). Thus, to ensure that




(φk(N \ {i})− γk).
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Table C.1: Expected revenue provided by all possible assortments
S φ1(S) φ2(S) φ3(S) S φ1(S) φ2(S) φ3(S)
∅ 0 0 0 {1, 2} 1/4 1/4 0
{1} 3/8 0 0 {1, 3} 1/4 0 1/2
{2} 0 3/8 0 {2, 3} 0 1/4 1/2
{3} 0 0 5/8 {1, 2, 3} 3/16 3/16 7/16




and γ3 = 316 , the expression above yields ρ21 =
1
3




(1− ρ22) and ρ32 = 17(1− ρ33). Lastly, consider the assortment {1}. By (C.1), we
have P2({1}) = γ2 +ρ22 P2({1})+ρ32 P3({1}), which is equivalent to (1−ρ22)P2({1}) =
γ2 + ρ32 P3({1}). Similarly, (1− ρ33)P3({1}) = γ3 + ρ23 P2({1}). Since ρ23 = 13(1− ρ22)
and ρ32 = 17(1− ρ33), the last two equalities become
(1− ρ22)P2({1}) = γ2 + 17 (1− ρ33)P3({1})
(1− ρ33)P3({1}) = γ3 + 13 (1− ρ22)P2({1}).
Since γ2 = 316 and γ3 =
7
16
, solving the equalities above, we get (1− ρ22)P2({1}) = 2180
and (1− ρ33)P3({1}) = 2140 . Also, by (C.1), we have P1({1}) = γ1 + ρ21 P2({1}) +
ρ31 P3({1}). Noting that γ1 = 316 , ρ21 =
1
3
(1 − ρ22) and ρ31 = 17(1 − ρ33), we get
P1({1}) = 316 +
1
3
(1 − ρ22)P2({1}) + 17(1− ρ33)P3({1}), but since (1− ρ22)P2({1}) =
21
80
and (1− ρ33)P3({1}) = 2140 , plugging them in the last equality, we must have have




Thus, we cannot choose the parameters of the Markov chain choice model to make sure
that its choice probabilities match those in Table C.1. The example that we give in this
section is not hard to find. Virtually for all randomly generated instances of our choice
model, we cannot calibrate a Markov chain choice model to match the choice probabilities
of our choice model.
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C.2 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Let H = {i ∈ N : x̂i = x̂0}, M = {i ∈ N : 0 < x̂i < x̂0} and L = {i ∈ N : x̂i = 0}.
To get a contradiction, assume that M 6= ∅. We construct two distinct feasible solu-
tions (x̃0, x̃, ỹ) and (x0,x,y) to the Assortment LP such that (x̂0, x̂, ŷ) = 12 (x̃0, x̃, ỹ) +
1
2
(x0,x,y), contradicting the fact that (x̂0, x̂, ŷ) is a basic feasible solution. For small
ε > 0, we define the solution (x̃0, x̃, ỹ) as
x̃0 = x̂0 − V (M) ε,
x̃i =

x̂i − V (M) ε if i ∈ H
x̂i + (1 + V (H)) ε if i ∈M
x̂i if i ∈ L,
ỹij =

min{x̃i, x̃j} if ŷij = min{x̂i, x̂j}
ŷij if ŷij < min{x̂i, x̂j}.
We claim that (x̃0, x̃, ỹ) is feasible to the Assortment LP. To see the claim, note that x̃0 +∑
i∈N vi x̃i = x̂0 +
∑
i∈N vi x̂i−V (M) ε−
∑
i∈H vi V (M) ε+
∑
i∈M vi (1 +V (H)) ε = 1,
where the last equality follows by the fact that x̂0 +
∑
i∈N vi x̂i = 1,
∑
i∈H vi = V (H) and∑
i∈M vi = V (M). Thus, (x̃0, x̃, ỹ) satisfies the first constraint. Noting that M 6= ∅, we
have x̂0 > 0. By the definitions of x̃i and x̃0, for all i ∈ H , we have x̃i = x̂i − V (M) ε =
x̂0 − V (M) ε = x̃0. For all i ∈ M , we have x̂i < x̂0, so for small ε > 0, it follows that
x̃i = x̂i+(1+V (H)) ε < x̂0−V (M) ε = x̃0. Lastly, for all i ∈ L, noting that x̂i = 0 < x̂0,
for small ε > 0, we get x̃i = x̂i < x̂0 − V (M) ε = x̃0. Thus, (x̃0, x̃, ỹ) satisfies the second
constraint as well. If ŷij = min{x̂i, x̂j}, then ỹij = min{x̃i, x̃j}, so ỹij ≤ x̃i and ỹij ≤ x̃j .
If, on the other hand, ŷij < min{x̂i, x̂j}, then ŷij < min{x̂i, x̂j}−V (M) ε for small ε > 0.
Noting that x̃i ≥ x̂i − V (M) ε for all i ∈ N , we get ỹij = ŷij < min{x̂i, x̂j} − V (M) ε ≤
min{x̃i, x̃j}, so ỹij ≤ x̃i and ỹij ≤ x̃j . Thus, (x̃0, x̃, ỹ) satisfies the third and fourth
constraints. Also, we have (x̃, ỹ) ∈ Rn+n2+ for small ε > 0, establishing the claim. We
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define the solution (x0,x,y) as
x0 = x̂0 + V (M) ε,
xi =

x̂i + V (M) ε if i ∈ H
x̂i − (1 + V (H)) ε if i ∈M
x̂i if i ∈ L,
yij =

min{xi, xj} if ŷij = min{x̂i, x̂j}
ŷij if ŷij < min{x̂i, x̂j}.
Using the same argument earlier in this paragraph, we can check that (x0,x,y) is feasible
to the Assortment LP. Noting that M 6= ∅, V (M) > 0, so x̃0 6= x0, which implies that











If we have ŷij < min{x̂i, x̂j}, then ỹij = ŷij = yij , so ŷij = 12 ỹij +
1
2
yij , as desired.
Thus, we assume that ŷij = min{x̂i, x̂j}. Note that ỹij = min{x̃i, x̃j} in this case. We
consider four cases.
Case 1: Assume that (i, j) ∈ H×H . The definition ofH implies that x̂i = x̂j = x̂0, so
ŷij = min{x̂i, x̂j} = x̂0. Furthermore, if (i, j) ∈ H×H , then we have x̃i = x̂i−V (M) ε =
x̂0−V (M) ε and x̃j = x̂j−V (M) ε = x̂0−V (M) ε, so ỹij = min{x̃i, x̃j} = x̂0−V (M) ε.








Case 2: Assume that (i, j) ∈ (H,M). By the definition of H and M , x̂i = x̂0 > x̂j ,
so ŷij = min{x̂i, x̂j} = x̂j . If (i, j) ∈ (H,M), then we have x̃i = x̂i − V (M) ε and
x̃j = x̂j + (1 + V (H)) ε, but noting that x̂i > x̂j , we get x̃i > x̃j for small ε > 0, so
ỹij = min{x̃i, x̃j} = x̃j = x̂j + (1 + V (H)) ε. By the symmetric reasoning, we have




Case 3: Assume that (i, j) ∈ (M,H) or (i, j) ∈ (M,M). In this case, by using the




Case 4: Assume that i ∈ L or j ∈ L. Let ` ∈ {i, j} be such that ` ∈ L. The definition
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of L implies that x̂` = 0, so ŷij = min{x̂i, x̂j} ≤ x̂` = 0. Furthermore, for ` ∈ L, we
have x̃` = x̂` = 0, in which case, we get ỹij = min{x̃i, x̃j} ≤ x̃` = 0. By the symmetric







C.3 Proof of Lemma 4.5
In this section, we give a proof for Lemma 4.5. By the discussion at the beginning of
Section 4.6, recall that if the Compact LP has multiple optimal solutions, then we choose
the one that has the largest value for the decision variable x0. Furthermore, to obtain a
solution that has the largest value for the decision variable for x0, for ε > 0, we can add
the additional term ε x0 to the objective function of the Compact LP. If ε is small enough,
then solving the Compact LP with the additional term provides an optimal solution to the
original version of the Compact LP that has the largest value for the decision variable x0.































vi xi = 1,
xi ≤ x0 ∀ i ∈ N,
yij ≤ xi ∀ i, j ∈ N, yij ≤ xj ∀ i, j ∈ N
}
.
If ε is small enough, then a basic optimal solution to the problem above is also a basic
optimal solution to problem the Compact LP. So, it is enough to show that if (x∗0,x
∗,y∗) is
a basic optimal solution to problem (C.2), then we have y∗ij = min{x∗i , x∗j} for all i, j ∈ N .
For notational brevity, we let P = {(x0,x,y) ∈ R × Rn+n
2
+ : x0 +
∑
i∈N vi xi = 1, xi ≤
x0 ∀ i ∈ N, yij ≤ min{xi, xj} ∀ i, j ∈ N}, denoting the polytope captured by the last
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four constraints in the LP above. The proof of Lemma 4.5 uses two lemmas, which closely
resemble results already established in the main text.
In the first lemma, we consider a slightly modified version the Assortment LP, where


















In the next lemma, we relate an optimal solution to the LP above to an optimal solution of
a slightly modified version of the Mixture problem.
Lemma C.1. For a basic optimal solution (x∗0,x∗,y∗) to problem (C.3), let S∗ = {i ∈













1 + V (S)
}
. (C.4)
Lemma C.1 is an analogue of Theorem 4.2 and its proof follows the same line of rea-
soning that we used in the proof of Theorem 4.2. We skip the proof.
In the second lemma, we relate problem (C.2) to a slightly modified version of the
Choice-Based LP. We can view this lemma as an analogue of Theorem 4.4.



































1 + V (S)
+ λ θi
)







Then, the optimal objective values of problems (C.2) and (C.5) are the same. Furthermore,
the optimal values of the dual variables for the first constraint in problems (C.2) and (C.5)
are the same.
The proof of the lemma above uses the same reasoning that we use in the proof of
Theorem 4.4 in conjunction with Lemma C.1. We skip the proof.
Next, using the dual variables µ = {µq : q ∈ M}, π, α = {αi : i ∈ N}, η = {ηij :


























∀ i ∈ N,







∀ i, j ∈ N
}
.
In the next lemma, we use complementary slackness to give two useful properties that are
satisfied by an optimal primal-dual solution pair for problem (C.2).
Lemma C.3. Let (x∗0,x∗,y∗) and (µ∗, π∗,α∗,η∗,σ∗) be a basic optimal primal-dual so-


















Proof. To see the first equality, note that x∗0 > 0. Otherwise, we have x
∗
i = 0 for all i ∈ N
by the third constraint in problem (C.2), in which case, it is impossible to satisfy the second
constraint. Since x∗0 > 0 and x
∗
i = 0 for all i 6∈ S∗, using complementary slackness on
the third constraint in problem (C.2), we have α∗i = 0 for all i 6∈ S∗, in which case, by the
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i + ε. To see the second equality, if
i ∈ S∗ and j 6∈ S∗, then x∗i > 0 and x∗j = 0, in which case, by the last two constraints in
problem (C.2), we have y∗ij = 0 and y
∗









using complementary slackness on the last two constraints in problem (C.2), we get η∗ij = 0
and σ∗ji = 0. Thus, if i ∈ S∗ and j 6∈ S∗, then η∗ij = 0 and σ∗ji = 0. In this case, the second






































Proof of Lemma 4.5. Let (x∗0,x
∗,y∗) and (µ∗, π∗,α∗,η∗,σ∗) be a basic optimal primal-
dual solution pair for problem (C.2). By the discussion right after problem (C.2), it is
enough show that y∗ij = min{x∗i , x∗j} for all i, j ∈ N . Let S∗ = {i ∈ N : x∗i > 0}.
Consider i, j ∈ S∗. We have x∗i > 0 and x∗j > 0, so using complementary slackness on the
last two constraints in problem (C.2), if y∗ij = 0, then η
∗
ij = 0 and σ
∗
ij = 0. On the other
hand, if y∗ij > 0, then using complementary slackness on the last constraint in problem
(C.6), we have η∗ij + σ
∗




q). Therefore, for all i, j ∈ S∗, we
have η∗ij + σ
∗







)+, where we let (a)+ = max{a, 0}.
For all i ∈ S∗, x∗i > 0, so using complementary slackness on the second constraint in











































































































where (a) follows from Lemma C.3, (b) holds since η∗ij+σ
∗






















i = (1 + V (S
∗))π∗ − ε, where the last equality follows
from Lemma C.3. In this case, replacing the left side of the chain of inequalities above by
(1 + V (S∗))π∗ − ε and dividing both sides of the inequality by 1 + V (S∗), we get
π∗ − ε

















To show the result by contradiction, assume that there exists i, j ∈ N such that y∗ij <
min{x∗i , x∗j}. Since y∗ij ≥ 0, it must be the case that x∗i > 0 and x∗j > 0, so we get i, j ∈ S∗.
Letting i, j ∈ S∗ such that y∗ij < min{x∗i , x∗j}, using complementary slackness on the
last two constraints in problem (C.2), it follows that η∗ij = 0 and σ
∗
ij = 0, in which case,




q . Thus, there exists








q ≤ 0}, so
N∗ is non-empty.
By Lemma C.2, problems (C.2) and (C.5) have the same optimal objective values. Let-























































































































































q ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N∗, (e) holds since
N∗ 6= ∅, so V (S∗ \ N∗) < V (S∗) and (f) holds by randomizing instead of picking one
assortment.
Consider computing the dual function for problem (C.5) by associating the dual multi-
pliers µ∗ = {µ∗q : q ∈ M} with the first constraint in this problem. In this case, the value
of the dual function precisely corresponds to the expression on the right side of the chain of
inequalities above. Furthermore, by Lemma C.2, µ∗, which gives the optimal values of the
dual variables associated with the first constraint in problem (C.2), also gives the optimal
values of the dual variables associated with the first constraint in problem (C.5). Thus, the
expression on the right side of the chain of inequalities above is the optimal objective value
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[6] A. H. Hübner and H. Kuhn, “Retail category management: State-of-the-art review
of quantitative research and software applications in assortment and shelf space
management,” Omega, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 199–209, 2012.
[7] A. G. Kök, M. L. Fisher, and R. Vaidyanathan, “Assortment planning: Review of
literature and industry practice,” in Retail Supply Chain Management, Springer,
2015, pp. 175–236.
[8] K. Littlewood, “Forecasting and control of passenger bookings,” Airline Group
International Federation of Operational Research Societies Proceedings, 1972,
vol. 12, pp. 95–117, 1972.
[9] J. I. McGill and G. J. Van Ryzin, “Revenue management: Research overview and
prospects,” Transportation Science, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 233–256, 1999.
[10] W. L. Cooper, T. Homem-de Mello, and A. J. Kleywegt, “Models of the spiral-down
effect in revenue management,” Operations Research, vol. 54, no. 5, pp. 968–987,
2006.
[11] G. Gallego, L. Li, and R. Ratliff, “Choice-based emsr methods for single-leg rev-
enue management with demand dependencies,” Journal of Revenue and Pricing
Management, vol. 8, no. 2-3, pp. 207–240, 2009.
[12] D. Walczak, S. Mardan, and R. Kallesen, “Customer choice, fare adjustments and
the marginal expected revenue data transformation: A note on using old yield man-
190
agement techniques in the brave new world of pricing,” Journal of Revenue and
Pricing Management, vol. 9, no. 1-2, pp. 94–109, 2010.
[13] W. L. Cooper and L. Li, “On the use of buy up as a model of customer choice
in revenue management,” Production and Operations Management, vol. 21, no. 5,
pp. 833–850, 2012.
[14] A. K. Strauss, R. Klein, and C. Steinhardt, “A review of choice-based revenue
management: Theory and methods,” European Journal of Operational Research,
vol. 271, no. 2, pp. 375–387, 2018.
[15] K. Talluri and G. Van Ryzin, “Revenue management under a general discrete choice
model of consumer behavior,” Management Science, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 15–33,
2004.
[16] G. Gallego, G. Iyengar, R. Phillips, and A. Dubey, “Managing flexible products on
a network,” available at SSRN 3567371, 2004.
[17] Q. Liu and G. Van Ryzin, “On the choice-based linear programming model for net-
work revenue management,” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 288–310, 2008.
[18] G. Gallego, R. Ratliff, and S. Shebalov, “A general attraction model and sales-
based linear program for network revenue management under customer choice,”
Operations Research, vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 212–232, 2015.
[19] D. Zhang and D. Adelman, “An approximate dynamic programming approach
to network revenue management with customer choice,” Transportation Science,
vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 381–394, 2009.
[20] K. Talluri, “New formulations for choice network revenue management,” INFORMS
Journal on Computing, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 401–413, 2014.
[21] L. Dong, P. Kouvelis, and Z. Tian, “Dynamic pricing and inventory control of sub-
stitute products,” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, vol. 11, no. 2,
pp. 317–339, 2009.
[22] H. Topaloglu, “Joint stocking and product offer decisions under the multinomial
logit model,” Production and Operations Management, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 1182–
1199, 2013.
[23] P. Rusmevichientong, Z.-J. M. Shen, and D. B. Shmoys, “Dynamic assortment op-
timization with a multinomial logit choice model and capacity constraint,” Opera-
tions Research, vol. 58, no. 6, pp. 1666–1680, 2010.
191
[24] P. Rusmevichientong and H. Topaloglu, “Robust assortment optimization in rev-
enue management under the multinomial logit choice model,” Operations Research,
vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 865–882, 2012.
[25] J. M. Davis, G. Gallego, and H. Topaloglu, “Assortment optimization under vari-
ants of the nested logit model,” Operations Research, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 250–273,
2014.
[26] G. Gallego and R. Wang, “Multiproduct price optimization and competition under
the nested logit model with product-differentiated price sensitivities,” Operations
Research, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 450–461, 2014.
[27] J. B. Feldman and H. Topaloglu, “Capacity constraints across nests in assortment
optimization under the nested logit model,” Operations Research, vol. 63, no. 4,
pp. 812–822, 2015.
[28] J. J. M. Bront, I. Méndez-Dı́az, and G. Vulcano, “A column generation algorithm
for choice-based network revenue management,” Operations Research, vol. 57,
no. 3, pp. 769–784, 2009.
[29] P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong, and H. Topaloglu, “Assortment opti-
mization under the multinomial logit model with random choice parameters,” Pro-
duction and Operations Management, vol. 23, no. 11, pp. 2023–2039, 2014.
[30] J. B. Feldman and H. Topaloglu, “Revenue management under the Markov chain
choice model,” Operations Research, vol. 65, no. 5, pp. 1322–1342, 2017.
[31] V. F. Farias, S. Jagabathula, and D. Shah, “A nonparametric approach to modeling
choice with limited data,” Management Science, vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 305–322, 2013.
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